A book about "religions and gods and beliefs in general, [which] also [examines] something called The Scientific Method, which is how we learn new things about the world. By the time you're done reading you will know the answers to some of life's biggest questions, but more importantly you will see why your questions, and all questions for that matter, are so important"--Amazon.com.

Social psychologists have studied beliefs and values, and related constructs such as "attitudes" and "prejudice" for decades. But as this innovative and interdisciplinary book convincingly demonstrates, the scientific examination of beliefs and values now influences research and practice across a range of disciplines. Specifically, this edited volume explores the many cutting edge implications and applications of Equilintegration or EI Theory and the Beliefs, Events, and Values Inventory (BEVI). Grounded in twenty years of research and practice, EI Theory seeks to explain the processes by which beliefs, values, and worldviews are acquired and maintained, why their alteration is resisted, and under what circumstances they are modified. Based upon EI Theory, the BEVI is a comprehensive analytic tool which examines how and why we come to see ourselves, others, and the larger world as we do as well as the influence of such processes on multiple aspects of human functioning. Edited by the developer of the EI model and BEVI method, and informed by contributions from leading U.S. and international scholars, this book features captivating research findings and pioneering practice applications. Research-focused chapters explain how the EI model and BEVI method increase our conceptual sophistication and methodological capacity across a range of areas: Culture, Development, Environment, Gender, Personality, Politics, and Religion. Practice-oriented chapters demonstrate how the BEVI is used in the real world across a range of applied domains: Assessment, Education, Forensics, Leadership, and Psychotherapy. Written in an accessible and engaging manner, this fascinating and timely volume speaks to many of the most pressing issues of our day, by illuminating why we believe what we believe, and demonstrating how our beliefs and values may be assessed, explained, and transformed in the real world. Key Features: Presents an interdisciplinary theoretical model and innovative assessment method derived from two decades of work on the etiology, maintenance, and transformation of beliefs and values Features contributions from leading scholars from the U.S. and internationally, demonstrating the many implications and applications of this cutting edge approach for research and practice Demonstrates the importance of "making sense of beliefs and values" in addressing many of the most pressing issues of our day

Why do we believe in the views of a political party or leader? How can we better understand vaccine hesitancy or denial of climate change science? What drives extremist or conspiracist beliefs? This vital and timely new text provides a compelling survey of the science behind how people form beliefs and evaluate those of others, and why it is that beliefs are often so resistant to change in the face of conflicting evidence. Bringing together theories and empirical evidence from cognitive, developmental, and social psychology, Nancy S. Kim presents an engaging overview of the field and its implications for a wide range of beliefs – from moral, political, religious, and superstitious beliefs to beliefs about ourselves and our own potential. The intriguing studies discussed demonstrate how many psychological factors contribute to belief, including memory, reasoning, judgment, emotion, personality, social cognition, and cognitive development. With thoughtful questions and a range of cross-cultural case studies, this is an ideal overview for students of psychology and all readers interested in the psychology of belief.

There have been many books over the past decade, including outstanding collections of essays, on the topic of the ethical virtues and virtue-theoretic approaches in ethics. But the professional journals of philosophy have only recently seen a strong and growing interest in the intellectual virtues and in the development of virtue-theoretic approaches in epistemology. There have been four single-authored book length treatments of issues of virtue epistemology over the last seven years, beginning with Ernest Sosa's Knowledge in Perspective (Cambridge, 1991), and extending to Linda Zabzebski's Virtue of the Mind (Cambridge, 1996). Weighing in with Jonathan Kvanvig's The Intellectual Virtues and the Life of the Mind (1992), and James Montmarquet's Epistemic Virtue and Doxastic Responsibility (1993), Rowman & Littlefield has had a particularly strong interest in the direction and growth of the field. To date, there has been no collection of articles directly devoted to the growing debate over the possibility and potential of a virtue epistemology. This volume exists in the belief that there is now a timely opportunity to gather together the best contributions of the influential authors working in this growing area of epistemological research, and to create a collection of essays as a useful course text and research source. Several of the articles included in the volume are previously unpublished. Several essays discuss the range and general approach of virtue theory in comparison with other general accounts. What advantages are supposed to accrue from a virtue-based account in epistemology, in handling well-known problems such as "Gettier," and "Evil-Genie"-type problems? Can reliabilist virtue epistemology handle skeptical challenges more satisfactorily than non-virtue-centered forms of epistemic reliabilism? Others provide a needed discussion of relevant analogies and disanalogies between ethical and epistemic evaluation. The readings all contribute

