This book constitutes the proceedings of the Joint Workshop on Automated Reasoning for Security Protocol Analysis and Issues in the Theory of Security held in Paphos, Cyprus, in March 2010.

This volume constitutes the proceedings of the 2nd International Joint C- ference on Automated Reasoning (IJCAR 2004) held July 4–8, 2004 in Cork, Ireland. IJCAR 2004 continued the tradition established at the ?rst IJCAR in Siena,Italyin2001,whichbroughttogetherdi?erentresearchcommunitieswo- ing in automated reasoning. The current IJCAR is the fusion of the following conferences: CADE: The International Conference on Automated Deduction, CALCULEMUS: Symposium on the Integration of Symbolic Computation and Mechanized Reasoning, FroCoS: Workshop on Frontiers of Combining Systems, FTP: The International Workshop on First-Order Theorem Proving, and TABLEAUX: The International Conference on Automated Reasoning with Analytic Tableaux and Related Methods. There were 74 research papers submitted to IJCAR as well as 12 system descriptions. After extensive reviewing, 26 research papers and 6 system - scriptions were accepted for presentation at the conference and publication in this volume. In addition, this volume also contains papers from the three invited speakers and a description of the CADE ATP system competition. We would like to acknowledge the enormous amount of work put in by the members of the program committee, the various organizing and steering c- mittees, the IJCAR o?cials, the invited speakers, and the additional referees named on the following pages. We would also like to thank Achim Brucker and Barbara Geiser for their help in producing this volume.

Security protocols employed in practice are used in our everyday life and we heavily depend on their security. The complexity of these protocols still poses a big challenge on their comprehensive analysis. To cope with this complexity, a promising approach is modular security analysis based on universal composability frameworks, such as Canetti's UC model. This appealing approach has, however, only very rarely been applied to the analysis of (existing) real-world protocols. Either the analysis was not fully modular or it could only be applied to idealized variants of the protocols. The main goal of this thesis therefore is to push modular protocol analysis as far as possible, but without giving up on accurate modeling. Our main contributions in a nutshell: An ideal functionality for symmetric key cryptography that provides a solid foundation for faithful, composable cryptographic analysis of real-world security protocols. A computational soundness result of formal analysis for key exchange protocols that use symmetric encryption. Novel universal and joint state composition theorems that are applicable to the analysis of real-world security protocols. Case studies on several security protocols: SSL/TLS, IEEE 802.11i (WPA2), SSH, IPsec, and EAP-PSK. We showed that our new composition theorems can be used for a faithful, modular analysis of these protocols. In addition, we proved composable security properties for two central protocols of the IEEE standard 802.11i, namely the 4-Way Handshake Protocol and the CCM Protocol. This constitutes the first rigorous cryptographic analysis of these protocols. While our applications focus on real-world security protocols, our theorems, models, and techniques should be useful beyond this domain.

Security protocols are widely used to ensure secure communications over insecure networks, such as the internet or airwaves. These protocols use strong cryptography to prevent intruders from reading or modifying the messages. However, using cryptography is not enough to ensure their correctness. Combined with their typical small size, which suggests that one could easily assess their correctness, this often results in incorrectly designed protocols. The authors present a methodology for formally describing security protocols and their environment. This methodology includes a model for describing protocols, their execution model, and the intruder model. The models are extended with a number of well-defined security properties, which capture the notions of correct protocols, and secrecy of data. The methodology can be used to prove that protocols satisfy these properties. Based on the model they have developed a tool set called Scyther that can automatically find attacks on security protocols or prove their correctness. In case studies they show the application of the methodology as well as the effectiveness of the analysis tool. The methodology’s strong mathematical basis, the strong separation of concerns in the model, and the accompanying tool set make it ideally suited both for researchers and graduate students of information security or formal methods and for advanced professionals designing critical security protocols.

The EuropeanSymposium on Researchin Computer Security (ESORICS) has a tradition that goes back two decades. It tries to bring together the international research community in a top-quality event that covers all the areas of computer security, ranging from theory to applications. ESORICS 2010 was the 15th edition of the event. It was held in Athens, Greece, September 20-22, 2010. The conference received 201 submissions. The papers went through a careful review process. In a ?rst round, each paper - ceived three independent reviews. For the majority of the papers an electronic discussion was also organized to arrive at the ?nal decision. As a result of the review process, 42 papers were selected for the ?nal program, resulting in an - ceptance rate of as low as 21%. The authors of accepted papers were requested to revise their papers, based on the comments received. The program was c- pleted with an invited talk by Udo Helmbrecht, Executive Director of ENISA (European Network and Information Security Agency). ESORICS 2010 was organized under the aegisof three Ministries of the G- ernment of Greece, namely: (a) the Ministry of Infrastructure, Transport, and Networks, (b) the General Secretariat for Information Systems of the Ministry of Economy and Finance, and (c) the General Secretariat for e-Governance of the Ministry of Interior, Decentralization, and e-Government.

