Exploring how the U.S. military can move beyond Iraq and Afghanistan Since the September 11, 2001, attacks, the U.S. military has been fighting incessantly in conflicts around the globe, often with inconclusive results. The legacies of these conflicts have serious implications for how the United States will wage war in the future. Yet there is a stunning lack of introspection about these conflicts. Never in modern U.S. history has the military been at war for so long. And never in U.S. history have such long wars demanded so much of so few. The legacy of wars without end include a military that feels the painful effects of war but often feels alone. The public is less connected to the military now than at any point in modern U.S. history. The national security apparatus seeks to pivot away from these engagements and to move on to the next threats—notably those emanating from China and Russia. Many young Americans question whether it even makes sense to invest in the military. At best, there are ad hoc, unstructured debates about Iraq or Afghanistan. Simply put, there has been no serious, organized stock-taking by the public, politicians, opinion leaders, or the military itself of this inheritance. Despite being at war for the longest continuous period in its history, the military is woefully unprepared for future wars. But the United States cannot simply hit the reset button. This book explores this inheritance by examining how nearly two decades of war have influenced civil-military relations, how the military goes to war, how the military wages war, who leads the military and who serves in it, how the military thinks about war, and above all, the enduring impact of these wars on those who waged them. If the U.S. military seeks to win in the future, it must acknowledge and reconcile with the inheritance of its long and inconclusive wars. This book seeks to help them do so.

With a rich comparative case-study approach that spans Europe, Asia, and the Middle East, Building Militaries in Fragile States unearths provocative findings that suggest the traditional way of working with foreign militaries needs to be rethought.

Why Nation-Building Matters establishes a framework for building security forces, economic development, and political consolidation that blends soft and hard power into a deployable and effective package.

The 2011 WDR on Conflict, Security and Development underlines the devastating impact of persistent conflict on a country or region's development prospects - noting that the 1.5 billion people living in conflict-affected areas are twice as likely to be in poverty. Its goal is to contribute concrete, practical suggestions on conflict and fragility.

This is a thoroughly revised second edition of a book that we published in 2010. Exporting Security is about the US military's role in military-to-military partnerships, such as helping to support and train foreign militaries, and about the US military's role in missions other than war, ranging from diplomacy, to development, to humanitarian assistance after disasters or during epidemics. Reveron is a proponent of these non-warfighting missions because he views them as an economical way to promote human security and regional security in trouble spots, which he says is in the US national interest. He also sees these efforts as making it less likely that the US will feel compelled to intervene directly in hot spots around the globe if our partners can maintain their own security or if humanitarian disasters can be averted. This second edition will take into account the Obama administration's foreign policy, the poor legacy of training the Iraqi army, the implications of more assertive foreign policies by Russia and China, and the US military's role in recent humanitarian crises such as the Ebola epidemic in West Africa--

Armed forces across the globe engage in economic activities both in times of war and peace. This book provides a critical analysis of this phenomenon, comparing experiences with 'military business' from four continents (Asia, Africa, Europe and Latin America). Taking an interdisciplinary approach, the volume shows the implications of 'military business' for civil-military relations, good governance and international development policies.

The post-World War II occupations of Germany and Japan set standards for postconflict nation-building that have not since been matched. Only in recent years has the United States has felt the need to participate in similar transformations, but it is now facing one of the most challenging prospects since the 1940s: Iraq. The authors review seven case studies--Germany, Japan, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan--and seek lessons about what worked well and what did not. Then, they examine the Iraq situation in light of these lessons. Success in Iraq will require an extensive commitment of financial, military, and political resources for a long time. The United States cannot afford to contemplate early exit strategies and cannot afford to leave the job half completed.

This book introduces the four principal sets of institutions that engage in bringing peace and relief to societies mired in violent conflicts and humanitarian crises—the United Nations and other international bodies; non-governmental organizations; civilian government agencies; and militaries. Because these institutions have distinct goals as well as overlapping mandates and activities on the ground, they do not always collaborate effectively, due in part to a lack of familiarity with how the other institutions are organized, make decisions or act on the ground. Despite declining public support for large-scale, state-building missions recently, more complex interagency efforts have evolved in partnership with host country governments. Numerous third parties continue to undertake peacebuilding, stabilization, and humanitarian relief measures around the globe. This book is intended primarily for those serving in the field, but it is also helpful to headquarters personnel and policymakers, as well as military and agency trainees and university students.

Military intervention in a conflict without a reasonable prospect of success is unjustifiable, especially when it is done in the name of humanity. Couched in the debate on the responsibility to protect civilians from violence and drawing on traditional 'just war' principles, the centralpremise of this book is that humanitarian military intervention can be justified as a policy option only if decision makers can be reasonably sure that intervention will do more good than harm. This book asks, 'Have past humanitarian military interventions been successful?' It defines success as saving lives and sets out a methodology for estimating the number of lives saved by a particular military intervention. Analysis of 17 military operations in six conflict areas that were thedefining cases of the 1990s-northern Iraq after the Gulf War, Somalia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Rwanda, Kosovo and East Timor-shows that the majority were successful by this measure. In every conflict studied, however, some military interventions succeeded while others failed, raising the question, 'Why have some past interventions been more successful than others?' This book argues that the central factors determining whether a humanitarian intervention succeeds are theobjectives of the intervention and the military strategy employed by the intervening states. Four types of humanitarian military intervention are offered: helping to deliver emergency aid, protecting aid operations, saving the victims of violence and defeating the perpetrators of violence. Thefocus on strategy within these four types allows an exploration of the political and military dimensions of humanitarian intervention and highlights the advantages and disadvantages of each of the four types.Humanitarian military intervention is controversial. Scepticism is always in order about the need to use military force because the consequences can be so dire. Yet it has become equally controversial not to intervene when a government subjects its citizens to massive violation of their basic humanrights. This book recognizes the limits of humanitarian intervention but does not shy away from suggesting how military force can save lives in extreme circumstances.