This work is an extensive analysis of the 1915 British landing at Suvla Bay, one of the most mismanaged and ineffective operations of World War I. Chapters examine the events that led to the landings on the Gallipoli peninsula, provide a comprehensive report on the landings themselves, and analyze the events and decisions contributing to their failure. Appendices provide first-hand accounts of the landings from period news articles, military documents and personal correspondence.

This work is a narrative of personal experiences of the author, John Hargrave, while serving with the 32nd Field Ambulance, X Division, Mediterranean Expeditionary Force, during the Great War This book is part of the World War One Centenary series; creating, collating and reprinting new and old works of poetry, fiction, autobiography and analysis. The series forms a commemorative tribute to mark the passing of one of the world's bloodiest wars, offering new perspectives on this tragic yet fascinating period of human history. Each publication also includes brand new introductory essays and a timeline to help the reader place the work in its historical context.

Evocative and richly atmospheric photographs of the Gallipoli Peninsula's battlefields today.

While the main emphasis of the Great War was on the Western Front of France and Belgium, the British Army also took part in what was a lesser known conflict, but one of equal intensity and drama. This was at Gallipoli, on the shores of Turkey, between April 1915 and January 1916. By December 1914, the war on the Western Front had ground to a halt in a stalemate of trench warfare, and Winston Churchill, then First Lord of the Admiralty, proposed a strategy to take Turkey, a German ally, out of the war. This could force Germany to fight on two fronts and could free up the Dardanelles waterway at Gallipoli. While the concept was sound, its execution was not, as it was hastily planned, and inadequately resourced. The 2nd Battalion the South Wales Borderers was present throughout the whole campaign and was the only Welsh battalion to take part in the amphibious assault on 25 April 1915. Other historians give little credence to the success of the battalion on that day and this book sets out to redress the balance. The 4th Battalion landed at Gallipoli a few months later, to take part in the second main offensive, at Suvla Bay, in August 1915. This campaign took part amidst the most appalling conditions, such as the unrelenting heat of a mediterranean summer, a lack of water, poor food, inadequate equipment and without proper sanitation. Sickness and disease were rife, and at the height of the war there were up to 5,000 cases of dysentery a week. Both battalions of this famous Welsh regiment endured the privations of the campaign with great stoicism, courage and dignity and were amongst the last soldiers to leave the peninsula during the final evacuation in January 1916. By a clever weave of official records and personal anecdotes, most of which have never been published before, the reader is taken on a journey of highs and lows, depicting the reality of life on active service. Meticulously researched and written, this is a personal account of the South Wales Borderers during the Gallipoli campaign which adds an important social dimension to the traditional style of books already written on one of the most dramatic campaigns in British military history. Some of the best, toughest and most generous soldiers in the British army come from Wales. This book serves as a tribute to those magnificent soldiers.

In this fascinating account, leading Australian military historians tackle 10 of the most enduring historical zombies, or national myths, that have staggered their way through the halls of military history for more than 200 years. From Aboriginal resistance and invasion to Australia’s recent involvement in East Timor, this record disproves the incorrectly memorialized and so-called gallant deeds of past Australian servicemen. Provocative and opinionated, this record attempts to correct the historical record.

The noted historian’s decisive and devastating history of the WWI Battle of Gallipoli “sets a new standard for assessing the Allied Dardanelles campaign" (Mustafa Aksakal, American Historical Review). The Gallipoli campaign of 1915–16 was an ill-fated Allied attempt to take control of the Dardanelles, secure a sea route to Russia, and create a Balkan alliance against the Central Powers. A failure in all respects, the operation ended in disaster, and the Allied forces suffered some 390,000 casualties. In this conclusive study, military historian Robin Prior assesses the many myths about Gallipoli and provides definitive answers to questions that have lingered about the operation. Prior proceeds step by step through the campaign, dealing with naval, military, and political matters and surveying the operations of all the armies involved: British, Anzac, French, Indian, and Turkish. Relying on primary documents, including war diaries and technical military sources, Prior evaluates the strategy, the commanders, and the performance of soldiers on the ground. His conclusions are powerful and unsettling: the naval campaign was not “almost” won, and the land action was not bedeviled by “minor misfortunes.” Instead, the badly conceived Gallipoli campaign was doomed from the start. And even had it been successful, the operation would not have shortened the war by a single day. Despite their bravery, the Allied troops who fell at Gallipoli died in vain. A Wall Street Journal Best Book of 2009

This text is Jones's account of his part in British Scientific Intelligence between 1939 and 1949. It was his responsibility to anticipate German applications of science to warfare, so that their new weapons could be countered before they were used. Much of his work had to do with radio navigation, as in the Battle of the Beams, with radar, as in the Allied Bomber Offensive and in the preparations for D-Day and in the war at sea. He was also in charge of intelligence against the V-1 (flying bomb) and the V-2 (rocket) retaliation weapons and, although the Germans were some distance behind from success, against their nuclear developments.