This text provides a comprehensive and succinct treatment of the history, structure, and behaviour of the various US institutions that enforce antitrust laws. It also draws comparisons with the structure of institutional enforcement outside the US, and it considers the possibility of creating international antitrust institutions.

From the man who coined the term "net neutrality" and who has made significant contributions to our understanding of antitrust policy and wireless communications, comes a call for tighter antitrust enforcement and an end to corporate bigness.

Preface p. xi 1 Economics p. 1 I. Definitions p. 1 II. Perfect Competition Versus Monopoly p. 9 III. Further Topics p. 21 2 Law and Policy p. 27 I. Some Interpretation Issues p. 28 II. Enacting the Antitrust Law p. 30 III. What Should Antitrust Law Aim to Do? p. 40 3 Enforcement p. 43 I. Optimal Enforcement Theory p. 43 II. Enforcement Provision of the Antitrust Laws p. 47 Appendix p. 64 4 Cartels p. 68 I. Cartels p. 68 II. Conscious Parallelism p. 73 III. Conclusion p. 89 5 Development of Section 1 Doctrine p. 90 I. The Sherman Act Versus the Common Law p. 90 II. Rule of Reason and Per-Se Rule p. 104 III. Conclusion p. 112 6 Rule of Reason and Per-Se Rule p. 113 I. The Case for Price Fixing p. 113 II. Per-Se and Rule of Reason Analysis: Further Developments p. 116 III. Per-Se Versus Rule of Reason Tests: Understanding the Supreme Court's Justification for the Per-Se Rule p. 129 7 Agreement p. 132 I. The Development of Inference Doctrine p. 133 II. Rejection of Unilateral Contract Theory p. 140 8 Facilitating Mechanisms p. 144 I. Data Dissemination Cases p. 145 II. Basing Point Pricing and Related Practices p. 154 III. Basing Point Pricing: Economics p. 160 9 Boycotts p. 166 I. Pre-Socony p. 166 II. Post-Socony p. 170 III. Post-BMI/Sylvania p. 181 IV. Conclusion p. 184 10 Monopolization p. 186 I. Development of Section 2 Doctrine p. 186 II. Leveraging and Essential Facility Cases p. 202 III. Predatory Pricing p. 212 IV. Conclusion p. 228 11 Power p. 230 I. Measuring Market Power p. 230 II. Determinants of Market Power p. 235 III. Substitutability and the Relevant Market: Cellophane p. 237 IV. Multimarket Monopoly and the Relevant Market: Alcoa p. 239 V. Measuring Power: Guidelines p. 243 12 Attempts p. 244 I. The Swift Formula and Modern Doctrine p. 244 II. Dangerous Probability Requirement p. 248 13 Vertical Restraints p. 252 I. Resale Price Maintenance p. 252 II. Vertical Nonprice Restraints p. 262 III. Manufacturer Retains Title p. 267 IV. Agreement p. 270 14 Tying and Exclusive Dealing p. 279 I. Introduction p. 279 II. Early Cases p. 284 III. Development of Per-Se Rule p. 286 IV. Tension Between Rule of Reason Arguments and Per-Se Rule p. 295 V. Technological Tying p. 301 VI. Exclusive Dealing p. 303 Appendix p. 307 15 Horizontal Mergers p. 311 I. Reasons for Merging and Implications for Law p. 311 II. Horizontal Merger Law p. 317 III. Conclusion p. 330 Appendix p. 330 16 Mergers, Vertical and Conglomerate p. 333 I. Vertical Mergers p. 333 II. Conglomerate Mergers p. 344 III. Concluding Remarks p. 351 17 Antitrust and the State p. 352 I. Noerr-Pennington Doctrine p. 354 II. Parker Doctrine p. 371 III. Some Final Comments: Error Costs and Immunity Doctrines p. 375 Index p. 379.

After 1 May 2004, the enforcement of European antitrust law entered a new era. At the same time as 10 new Member States joined the European Union, Regulation No 17, which had governed the enforcement of Articles 81 and 82 EC since 1962, was replaced by Regulation No 1/2003, which has ushered in far-reaching changes. This book brings together six essays which analyse the background and main characteristics of the new enforcement system, as well as a number of outstanding questions and potential areas of further reform, including the question whether private antitrust enforcement should be encouraged, and the question whether the decisional power in antitrust matters should be transferred to the courts. Special attention is given to the problem of the compatibility of the new enforcement system and of the practice of European antitrust enforcement with the requirements of the European Convention of Human Rights and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, including the principle of ne bis in idem, the privilege against self-incrimination, and the right to an independent and impartial tribunal. On many of these issues, the discussion contained in this book is not only legal, but also includes an economic analysis from the perspective of efficient law enforcement.

