How do you know anything is true? What relation is there between my psyche and your psyche, does one exist? Can we doubt everything or are some things indubitable? What does Jung have to say about body and psyche, body and mind? Cartesian Philosophy and the Flesh is an analysis and critique of interpretations of Cartesian philosophy in analytical psychology. It focuses on readings of Descartes that have important implications for understanding Jung, and analytical and existential psychology generally. Frances Gray's book raises questions about the 'place' of the body in a theory of the human psyche and about what kind of psyche, if any, is essential to concepts of human being. Gray claims that the debates around Descartes and metaphysical dualism have been oversimplified and that this has had a profound effect on conceptualizing an on-going relation between psyche and body. The book also explores the relationship between Jung's conception of the phenomenological standpoint and that of Edmund Husserl and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Cartesian Philosophy and Flesh brings together Descartes’ idea of self-interrogation and self-reflection and Jung's project in The Red Book, the practice of spiritual exercises is the underpinning orientation of both men. It recommends similar practices to anyone interested in the truths of their own living. Gray’s book will be of interest to Jung scholars, and those with an interest in Jungian studies, Analytical Psychologists and Philosophers.

What are human beings like? How is knowledge possible? What is truth? Where do moral values come from? Questions like these have stood at the center of Western philosophy for centuries. In addressing them, philosophers have made certain fundamental assumptions-that we can know our own minds by introspection, that most of our thinking about the world is literal, and that reason is disembodied and universal-that are now called into question by well-established results of cognitive science. It has been shown empirically that:Most thought is unconscious. We have no direct conscious access to the mechanisms of thought and language. Our ideas go by too quickly and at too deep a level for us to observe them in any simple way.Abstract concepts are mostly metaphorical. Much of the subject matter of philosopy, such as the nature of time, morality, causation, the mind, and the self, relies heavily on basic metaphors derived from bodily experience. What is literal in our reasoning about such concepts is minimal and conceptually impoverished. All the richness comes from metaphor. For instance, we have two mutually incompatible metaphors for time, both of which represent it as movement through space: in one it is a flow past us and in the other a spatial dimension we move along.Mind is embodied. Thought requires a body-not in the trivial sense that you need a physical brain to think with, but in the profound sense that the very structure of our thoughts comes from the nature of the body. Nearly all of our unconscious metaphors are based on common bodily experiences.Most of the central themes of the Western philosophical tradition are called into question by these findings. The Cartesian person, with a mind wholly separate from the body, does not exist. The Kantian person, capable of moral action according to the dictates of a universal reason, does not exist. The phenomenological person, capable of knowing his or her mind entirely through introspection alone, does not exist. The utilitarian person, the Chomskian person, the poststructuralist person, the computational person, and the person defined by analytic philosopy all do not exist.Then what does?Lakoff and Johnson show that a philosopy responsible to the science of mind offers radically new and detailed understandings of what a person is. After first describing the philosophical stance that must follow from taking cognitive science seriously, they re-examine the basic concepts of the mind, time, causation, morality, and the self: then they rethink a host of philosophical traditions, from the classical Greeks through Kantian morality through modern analytic philosopy. They reveal the metaphorical structure underlying each mode of thought and show how the metaphysics of each theory flows from its metaphors. Finally, they take on two major issues of twentieth-century philosopy: how we conceive rationality, and how we conceive language.

On Descartes’ Passive Thought is the culmination of a life-long reflection on the philosophy of Descartes by one of the most important living French philosophers. In it, Jean-Luc Marion examines anew some of the questions left unresolved in his previous books about Descartes, with a particular focus on Descartes’s theory of morals and the passions. Descartes has long been associated with mind-body dualism, but Marion argues here that this is a historical misattribution, popularized by Malebranche and popular ever since both within the academy and with the general public. Actually, Marion shows, Descartes held a holistic conception of body and mind. He called it the meum corpus, a passive mode of thinking, which implies far more than just pure mind—rather, it signifies a mind directly connected to the body: the human being that I am. Understood in this new light, the Descartes Marion uncovers through close readings of works such as Passions of the Soul resists prominent criticisms leveled at him by twentieth-century figures like Husserl and Heidegger, and even anticipates the non-dualistic, phenomenological concepts of human being discussed today. This is a momentous book that no serious historian of philosophy will be able to ignore.

