David Stevenson directs attention away from the Anglo-German naval race towards the competition on land between the continental armies. He analyses the defence policies of the Powers, and the interaction between the growth of military preparedness and the diplomatic crises in the Mediterranean and the Balkans that culminated in the events of July-August 1914.

The First World War has been described as the "primordial catastrophe of the twentieth century." Arguably, Italian Fascism, German National Socialism and Soviet Leninism and Stalinism would not have emerged without the cultural and political shock of World War I. The question why this catastrophe happened therefore preoccupies historians to this day. The focus of this volume is not on the consequences, but rather on the connection between the Great War and the long 19th century, the short- and long-term causes of World War I. This approach results in the questioning of many received ideas about the war's causes, especially the notion of "inevitability."

There is no shortage of reference books on the warships that fought the Second World War, but the weapons they carried have been largely ignored. This situation is entirely rectified in this classic work, which is encyclopaedic in scope and largely based on original research. Divided by country (including minor powers not directly involved in the war), the book covers all the major weaponry of the period. Weapons of earlier vintage that were employed during the war, and those that were at an experimental, trial or design stage in 1945 are also included. The size, scope and originality of this work make it one of the most important reference works available on naval warfare during the Second World War.

Learn about the evolution of weapons by studying the design of the Civil War weapons cataloged in this attractive, full-color reference book. More than three million Americans fought in the Civil War and over six hundred thousand men, or two percent of the population, died in this dreadful conflict. Its impact is still felt today, for the war shaped our nation, and our national character. Studying the weapons used by both the Union army and Confederate forces tells an intriguing story of its own. The well-equipped Union army had access to the best of the industrial North's manufacturing output. By contrast, the South had to get by with imported arms and locally made copies of patented weapons. But the pressure of war quickly led to improvements in both sides' firearms. A War that began with single-shot horse pistols ended with multi-shot revolvers. Poignant archive photography is used throughout the book, showing the weapons in contemporary action, and placing them in their Civil War context. Evocative paintings by renowned Civil War artist Don Troiani bring the battlefield action to life.

`Careful, original and wide-ranging study of many different aspects of late medieval military history.' HISTORY The Hundred Years War embraced warfare in all aspects, from the grand set pieces of Crecy and Agincourt to the pillaged lands of the dispossessed population. What makes this book different from previous studies emphasising the great battles is its use of less familiar evidence, such as administrative records and landscape archaeology, to gain a truer picture of the realities of medieval warfare. From a general review of battle tactics, the book turns to examine (at points enlisting computer analysis) a number of issues: the composition of the English army, the management of affairs in Aquitaine, the response in England at large to the war and the consequent propaganda and hardship, and the impact of warfare on local communities. Close study of surviving artefacts - weapons, fortifications - also allows realistic assessments of military and naval experiences. Contributors: ANDREW AYTON, MATTHEW BENNETT, ANNE CURRY, IAN FRIEL, ROBERT HARDY, MICHAEL HUGHES, MICHAEL JONES, BRIAN KEMP, JOHN KENYON, MARK ORMROD, ROBERT SMITH, MALCOLM VALE.

The nature of warfare has changed! Like it or not, terrorism has established a firm foothold worldwide. Economics and environmental issues are inextricably entwined on a global basis and tied directly to national regional security. Although traditional threats remain, new, shadowy, and mercurial adversaries are emerging, and identifying and locating them is difficult. Future War, based on the hard-learned lessons of Bosnia, Haiti, Somalia, Panama, and many other trouble spots, provides part of the solution. Non-lethal weapons are a pragmatic application of force, not a peace movement. Ranging from old rubber bullets and tear gas to exotic advanced systems that can paralyze a country, they are essential for the preservation of peace and stability. Future War explains exactly how non-lethal electromagnetic and pulsed-power weapons, the laser and tazer, chemical systems, computer viruses, ultrasound and infrasound, and even biological entities will be used to stop enemies. These are the weapons of the future.

David Herrmann's work is the most complete study to date of how land-based military power influenced international affairs during the series of diplomatic crises that led up to the First World War. Instead of emphasizing the naval arms race, which has been extensively studied before, Herrmann draws on documentary research in military and state archives in Germany, France, Austria, England, and Italy to show the previously unexplored effects of changes in the strength of the European armies during this period. Herrmann's work provides not only a contribution to debates about the causes of the war but also an account of how the European armies adopted the new weaponry of the twentieth century in the decade before 1914, including quick-firing artillery, machine guns, motor transport, and aircraft. In a narrative account that runs from the beginning of a series of international crises in 1904 until the outbreak of the war, Herrmann points to changes in the balance of military power to explain why the war began in 1914, instead of at some other time. Russia was incapable of waging a European war in the aftermath of its defeat at the hands of Japan in 1904-5, but in 1912, when Russia appeared to be regaining its capacity to fight, an unprecedented land-armaments race began. Consequently, when the July crisis of 1914 developed, the atmosphere of military competition made war a far more likely outcome than it would have been a decade earlier.

How and when do military innovations take place? Do they proceed differently during times of peace and times of war? In Winning the Next War, Stephen Peter Rosen argues that armies and navies are not forever doomed to "fight the last war." Rather, they are able to respond to shifts in the international strategic situation. He also discusses the changing relationship between the civilian innovator and the military bureaucrat. In peacetime, Rosen finds, innovation has been the product of analysis and the politics of military promotion, in a process that has slowly but successfully built military capabilities critical to American military success. In wartime, by contrast, innovation has been constrained by the fog of war and the urgency of combat needs. Rosen draws his principal evidence from U.S. military policy between 1905 and 1960, though he also discusses the British army's experience with the battle tank during World War I.