Includes over 75 maps, photos and plans. In Advice and Support: The Final Years the author describes the U.S. Army advisory effort to the South Vietnamese armed forces during the period when the U.S. commitment in Southeast Asia was at its peak. The account encompasses a broad spectrum of activities at several levels, from the physically demanding work of the battalion advisers on the ground to the more sophisticated undertakings of our senior military officers at the highest echelons of the American military assistance command in Saigon. Among critical subjects treated are our command relationships with the South Vietnamese army, our politico-military efforts to help reform both the South Vietnamese military and government, and our implementation of the Vietnamization policy inaugurated in 1969. The result tells us much about the U.S. Army’s role as an agent of national policy in a critical but often neglected arena, and constitutes a major contribution to our understanding of not only the events that occurred in Vietnam but also the decisions and actions that produced them.

Includes 3 maps and more than 10 illustrations The preponderance of conflicts fought over the last seventy years have included or been centered on irregular warfare and counter-insurgency. Indeed, the helicopter’s first significant trials in combat took place during the Algerian War 1954-1962, the Vietnam War 1955-1975, and the Soviet-Afghan War 1979-1989. During these wars, French, U.S., and Soviet militaries used significant numbers of helicopters to fight insurgents and guerrillas, and each country lost their respective conflict. As conventional organizations, these militaries used helicopters to seek military dominance, often blind to or in spite of politico-strategic goals like legitimacy. The helicopter’s firepower and mobility tactically decimated insurgents, but the nature of irregular warfare rendered tactical dominance indecisive. Helicopters were indecisive or bad at enabling legitimacy, population control, and isolation, key tenets of successful COIN. Convinced that helicopter enabled military dominance could win, the French, U.S., and Soviet militaries were unable to balance the pursuit of military and politically objectives. Airmobility distracted leaders from focusing on the political aspects of counter-insurgency.

On December 2, 1975, the Lao monarchy was abolished and replaced by the Lao People's Democratic Republic. This marked the end of a controversial U.S. policy in which the State Department, the CIA, the Department of Defense, and the United States Agency for International Development supplied covert military aid to a nation that was technically neutral. At War in the Shadow of Vietnam is the first book to recount the full story of U.S. covert activity in Laos from 1955 to 1975. Based on newly declassifled materials as well as interviews with scores of key American and Laotian participants, it describes in detail the structure and execution of America's "secret war" and the long-term consequences. In an effort to defend the Lao kingdom - and to disrupt the flow of communist arms, material, and soldiers traversing Laos en route to South Vietnam - the U.S. created and clandestinely administered a covert military aid plan that fueled a unique and little-known conflict. Castle chronicles the close relationship between the CIA and the Lao army, the role of the CIA's proprietary airline, Air America, and the evolution of U.S.-Thailand cooperation and the impact of Thai support on the Lao military assistance program. Until now, the covert war in Laos has been documented only in fragmented and speculative fashion. By synthesizing an enormous amount of source material - much of it gathered in Laos - Castle not only deepens our understanding of American intervention in Southeast Asia but also provides a masterful reconstruction of a secretive and ultimately tragic episode in United States foreign policy.