From riverine operations in the American Civil War and China in the 1860s to the major fleet engagements of the World Wars, plus more recent naval actions in the Falklands/Malvenas War and Gulf War, Lindberg and Todd methodically show how geography has shaped the strategy, tactics, and tools of naval warfare. Alfred T. Mahan was perhaps the first naval professional to recognize and acknowledge fully the influence of geography on navies and naval warfare. Many of his principles of seapower were inherently geographical and influenced both what kind of naval force a state would possess and how it would be utilized. In the time that has passed since Mahan made his observations, naval warfare and navies have experienced major technological changes, yet geographical factors continue to exert their influence on how navies fight, how they are structured, and the design of the ships that they deploy. After providing a comprehensive review of geostrategic theory and its application to naval warfare, the book is organized by major operational environments in which such warfare occurs--the high seas, littoral regions, and inland waterways. Lindberg and Todd illustrate how such geographical factors as distance, location, surface, and subsurface conditions influence naval operations, including fleet-to-fleet engagements, amphibious assault, coastal defense, logistical support, and riverine actions. A separate chapter takes an in-depth look at the ways in which geography influences navies themselves with issues such as primary mission type, force structure development, and ship design. Through the use of historical case studies, this volume applies long held geographical concepts to fundamental naval theories and practices to illustrate just how pervasive geography's influence has been during the past 140 years.

Over 3 million U.S. military personnel were sent to Southeast Asia to fight in the Vietnam War. Since the end of the Vietnam War, veterans have reported numerous health effects. Herbicides used in Vietnam, in particular Agent Orange have been associated with a variety of cancers and other long term health problems from Parkinson's disease and type 2 diabetes to heart disease. Prior to 1997 laws safeguarded all service men and women deployed to Vietnam including members of the Blue Navy. Since then, the Department of Veteran Affairs (VA) has established that Vietnam veterans are automatically eligible for disability benefits should they develop any disease associated with Agent Orange exposure, however, veterans who served on deep sea vessels in Vietnam are not included. These "Blue Water Navy" veterans must prove they were exposed to Agent Orange before they can claim benefits. At the request of the VA, the Institute of Medicine (IOM) examined whether Blue Water Navy veterans had similar exposures to Agent Orange as other Vietnam veterans. Blue Water Navy Vietnam Veterans and Agent Orange Exposure comprehensively examines whether Vietnam veterans in the Blue Water Navy experienced exposures to herbicides and their contaminants by reviewing historical reports, relevant legislation, key personnel insights, and chemical analysis to resolve current debate on this issue.

The Damietta Crusade, which is often referred to as the 'Fifth Crusade', was the first of the numbered crusades to be targeted against Egypt. Rather than directly targeting Jerusalem, its architects believed that by threatening the economic hub of Cairo the Ayyubid sultan would gladly give up Jerusalem in exchange. Here Laurence Marvin offers the first book-length treatment of the Damietta Crusade in almost 40 years. Written in accessible language and driven by a narrative and analysis firmly grounded in the primary sources in multiple languages, Marvin emphasizes what made this campaign unique, from its planning, choice of target, "brown-water" or amphibious nature, course, and result. He presents a multi-sided perspective by amply describing and analyzing the Egyptians and other groups in the eastern Mediterranean who played an important role in mounting a successful defense against Latin Christian forces. Marvin contends that the crusade in Egypt failed not because it derived from an unachievable or flawed grand strategy, but because of shifting operational goals, leadership issues, the social dynamics within the army, arrivals and departures of participants, and the effective defense led by Egypt's sultan, al-Kamil. This detailed analysis of an understudied event of thirteenth century history brings the latest methodologies of military history to bear on a wide range of primary sources, raising important questions about the complex nature of warfare and crusade in the medieval Mediterranean.

This book focuses on the theory and practice of maritime strategy and operations by the weaker powers at sea. Illustrated by examples from naval and military history, the book explains and analyzes the strategies of the weaker side at sea in both peacetime and wartime; in defense versus offense; the main prerequisites for disputing control of the sea; and the conceptual framework of disputing control of the sea. It also explains and analyzes in some detail the main methods of disputing sea control – avoiding/seeking decisive encounters, weakening enemy naval forces over time, counter-containment of enemy naval forces, destroying the enemy’s military-economic potential at sea, attacks on the enemy coast, defense of the coast, defense/capturing important positions/basing areas, and defense/capturing of a choke point. A majority of the world’s navies are currently of small or medium-size. In the case of a war with a much stronger opponent, they would be strategically on the defensive, and their main objective then would be to dispute control of the sea by a stronger side at sea. This book provides a practical guide to such a strategy. This book would be of much interest to students of naval power, maritime security, strategic studies and military/naval history.

In this book, contributors from both sides of the Atlantic examine several key themes in the increasingly important subject of counter-insurgency. It assesses the lessons that contemporary policy makers and military practitioners can draw from historical and more recent experience.

