Examining the revival of Bergsonism for phenomenology, leading scholars of both areas inaugurate a dialogue long overdue. By assessing phenomenology's readings of Bergson and Bergsonian challenges to phenomenological methods, the essays in this volume explore anew the issues of central concern in contemporary continental philosophy.

James Joyce and the Phenomenology of Film reappraises the lines of influence said to exist between Joyce's writing and early cinema and provides an alternative to previous psychoanalytic readings of Joyce and film. Through a compelling combination of historical research and critical analysis, Cleo Hanaway-Oakley demonstrates that Joyce, early film-makers, and phenomenologists (Maurice Merleau-Ponty, in particular) share a common enterprise: all are concerned with showing, rather than explaining, the 'inherence of the self in the world'. Instead of portraying an objective, neutral world, bereft of human input, Joyce, the film-makers, and the phenomenologists present embodied, conscious engagement with the environment and others: they are interested in the world-as-it-is-lived and transcend the seemingly-rigid binaries of seer/seen, subject/object, absorptive/theatrical, and personal/impersonal. This book re-evaluates the history of body- and spectator-focused film theories, placing Merleau-Ponty at the centre of the discussion, and considers the ways in which Joyce may have encountered such theories. In a wealth of close analyses, Joyce's fiction is read alongside the work of early film-makers such as Charlie Chaplin, Georges Melies, and Mitchell and Kenyon, and in relation to the philosophical dimensions of early-cinematic devices such as the Mutoscope, the stereoscope, and the panorama. By putting Joyce's literary work--Ulysses above all--into dialogue with both early cinema and phenomenology, this book elucidates and enlivens literature, film, and philosophy.

Deleuze, Bergson, Merleau-Ponty: The Logic and Pragmatics of Creation, Affective Life, and Perception offers the only full-length examination of the relationships between Deleuze, Bergson and Merleau-Ponty. Henri Bergson (1859–1941), Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961), and Gilles Deleuze (1925–1995) succeeded one another as leading voices in French philosophy over a span of 136 years. Their relationship to one another's work involved far more than their overlapping lifetimes. Bergson became both the source of philosophical insight and a focus of criticism for Merleau-Ponty and Deleuze. Deleuze criticized Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology as well as his interest in cognitive and natural science. Author Dorothea Olkowski points out that each of these philosophers situated their thought in relation to their understandings of crucial developments and theories taken up in the history and philosophy of science, and this has been difficult for Continental philosophy to grasp. She articulates the differences between these philosophers with respect to their disparate approaches to the physical sciences and with how their views of science function in relation to their larger philosophical projects. In Deleuze, Bergson, Merleau-Ponty, Olkowski examines the critical areas of the structure of time and memory, the structure of consciousness, and the question of humans' relation to nature. She reveals that these philosophers are working from inside one another's ideas and are making strong claims about time, consciousness, reality, and their effects on humanity that converge and diverge. The result is a clearer picture of the intertwined workings of Continental philosophy and its fundamental engagement with the sciences.

Volume XXI Special Issue, 2023 Part 1: Phenomenological Perspectives on Aesthetics and Art Part 2: Heidegger and Contemporary French Philosophy Aim and Scope: The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy provides an annual international forum for phenomenological research in the spirit of Husserl’s groundbreaking work and the extension of this work by such figures as Reinach, Scheler, Stein, Heidegger, Sartre, Levinas, Merleau-Ponty and Gadamer. Contributors: Liliana Albertazzi, Dimitris Apostolopoulos, Gabriele Baratelli, Anna Irene Baka, Irene Breuer, John Brough, Peer Bundgaard, Justin Clemens, Richard Colledge, Bryan Cooke, Françoise Dastur, Ivo De Gennaro, Natalie Depraz, Helena De Preester, Daniele De Santis, Madalina Diaconu, Arto Haapala, Robyn Horner, Erik Kuravsky, Donald Landes, Elisa Magri, Michelle Maiese, Regina-Nino Mion, Brian O’Connor, Costas Pagondiotis, Knox Peden, Constantinos Picolas, Hans Reiner Sepp, Jack Reynolds, Jon Roffe, Claude Romano, Maxine Sheets-Johnstone, Michela Summa, Panos Theodorou, Fotini Vassiliou, and Sanem Yazicioglu. Submissions: Manuscripts, prepared for blind review, should be submitted to the Editors ([email protected] and [email protected]) electronically via e-mail attachments.

