The fourth volume of Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science consists mainly of papers which were contributed to our Colloquium during the past few years. The volume represents a wide range of interests in contem porary philosophy of science: issues in the philosophy of mind and of language, the neurophysiology of perceptual and linguistic behavior, philosophy of history and of the social sciences, and studies in the fun damental categories and methods of philosophy and the inter-relation ships of the sciences with ethics and metaphysics. Papers on the logic and methods of the natural sciences, including biological, physical and mathematical topics appear in the fifth volume of our series. We have included in the present volume the first English translation of the classic and fundamental work on aphasia by Carl Wernicke, together with a lucid and appreciative guide to his work by Dr. Norman Geschwind. The papers were not written to form a coherent volume, nor have they been edited with such a purpose. They represent current work-in progress, both in the United States and in Europe. Although most of the authors are philosophers, it is worth noting that we have essays of philosophical significance here written by a sociologist, an anthropologist, a political scientist, and by three neurophysiologists. We hope that collaboration among working scientists and working philosophers may develop further.

Though the publication of Kuhn's Structure of Scientific Revolutions seemed to herald the advent of a unified study of the history and philosophy of science, it is a hard fact that history of science and philosophy of science have increasingly grown apart. Recently, however, there has been a series of workshops on both sides of the Atlantic (called '&HPS') intended to bring historians and philosophers of science together to discuss new integrative approaches. This is therefore an especially appropriate time to explore the problems with and prospects for integrating history and philosophy of science. The original essays in this volume, all from specialists in the history of science or philosophy of science, offer such an exploration from a wide variety of perspectives. The volume combines general reflections on the current state of history and philosophy of science with studies of the relation between the two disciplines in specific historical and scientific cases.

This book discusses two of the oldest and hardest problems in both science and philosophy: What is matter?, and What is mind? A reason for tackling both problems in a single book is that two of the most influential views in modern philosophy are that the universe is mental (idealism), and that the everything real is material (materialism). Most of the thinkers who espouse a materialist view of mind have obsolete ideas about matter, whereas those who claim that science supports idealism have not explained how the universe could have existed before humans emerged. Besides, both groups tend to ignore the other levels of existence—chemical, biological, social, and technological. If such levels and the concomitant emergence processes are ignored, the physicalism/spiritualism dilemma remains unsolved, whereas if they are included, the alleged mysteries are shown to be problems that science is treating successfully.

The first part deals with philosophies that have had a significant input, positive or negative, on the search for truth; it suggests that scientific and technological are either stimulated or smothered by a philosophical matrix; and it outlines two ontological doctrines believed to have nurtured research in modern times: systemism (not to be mistaken for holism) and materialism (as an extension of physicalism). The second part discusses a few practical problems that are being actively discussed in the literature, from climatology and information science to economics and legal philosophy. This discussion is informed by the general principles analyzed in the first part of the book. Some of the conclusions are that standard economic theory is just as inadequate as Marxism; that law and order are weak without justice; and that the central equation of normative climatology is a tautology–which of course does not put climate change in doubt. The third and final part of the book tackles a set of key concepts, such as those of indicator, energy, and existence, that have been either taken for granted or neglected. For instance, it is argued that there is at least one existence predicate, and that it is unrelated to the so-called existential quantifier; that high level hypotheses cannot be put to the test unless conjoined with indicator hypotheses; and that induction cannot produce high level hypotheses because empirical data do not contain any transempirical concepts. Realism, materialism, and systemism are thus refined and vindicated. ​

With this defense of intensional realism as a philosophical foundation for understanding scientific procedures and grounding scientific knowledge, James Fetzer provides a systematic alternative to much of recent work on scientific theory. To Fetzer, the current state of understanding the 'laws' of nature, or the 'law-like' statements of scientific theories, appears to be one of philosophical defeat; and he is determined to overcome that defeat. Based upon his incisive advocacy of the single-case propensity interpretation of probability, Fetzer develops a coherent structure within which the central problems of the philosophy of science find their solutions. Whether the reader accepts the author's contentions may, in the end, depend upon ancient choices in the interpretation of experience and explanation, but there can be little doubt of Fetzer's spirited competence in arguing for setting ontology before epistemology, and within the analysis of language. To us, Fetzer's ambition is appealing, fusing, as he says, the substantive commitment of the Popperian with the conscientious sensitivity of the Hempelian to the technical precision required for justified explication. To Fetzer, science is the objective pursuit of fallible general knowledge. This innocent character ization, which we suppose most scientists would welcome, receives a most careful elaboration in this book; it will demand equally careful critical con sideration. Center for the Philosophy and ROBERT S. COHEN History of Science, MARX W. WARTOFSKY Boston University October 1981 v TABLE OF CONTENTS EDITORIAL PREFACE v FOREWORD xi ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS xv PART I: CAUSATION 1.

Having examined previous volumes of the Boston Studies series devoted to different countries, and having discussed the best way to present contemporary research in France, we have arrived at a careful selection of 15 participants, including the organizers. Our aim is to bring together philosophers and practicing scientist from the major institutions of the country, both universities and research centers. The areas of research represented here cover a wide spectrum of sciences, from mathematics and physics to the life sciences, as well as linguistics and economics. This selection is a showcase of French philosophy of science, illustrating the different methods employed: logico-linguistic analysis, rational reconstruction and historical inquiry. These participants have the ability to relate their research both to the French tradition and current discussions on the international scene. Also included is a substantial historical introduction, explaining the development of philosophy of science in France, the various schools of thought and methods as well as the major concepts and their significance.

Recently there has been a revival of interest in structuralist approaches to science. Taking their lead from scientific structuralists such as Henri Poincaré, Ernst Cassirer, and Bertrand Russell, some contemporary philosophers and scientists have argued that the most fruitful approach to solving many problems in the philosophy of science lies in focusing on the structural features of our scientific theories. Much of the work in scientific structuralism to date has been focused on the problem of scientific realism, where it has been argued that even in cases of radical theory change the most important structural features of predecessor theories are preserved. These structural realists argue that what our most successful theories get right about the world is these abstract structural features, rather than any particular ontological claims. More recently, philosophers of science have adopted structuralist approaches to many other issues in the philosophy of science, such as scientific explanation and intertheory relations. The nine articles collected in this volume, written by the leading researchers in scientific structuralism, represent some of the most important directions of research in this field. This book will be of particular interest to those philosophers, scientists, and mathematicians who are interested in the foundations of science.

Professor Joseph Agassi has published his Towards an Historiography of Science in 1963. It received many reviews by notable academics, including Maurice Finocchiaro, Charles Gillispie, Thomas S. Kuhn, Geroge Mora, Nicholas Rescher, and L. Pearce Williams. It is still in use in many courses in the philosophy and history of science. Here it appears in a revised and updated version with responses to these reviews and with many additional chapters, some already classic, others new. They are all paradigms of the author’s innovative way of writing fresh and engaging chapters in the history of the natural sciences.

This comprehensive volume marks a new standard in scholarship in the emerging field of the philosophy of chemistry. Philosophers, chemists, and historians of science ask some fundamental questions about the relationship between philosophy and chemistry.