This book criticizes theories, dominant today, that reduce the self to a simple illusion, proposing a new theory of the ego that allows us to better understand our existence and our relations with others.

The concept of the body is one of the most recent, and hotly contested areas of inquiry among philosophers today.

Philosophical Perspectives on Metaphor was first published in 1981. Minnesota Archive Editions uses digital technology to make long-unavailable books once again accessible, and are published unaltered from the original University of Minnesota Press editions. "We are," says Mark Johnson, "in the midst of metaphormania." The past few years have seen an explosion of interest in metaphor as a vehicle for exploring the relations between language and thought. While a number of recent books have dealt with metaphor from the standpoints of several disciplines, there is no collection that shows the best of the work that has been done in the field of philosophy. Mark Johnson has brought together essays that define the central issues of the discussion in this field. His introductory essay offers a critical survey of historically influential treatments of figurative language (including those of Aristotle, Hobbes, Locke, Kant, and Nietzsche) and sets forth the nature of various issues that have been of interest to philosophers. Thus, it provides a context in which to understand the motivations, influences, and significance of the collected essays. An annotated bibliography serves as a catalog of all relevant literature. Philosophical Perspectives on Metaphor provides an entry point into the philosophical exploration of metaphor for students, philosophers, linguists, psychologists, artists, critics, or anyone interested in language and its relation to understanding and experience.

The articles in this volume reflect upon the intersections of corporeity and affectivity in Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology. They illuminate the meaning of his phenomenology regarding corporeity and affectivity from various phenomenological perspectives. Corporeity and Affectivity explores his invaluable contribution in interdisciplinary and trans-disciplinary respect, including the humanities, the arts and the sciences. Contributors include: Alexei Chernyakov (†), Jagna Brudzińska, Universität Köln, IFiS PAN Warschau, Nicola Zippel, Sapienza University of Rome, Department of Philosophy, Karel Novotný, Faculty of Humanities, Charles University of Prague, James Mensch, Charles University in Prague, Faculty of Humanities, Annabelle Dufourcq, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Humanities, Juho Hotanen, University of Helsinki, Silvia Stoller, Universität Wien, Pierre Rodrigo, Université de Bourgogne, Dijon, Antonino Firenze, University Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona, Shaun Gallagher, University of Memphis, Department of Philosophy, Kwok-ying Lau, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Monika Murawska, The Academy of Fine Arts, Warsaw, Irene Breuer, Bergische Universität Wuppertal, Mauro Carbone, Université “Jean Moulin” Lyon 3, Faculté de philosophie, László Tengelyi, Bergische Universität Wuppertal, Björn Thorsteinsson, University of Oceland, Institute of Philosophy, Mikkel B. Tin, Telemark University College, Porsgrunn, Tamás Ullmann, ELTE University of Budapest, Institute of Philosophy, Johann P. Arnason, La Trobe University, Melbourne; Charles University, Faculty of Humanities, Prague, Michael Staudigl, Vienna University, Department of Philosophy, Suzi Adams, Flinders University, Adelaide

Of all the works of the man claimed by many as the father of modern philosophy, the MEDITATIONS, first published in 1641, must surely be Rene Descartes' masterpiece. This volume consists of not only a new translation of the original Latin text and the expanded objections and replies, but also includes selected correspondence and other metaphysical writings from the period 1641-49.

Brown and Normore show how Descartes accounted for the complex and diverse objects of human experience within his metaphysical system. They argue that, far from reducing them all to two basic categories of substance, mind and body, he recognized irreducible composites that resist reduction and require their own distinctive modes of explanation.