"The main aim of this thoughtful and thought-provoking book is to characterize and explain the difference between pre-scientific systems of belief within which science could, and did, emerge and develop. Using the armoury of both philosophy and anthropology, Ernest Gellner attacks his task with his customary sharp wit and polemical gusto." - Times Literary Supplement.

Knowledge, from Plato onwards, has been considered in relation to justified belief. Current debate has centred around the nature of the justification and whether justified belief can be considered an internal or extenal matter. Epistemological internalists argue that the subject must be able to reflect upon a belief to complete the process of justification. The externalists, on the other hand, claim that it is only necessary to consider whether the belief is reliably formed, and argue that the ability to know by reflection is not required for a justified belief. In the historical section of this book the three most important epistemologists, Plato, Descartes and Hume, as well as the ancient epistemologies of the stoics, Academics and Pyrhonians, are considered. In reconsidering the history of epistemology the author is led to argue against hte view that internalism is historically dominant. His critique of internalism is then developed into a sustained argument against many of its forms, and he goes onto defend an externalist, reliabilist epistemology.

Describes the notion of warrant as that which distinguishes knowledge from true belief. This volume examines warrant's role in theistic belief, tackling the questions of whether it is rational, reasonable, justifiable, and warranted to accept Christian belief and whether there is something epistemically unacceptable in doing so.

A groundbreaking reinterpretation that draws on cognitive theory to show that belief wasn’t absent from—but rather was at the heart of—Roman religion Belief and Cult argues that belief isn’t uniquely Christian but was central to ancient Roman religion. Drawing on cognitive theory, Jacob Mackey shows that despite having nothing to do with salvation or faith, belief underlay every aspect of Roman religious practices—emotions, individual and collective cult action, ritual norms, social reality, and social power. In doing so, he also offers a thorough argument for the importance of belief to other non-Christian religions. At the individual level, the book argues, belief played an indispensable role in the genesis of cult action and religious emotion. However, belief also had a collective dimension. The cognitive theory of Shared Intentionality shows how beliefs may be shared among individuals, accounting for the existence of written, unwritten, or even unspoken ritual norms. Shared beliefs permitted the choreography of collective cult action and gave cult acts their social meanings. The book also elucidates the role of shared belief in creating and maintaining Roman social reality. Shared belief allowed the Romans to endow agents, actions, and artifacts with socio-religious status and power. In a deep sense, no man could count as an augur and no act of animal slaughter as a successful offering to the gods, unless Romans collectively shared appropriate beliefs about these things. Closely examining augury, prayer, the religious enculturation of children, and the Romans’ own theories of cognition and cult, Belief and Cult promises to revolutionize the understanding of Roman religion by demonstrating that none of its features makes sense without Roman belief.

The papers collected here are, with three exceptions, those presented at a conference on probability and causation held at the University of California at Irvine on July 15-19, 1985. The exceptions are that David Freedman and Abner Shimony were not able to contribute the papers that they presented to this volume, and that Clark Glymour who was not able to attend the conference did contribute a paper. We would like to thank the National Science Foundation and the School of Humanities of the University of California at Irvine for generous support. WILLIAM HARPER University of Western Ontario BRIAN SKYRMS University of California at Irvine Vll INTRODUCTION PART I: DECISIONS AND GAMES Causal notions have recently corne to figure prominently in discussions about rational decision making. Indeed, a relatively influential new approach to theorizing about rational choice has come to be called "causal decision theory". 1 Decision problems such as Newcombe's Problem and some versions of the Prisoner's Dilemma where an act counts as evidence for a desired state even though the agent knows his choice of that act cannot causally influence whether or not the state obtains have motivated causal decision theorists.