This book constitutes the carefully refereed post-proceedings of the 6th Symposium on Foundations and Practice of Security, FPS 2013, held in La Rochelle, France, in October 2013. The 25 revised full papers presented together with a keynote address were carefully reviewed and selected from 65 submissions. The papers are organized in topical sections on security protocols, formal methods, physical security, attack classification and assessment, access control, cipher attacks, ad-hoc and sensor networks, resilience and intrusion detection.

Drawing upon the expertise of world-renowned researchers and experts, The Cloud Security Ecosystem comprehensively discusses a range of cloud security topics from multi-disciplinary and international perspectives, aligning technical security implementations with the most recent developments in business, legal, and international environments. The book holistically discusses key research and policy advances in cloud security – putting technical and management issues together with an in-depth treaties on a multi-disciplinary and international subject. The book features contributions from key thought leaders and top researchers in the technical, legal, and business and management aspects of cloud security. The authors present the leading edge of cloud security research, covering the relationships between differing disciplines and discussing implementation and legal challenges in planning, executing, and using cloud security. - Presents the most current and leading-edge research on cloud security from a multi-disciplinary standpoint, featuring a panel of top experts in the field - Focuses on the technical, legal, and business management issues involved in implementing effective cloud security, including case examples - Covers key technical topics, including cloud trust protocols, cryptographic deployment and key management, mobile devices and BYOD security management, auditability and accountability, emergency and incident response, as well as cloud forensics - Includes coverage of management and legal issues such as cloud data governance, mitigation and liability of international cloud deployment, legal boundaries, risk management, cloud information security management plans, economics of cloud security, and standardization efforts

The chapters in this book present the work of researchers, scientists, engineers, and teachers engaged with developing unified foundations, principles, and technologies for cyber-physical security. They adopt a multidisciplinary approach to solving related problems in next-generation systems, representing views from academia, government bodies, and industrial partners, and their contributions discuss current work on modeling, analyzing, and understanding cyber-physical systems.

This open access book constitutes the proceedings of the 24th International Conference on Fundamental Approaches to Software Engineering, FASE 2021, which took place during March 27–April 1, 2021, and was held as part of the Joint Conferences on Theory and Practice of Software, ETAPS 2021. The conference was planned to take place in Luxembourg but changed to an online format due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The 16 full papers presented in this volume were carefully reviewed and selected from 52 submissions. The book also contains 4 Test-Comp contributions.

Inthe?eldofformalmethodsincomputerscience,concurrencytheoryisreceivinga constantlyincreasinginterest.Thisisespeciallytrueforprocessalgebra.Althoughit had been originally conceived as a means for reasoning about the semantics of c- current programs, process algebraic formalisms like CCS, CSP, ACP, ?-calculus, and their extensions (see, e.g., [154,119,112,22,155,181,30]) were soon used also for comprehendingfunctionaland nonfunctionalaspects of the behaviorof com- nicating concurrent systems. The scienti?c impact of process calculi and behavioral equivalences at the base of process algebra is witnessed not only by a very rich literature. It is in fact worth mentioningthe standardizationprocedurethat led to the developmentof the process algebraic language LOTOS [49], as well as the implementation of several modeling and analysis tools based on process algebra, like CWB [70] and CADP [93], some of which have been used in industrial case studies. Furthermore, process calculi and behavioral equivalencesare by now adopted in university-levelcourses to teach the foundations of concurrent programming as well as the model-driven design of concurrent, distributed, and mobile systems. Nevertheless, after 30 years since its introduction, process algebra is rarely adopted in the practice of software development. On the one hand, its technica- ties often obfuscate the way in which systems are modeled. As an example, if a process term comprises numerous occurrences of the parallel composition operator, it is hard to understand the communicationscheme among the varioussubterms. On the other hand, process algebra is perceived as being dif?cult to learn and use by practitioners, as it is not close enough to the way they think of software systems.