The study summarizes policy lessons for future efforts to monitor possible covert biological warfare programs based on past Iraqi and South African covert biowarfare programs. This comparative case study approach identified several commonalities in past biowarfare programs in developing countries. One was a tendency of governments to recruit some of the brightest students and send them abroad for advanced studies at western universities. This trend changed dramatically after the September 11, 2001, and it is now much more likely that future scientists working for government-sponsored bioweapons programs or for terrorist groups in the developing world will receive their advanced training at nonwestern institutions. A second commonality is that covert biological weapons research and development efforts have focused on exploiting readily available, naturally occurring pathogens for use as weapons of mass disruption or terror, in addition to efforts to develop sophisticated, genetically modified, weaponized organisms delivered in sophisticated delivery systems. Both the Iraqi and South African programs relied heavily on open-source literature to develop biological pathogens at multiple dual-use civilian facilities. This diffusion of covert research and development facilities is likely to increasingly in the future as mobile equipment and production facilities are more readily available for sale to any interested buyer. While these trends will make it difficult to detect preliminary covert biowarfare-related research and development, the full-scale production will continue to be difficult to hide. The second section of this study identified and discusses new biosecurity issues that emerged since September 11, 2001. These security issues increasingly collide with the economic development goals embraced by countries who are trying to increase civilian biotechnology research and development capacity in order to produce high-valued biotechnology exports and jobs.

Biomedical advances have made it possible to identify and manipulate features of living organisms in useful ways-leading to improvements in public health, agriculture, and other areas. The globalization of scientific and technical expertise also means that many scientists and other individuals around the world are generating breakthroughs in the life sciences and related technologies. The risks posed by bioterrorism and the proliferation of biological weapons capabilities have increased concern about how the rapid advances in genetic engineering and biotechnology could enable the production of biological weapons with unique and unpredictable characteristics. Globalization, Biosecurity, and the Future of Life Sciences examines current trends and future objectives of research in public health, life sciences, and biomedical science that contain applications relevant to developments in biological weapons 5 to 10 years into the future and ways to anticipate, identify, and mitigate these dangers.

This study offers policy lessons for efforts to monitor covert biological warfare programs based on recent investigations of past Iraqi and South African programs. This comparative case study approach identified commonalities in past biowarfare programs in developing countries. Both the Iraqi and South African cases showed that no single control strategy was entirely effective at stopping covert biological research and development. However, a combined approach based on import controls, sanctions, good intelligence on the ground from bilateral sources, and continuous international inspections that backed by a strong international consensus (in the case of Iraq) was remarkably effective at disrupting, slowing down the research and development process, and substantially raising the cost of conducting covert biowarfare programs.

In every decade of the nuclear era, one or two states have developed nuclear weapons despite the international community's opposition to proliferation. In the coming years, the breakdown of security arrangements, especially in the Middle East and Northeast Asia, could drive additional countries to seek their own nuclear, biological, or chemical (NBC) weapons and missiles. This likely would produce greater instability, more insecure states, and further proliferation. Are there steps concerned countries can take to anticipate, prevent, or dissuade the next generation of proliferators? Are there countries that might reassess their decision to forgo a nuclear arsenal? This volume brings together top international security experts to examine the issues affecting a dozen or so countries' nuclear weapons policies over the next decade. In Part I, National Decisions in Perspective, the work describes the domestic political consideration and international pressures that shape national nuclear policies of several key states. In Part II, Fostering Nonproliferation, the contributors discuss the factors that shape the future motivations and capabilities of various states to acquire nuclear weapons, and assess what the world community can do to counter this process. The future utility of bilateral and multilateral security assurances, treaty-based nonproliferation regimes, and other policy instruments are covered thoroughly.

This paper combines three separate threads of analysis on culture and violent nonstate actors as a launching pad to spur further research into this critical arena of culture and security. Jim Smith lays out a series of templates for guiding analysis of culture and violent nonstate actors. Mark Long applies cultural analysis of radical Islam and alQaida in discussing the influences involved in the core al Qaida group's WMD decisions. Tom Johnson, in examining a tribal insurgent psychological campaign in Afghanistan, demonstrates that behavioral influences can be manipulated for significant effect in countering our efforts to gain stability and legitimacy for the Afghan government. James M. Smith, PhD, is the Director, USAF Institute for National Security Studies and Professor, Military Strategic Studies at the US Air Force Academy.Jerry Mark Long, PhD, is Associate Professor and Director, Middle East Studies, Honors College, Baylor University. Thomas H. Johnson is Research Professor at the Naval Postgraduate School.

In this paper, the author differentiates and characterizes terrorists and insurgents, and he conducts a detailed conceptual and historical analysis of insurgency and its current manifestation on a global scale by the Salafi Jihad movement. This work lays out the case that terrorism and insurgency differ, and that the current "long war" is actually being fought by the other side as an insurgency. As a result, the United States must amend and adapt its strategy to one of global counterinsurgency, beyond a global war on terrorism alone.

Scientific advances over the past several decades have accelerated the ability to engineer existing organisms and to potentially create novel ones not found in nature. Synthetic biology, which collectively refers to concepts, approaches, and tools that enable the modification or creation of biological organisms, is being pursued overwhelmingly for beneficial purposes ranging from reducing the burden of disease to improving agricultural yields to remediating pollution. Although the contributions synthetic biology can make in these and other areas hold great promise, it is also possible to imagine malicious uses that could threaten U.S. citizens and military personnel. Making informed decisions about how to address such concerns requires a realistic assessment of the capabilities that could be misused. Biodefense in the Age of Synthetic Biology explores and envisions potential misuses of synthetic biology. This report develops a framework to guide an assessment of the security concerns related to advances in synthetic biology, assesses the levels of concern warranted for such advances, and identifies options that could help mitigate those concerns.

This publication gives a history of biological warfare (BW) from the prehistoric period through the present, with a section on the future of BW. The publication relies on works by historians who used primary sources dealing with BW. In-depth definitions of biological agents, biological weapons, and biological warfare (BW) are included, as well as an appendix of further reading on the subject. Related items: Arms & Weapons publications can be found here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/catalog/arms-weapons Hazardous Materials (HAZMAT & CBRNE) publications can be found here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/catalog/hazardous-materials-hazmat-cbrne