This volume brings together recent work on the nature of belief, imagination, and delusion, and seeks to get clearer on the nature of belief and imagination, the ways in which they relate to one another, and how they might be integrated into accounts of delusional belief formation.

This volume is an interdisciplinary examination of the relationship between delusions and self-deception, bringing recent work on motivated reasoning to bear on the problems posed by these forms of pathological belief. The volume will appeal to cognitive scientists, clinicians and philosophers interested in the nature of belief and the disturbances to which it is subject.

Delusions play an important and fascinating role in philosophy and are a particularly fertile area of study in recent years, spanning philosophy of mind and psychology, epistemology, ethics, psychology, psychiatry, and cognitive science. The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Delusion explores the conceptual and philosophical issues in the study of delusion and is the first major reference source of its kind. Comprising 38 chapters by an international team of contributors, the Handbook is divided into six clear parts: The Nature of Delusion Delusion in Disorders Epistemology of Delusion Delusion’s Place in the Mind Delusion Formation Responsibility, Culture, and Society. Within these sections, key topics are discussed including delusions and wellbeing, delusions as they occur in wider mental disorder, the epistemic profile of delusions (evidence, justification, rationality), how delusions are formed, delusions and folk psychology (how they relate to belief, self-deception, imagination, and so on), and delusions in the wider social and cultural context. An outstanding resource for both students and researchers, The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Delusion is essential reading for those working on delusion in philosophy departments, and also suitable for those in related disciplines such as psychology, psychiatry, and cognitive science.

Belief systems are supposed to be governed by norms of rationality. Yet some people seem to believe quite extraordinary things: for example, that they are dead, or that their closest relatives have been replaced by impostors, or that the person they see in the mirror is not really them, or that someone else's thoughts are being inserted into their mind. Do people really believe such things? Could beliefs like these simply be rational interpretations of unusual experiences? Why are these beliefs maintained despite their utter implausibility and the uniform skepticism with which others greet them? In this book, psychologists and philosophers describe and discuss a range of case studies of delusional beliefs, drawing out general lessons both for the cognitive architecture of the mind and for the notion of rationality, and exploring connections between the delusional beliefs that occur in schizophrenia and the flawed understanding of beliefs that is characteristic of autism.

The philosophy of psychosis and the psychosis of philosophy: a philosopher draws on his experience of madness. In this book, philosopher and linguist Wouter Kusters examines the philosophy of psychosis—and the psychosis of philosophy. By analyzing the experience of psychosis in philosophical terms, Kusters not only emancipates the experience of the psychotic from medical classification, he also emancipates the philosopher from the narrowness of textbooks and academia, allowing philosophers to engage in real-life praxis, philosophy in vivo. Philosophy and madness—Kusters's preferred, non-medicalized term—coexist, one mirroring the other. Kusters draws on his own experience of madness—two episodes of psychosis, twenty years apart—as well as other first-person narratives of psychosis. Speculating about the maddening effect of certain words and thought, he argues, and demonstrates, that the steady flow of philosophical deliberation may sweep one into a full-blown acute psychotic episode. Indeed, a certain kind of philosophizing may result in confusion, paradoxes, unworldly insights, and circular frozenness reminiscent of madness. Psychosis presents itself to the psychotic as an inescapable truth and reality. Kusters evokes the mad person's philosophical or existential amazement at reality, thinking, time, and space, drawing on classic autobiographical accounts of psychoses by Antonin Artaud, Daniel Schreber, and others, as well as the work of phenomenological psychiatrists and psychologists and such phenomenologists as Edmund Husserl and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. He considers the philosophical mystic and the mystical philosopher, tracing the mad undercurrent in the Husserlian philosophy of time; visits the cloud castles of mystical madness, encountering LSD devotees, philosophers, theologians, and nihilists; and, falling to earth, finds anxiety, emptiness, delusions, and hallucinations. Madness and philosophy proceed and converge toward a single vanishing point.

The guiding thread of this book is the distinction McGinn draws a distinction between perception and imagination, showing what the differences are, arguing that imagination is a sui generis mental faculty. His overall claim is that imagination pervades our mental life, obeys its own distinctive principles, and merits much more attention.

A timely collection of debates concerning the major themes and topics in philosophy of mind, fully updated with new topics covering the latest developments in the field Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind provides a lively and engaging introduction to the conceptual background, ongoing debates, and contentious issues in the field today. Original essays by more than 30 of the discipline’s most influential thinkers offer opposing perspectives on a series of contested questions regarding mental content, physicalism, the place of consciousness in the physical world, and the nature of perception and mental capacities. Written to appeal to non-specialists and professional philosophers alike, the second edition of Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind features five entirely new debates on the relation between perception and cognition, whether pain is a natural kind, whether perception is best understood through representational content or direct contact with the world, whether we need imagination that goes beyond imagery and supposition, and whether perceptual contents are general, particular, or a hybrid. Presents 15 sets of specially commissioned essays with opposing viewpoints on central topics in philosophy of mind Offers head-to-head debates on central topics such as consciousness, intentionality, normativity, mental causation, materialism, and perception Provides a dynamic view of contemporary thinking about fundamental and controversial issues Includes a thorough introduction providing a comprehensive background to the issues explored in each debate Part of Wiley-Blackwell’s acclaimed Contemporary Debates in Philosophy series, Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind, Second Edition is essential reading for undergraduate and graduate students, academics, professional philosophers, and sophisticated general readers with an interest in the subject.

This book explores the relationship between schizophrenia and common sense. It approaches this theme from a multidisciplinary perspective. Coverage features contributions from phenomenology, cognitive neuroscience, philosophy of mind, psychology, and social cognition. The contributors address the following questions: How relevant is the loss of common sense in schizophrenia? How can the study of schizophrenia contribute to the study of common sense? How to understand and explain this loss of common sense? They also consider: What is the relationship of practical reasoning and logical formal reasoning with schizophrenia? What is the relationship between the person with a diagnosis of schizophrenia and social values? Chapters examine such issues as rationality, emotions, self, and delusion. In addition, one looks at brain structure and neurotransmission. Others explore phenomenological and Wittgensteinian theories. The book features papers from the Schizophrenia and Common Sense International Workshop, held at New University of Lisbon, November 2015. It offers new insights into this topic and will appeal to researchers, students, as well as interested general readers.

What sort of mental state is a delusion? What causes delusions? Why are delusions pathological? This book examines these questions, which are normally considered separately, in a much-needed exploration of an important and fascinating topic, Kengo Miyazono assesses the philosophical, psychological and psychiatric literature on delusions to argue that delusions are malfunctioning beliefs. Delusions belong to the same category as beliefs but - unlike healthy irrational beliefs - fail to play the function of beliefs. Delusions and Beliefs: A Philosophical Inquiry will be of great interest to students of philosophy of mind and psychology and philosophy of mental disorder, as well as those in related fields such as mental health and psychiatry.

What sort of mental state is a delusion? What causes delusions? Why are delusions pathological? This book examines these questions, which are normally considered separately, in a much-needed exploration of an important and fascinating topic, Kengo Miyazono assesses the philosophical, psychological and psychiatric literature on delusions to argue that delusions are malfunctioning beliefs. Delusions belong to the same category as beliefs but - unlike healthy irrational beliefs - fail to play the function of beliefs. Delusions and Beliefs: A Philosophical Inquiry will be of great interest to students of philosophy of mind and psychology and philosophy of mental disorder, as well as those in related fields such as mental health and psychiatry.