U.S. Antitrust Law and Enforcement provides readers with an updated unique and straight-forward introduction to United States antitrust law. This book delivers a one-stop introduction to the entire field of antitrust law and practice, allowing law firm and in-house practitioners who do not specialize in antitrust, foreign attorneys, newly-minted lawyers, and law students to quickly gain an understanding of the wide variety of issues and policies affected by U.S. antitrust laws. The Second Edition features new Supreme Court decisions as well as analyses of important revisions to the Merger Guidelines used by the federal antitrust enforcement agencies and to the Hart-Scott-Rodino Rules and the premerger notification report form. U.S. Antitrust Law and Enforcement helps attorneys develop the ability to spot and analyze antitrust law issues by providing an approachable overview of the statutes and regulations that make up the law, the leading Supreme Court decisions that create the framework for analysis found in lower court cases, the elements that must be proved to make out a claim under the various antitrust laws, and the guidelines and policy statements that describe antitrust enforcement at the federal agency level.

'A creative, informative, and highly readable narrative... The book consists of four sections dealing in turn with (1) the law and economics of antitrust policy; (2) the problem of collusion; (3) the question of exclusionary practices; and (4) the difficulties of enforcement... This is a provocative work that judiciously raises pertinent questions about our antitrust policy.'-Robert J. Steamer, Perspective

Competition enforcement authorities use settlements as a tool to ensure compliance with antitrust law. Companies can make commitments to remedy breaches, ensuring that they avoid litigation and potential fines and reputational damage. The author of this highly original and innovative book shows that, rather than fines or arguing principles of competition law in litigation, antitrust settlements (namely U.S. consent decrees and EU commitment decisions) hold the key to globally effective enforcement, particularly in the digital and blockchain era. Antitrust law does not necessarily need to be abolished, but rather should be fully exploited as an economic regulation led by antitrust settlements. In supporting her thesis, the author examines such elements of competition enforcement as the following: drawbacks of allowing the courts to regulate markets; whether antitrust settlements sacrifice antitrust deterrence; how settlements rapidly and surgically regulate markets; comparative analysis between U.S. consent decrees and EU commitment decisions; economic analysis on the adoption of antitrust settlements in both the U.S. and EU markets from 2013 to 2018; fundamental role of antitrust settlements in regulating the current digital markets; and comprehensive description on how to use antitrust settlements to regulate the data industry. With its thorough guidance on U.S. consent decrees and EU commitment decisions from their functioning to their characteristics and procedure--and its extensive treatment of the main antitrust remedies available and used in enforcing of antitrust law in both the U.S. and EU--the book provides both an economic and a legal analysis of the functioning and the scope of antitrust settlements. It assesses the influence of decisions on companies' behavior and agencies' practice, using economic analysis to show the procompetitive or anticompetitive effects of remedies, with special attention to digital markets. Because markets have become so dynamic and unpredictable that is difficult to preserve efficiency, the author says, there is a little room for law--economic regulation is a better fit. This book is a springboard to further investigate how a simple antitrust enforcement tool, having turned competition law into an economic regulation policy, can drive our economy, leading both the antitrust and regulatory interventions in tackling today's market challenges.

In this outstanding new book Professor Keith Hylton and his collaborators examine what antitrust law has become over the past ten years, a time in which economic analysis has become its undisputed core. What has become of the old antitrust doctrine, what are the new issues for the immediate future? This book brings together the leading experts to examine this silent revolution at the core of US domestic policy. Mark Grady, UCLA School of Law, US Hylton s Antitrust Law and Economics brings together many of the best authors writing in antitrust today. Their essays range widely, covering proof of agreement under the Sherman Act, group boycotts, monopolization and essential facilities, tying and other vertical restraints, and merger policy. The writing is clear, accessible but still technically sophisticated and comprehensive. This book represents the best in contemporary antitrust scholarship, by authors who understand and are able to communicate the centrality of economic analysis to antitrust. No antitrust lawyer, serious antitrust student, or antitrust economist should be without this book. Herbert Hovenkamp, University of Iowa College of Law, US This comprehensive book provides an extensive overview of the major topics of antitrust law from an economic perspective. Its in-depth treatment and analysis of both the law and economics of antitrust is presented via a collection of interconnected original essays. The contributing authors are among the most influential scholars in antitrust, with a rich diversity of backgrounds. Their entries cover, amongst other issues, predatory pricing, essential facilities, tying, vertical restraints, enforcement, mergers, market power, monopolization standards, and facilitating practices. This well-organized and substantial work will be invaluable to professors of American antitrust law and European competition law, as well as students specializing in competition law. It will also be an important reference for professors and graduate students of economics and business.

In the last few years, the public enforcement of Articles 81 and 82 EC has been thoroughly transformed: the competition authorities of the EU Member States have become active enforcers within the European Competition Network, the European Commission has imposed more and higher fines than ever before, leniency has become a major instrument of cartel detection, and some Member States have introduced criminal penalties. The overall trend towards more and stronger enforcement of Articles 81 and 82 EC has also rekindled discussion on the old question of how to strike the right balance between efficient enforcement and adequate protection of the rights of the defence. This book brings together six essays which analyse from both a legal and an economic perspective the powers of investigation of the European Commission and the competition authorities of the Member States, and the corresponding procedural rights and guarantees, the use of settlements, the theory and practice of fines and of leniency, and the criminalization of European antitrust enforcement.