Transcendental phenomenology presumed to have overcome the classic mind-body dichotomy in terms of consciousness. Should we indeed dissolve the specificity of human consciousness by explaining human experience in its multiple sense-giving modalities through the physiological functions of the brain? The present collection of studies addresses this crucial question challenging such "naturalizing" reductionism from multiple angles.

This volume illustrates the relevance of phenomenology to a range of contemporary concerns. Displaying both the epistemological rigor of classical phenomenology and the empirical analysis of more recent versions, its chapters discuss a wide range of issues from justice and value to embodiment and affectivity. The authors draw on analytic, continental, and pragmatic resources to demonstrate how phenomenology is an important resource for questions of personal existence and social life. The book concludes by considering how the future of phenomenology relates to contemporary philosophy and related academic fields.

This work develops the ethical attitude of courageous vulnerability through the integration of the phenomenon of involuntary memory in Marcel Proust's work and a variety of closely related themes taken from the philosophies of Henri Bergson, William James, and Gabriel Marcel.

Phenomenalism, Phenomenology and the Question of Time: A Comparative Study of the Theories of Mach, Husserl, and Boltzmann analyzes two interconnected themes: the split between phenomenalism and phenomenology, and the question of time in relation to physical processes and irreversibility in physics. The first theme is the overlooked connections between the modern phenomenology of Edmund Husserl (and his mentor Franz Brentano) and phenomenalism as associated with Ernst Mach. The book’s historical-conceptual perspective draws attention to the ways in which Husserl’s twentieth century advance of phenomenological method was conceived in relation to Mach’s late nineteenth century and early twentieth century work both in science and philosophy. At first glance, Mach’s phenomenalism appears to be in stark contrast to Husserl’s phenomenology, but on closer inspection, it influenced and informed its inception. By analyzing Husserl’s revolutionary method of phenomenology in connection to Mach’s earlier conceptions, the book elucidates the rise of modern physics, especially through the work of Ludwig Boltzmann, as an important context to both Mach’s philosophical work and Husserl’s early overtures into phenomenology and his later critique of the “crisis” of European sciences. The discursive affinities and differences between phenomenalism and phenomenology are examined in terms of a more contemporary debate over naturalizing phenomenology, either as a method continuous with science or reduced to it. This immanent tension is examined and evaluated specifically through the second thematic axis of the book, which deals with the question of time and irreversibility. Time in physics conforms to an explanatory scheme that relegates the issues of directionality and symmetry of time to concepts that are radically different from any phenomenological attempts to explain temporality in terms of intuition and consciousness. It is precisely through the notion of irreversibility that both perspectives, scientific and phenomenological, explicate time’s arrow not as a mere manifestation of sensory asymmetry, as Mach would have it, but rather, through indirect descriptions of time and temporal objects. The issue of time’s arrow, irreversibility, and Boltzmann’s physical hypotheses regarding the nature of time are introduced and comparatively assessed with Husserl’s work on phenomenology and the role of temporality to consciousness.

Using hybrid phenomenological approaches to film, this book focuses on how moving images are 'experienced' and 'encountered' as well as 'read' and 'viewed'. Its close engagements with films and installations by four contemporary French filmmakers explore the limits and possibilities of 'cinematic' subjectivity.

The digital age we now live in is fundamentally changing how we relate to our perceptions and images. Daniel O'Shiel provides the first comprehensive phenomenology of virtual technology in order to show how the previously well-established experiential lines and structures between three basic categories of phenomenal experience – our everyday perceptions of reality; our everyday fantasies of irreality; and our everyday engagements with external images, not least digital ones – are becoming blurred, inverted or are even collapsing in a new era where a specific type of virtuality is coming to the fore. O'Shiel examines in depth just what this means for the phenomenology behind it, as well as the concrete practical consequences going forward. The work is divided into two main parts. In the first O'Shiel fully investigates the phenomenological natures of perception and imagination through close textual analyses of the relevant works by Edmund Husserl, Eugen Fink and Jean-Paul Sartre. In each phenomenologist perception and imagination are ultimately seen as different in kind, although the dividing line differs, especially with reference to a middle category of 'image-consciousness' (Bildbewusstsein). This first part argues for basic phenomenological differences between perceptions; physical and external images; and more mental imagery, while also allowing for a more general gradation between them. The second part then applies these theoretical findings to some of the most influential 'virtual technologies' today – social media; online gaming; and some virtual, augmented and mixed reality technologies – in order to show how previously clear categories of real and irreal, present and absent, genuine and fake, and even true and false, are becoming less so.