This is the fourth, revised and updated, edition of Geoffrey Till's Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-first Century. The rise of the Chinese and other Asian navies, worsening quarrels over maritime jurisdiction and the United States’ maritime pivot towards the Asia-Pacific region reminds us that the sea has always been central to human development as a source of resources, and as a means of transportation, information-exchange and strategic dominion. It has provided the basis for mankind's prosperity and security, and this is even more true in the early twenty-first century, with the emergence of an increasingly globalised world trading system. Navies have always provided a way of policing, and sometimes exploiting, the system. In contemporary conditions, navies, and other forms of maritime power, are having to adapt, in order to exert the maximum power ashore in the company of others and to expand the range of their interests, activities and responsibilities. While these new tasks are developing fast, traditional ones still predominate. Deterrence remains the first duty of today’s navies, backed up by the need to ‘fight and win’ if necessary. How navies and their states balance these two imperatives will tell us a great deal about our future in this increasingly maritime century. This book investigates the consequences of all this for the developing nature, composition and functions of all the world's significant navies, and provides a guide for anyone interested in the changing and crucial role of seapower in the twenty-first century. Seapower is essential reading for all students of naval power, maritime security and naval history, and highly recommended for students of strategic studies, international security and international relations.

This book examines British naval diplomacy from the end of the Crimean War to the American Civil War, showing how the mid-Victorian Royal Navy suffered serious challenges during the period. Many recent works have attempted to depict the mid-Victorian Royal Navy as all-powerful, innovative, and even self-assured. In contrast, this work argues that it suffered serious challenges in the form of expanding imperial commitments, national security concerns, precarious diplomatic relations with European Powers and the United States, and technological advancements associated with the armoured warship at the height of the so-called 'Pax Britannica'. Utilising a wealth of international archival sources, this volume explores the introduction of the monitor form of ironclad during the American Civil War, which deliberately forfeited long-range power-projection for local, coastal command of the sea. It looks at the ways in which the Royal Navy responded to this new technology and uses a wealth of international primary and secondary sources to ascertain how decision-making at Whitehall affected that at Westminster. The result is a better-balanced understanding of Palmerstonian diplomacy from the end of the Crimean War to the American Civil War, the early evolution of the modern capital ship (including the catastrophic loss of the experimental sail-and-turret ironclad H.M.S. Captain), naval power-projection, and the nature of 'empire', 'technology', and 'seapower'. This book will be of great interest to all students of the Royal Navy, and of maritime and strategic studies in general.

Although previously undervalued for their strategic impact because they represented only a small percentage of total forces, the Union and Confederate navies were crucial to the outcome of the Civil War. In War on the Waters, James M. McPherson has crafted an enlightening, at times harrowing, and ultimately thrilling account of the war's naval campaigns and their military leaders. McPherson recounts how the Union navy's blockade of the Confederate coast, leaky as a sieve in the war's early months, became increasingly effective as it choked off vital imports and exports. Meanwhile, the Confederate navy, dwarfed by its giant adversary, demonstrated daring and military innovation. Commerce raiders sank Union ships and drove the American merchant marine from the high seas. Southern ironclads sent several Union warships to the bottom, naval mines sank many more, and the Confederates deployed the world's first submarine to sink an enemy vessel. But in the end, it was the Union navy that won some of the war's most important strategic victories--as an essential partner to the army on the ground at Fort Donelson, Vicksburg, Port Hudson, Mobile Bay, and Fort Fisher, and all by itself at Port Royal, Fort Henry, New Orleans, and Memphis.

Naval modernization is an extremely expensive, time-consuming, and a relatively rare phenomenon. Scholars have proposed various arguments to explain this process ranging from bureaucratic politics, to nationalism, and to the security dilemma. The Nexus of Naval Modernization in India and China demonstrates that from 1990 until 2020, the primary driver of naval modernization resulted from a strategic rivalry. Key to strategic rivalries is perceived threat perceptions that cause decision makers to prepare for worst-case scenarios when trying to decipher their enemy's behaviour. When a state believes it is threatened by a rival's naval power it is likely to pursue its own form of naval modernization for self-protection. Importantly, rivalries do not exist in a vacuum and are frequently linked. This project will reveal how the interconnected nature of rivalries can also cause naval modernization. Through a close examination of scholarly works, government documents, and in-depth focused interviews with experts based in India, China, Australia, and the U.S. Colley argues that while strategic rivalry is not the only driver of naval modernization, it is the most compelling explanation. Other arguments are frequently embedded within the strategic rivalry model and thus are best seen as only partial drivers. This study contributes to the rivalry research program as well as the policy and security studies literatures.

Though considerable research literature is now available on China–India relations, most of it still follows a conventional narrative, viewing the relationship through the narrow conflictual prism limited to South Asia than in the new, larger perspective, especially in the context of emerging East Asian dynamics. This book offers comprehensive analyses of some of these issues in papers addressing two broad themes. One, significant trends in the relationship between China and India on a range of issues, including economic development models, their military strategies, and the boundary dispute; and two, how others are responding to the rise of India and China and their impact on East Asia. Together, the chapters constitute a comprehensive study on both China–India relations and their concurrent rise, including a variety of perspectives and methodologies. Written by some of the top experts on the subject from India, China, Japan, and Taiwan and covering a broad range of issues, the book will generate considerable interest in understanding this relatively neglected dimension of today’s East Asia.