Donald Davidson has prepared a new edition of his classic 1980 collection of Essays on Actions and Events, including two additional essays. In this seminal investigation of the nature of human action, Davidson argues for an ontology which includes events along with persons and other objects. Certain events are identified and explained as actions when they are viewed as caused and rationalized by reasons; these same events, when described in physical, biological, or physiological terms, may be explained by appeal to natural laws. The mental and the physical thus constitute irreducibly discrete ways of explaining and understanding events and their causal relations. Among the topics discussed are: freedom to act; weakness of the will; the logical form of talk about actions, intentions, and causality; the logic of practical reasoning; Hume's theory of the indirect passions; and the nature and limits of decision theory. The introduction, cross-references, and appendices emphasize the relations between the essays and explain how Davidson's views have developed.

Donald Davidson has prepared a new edition of his classic 1980 collection of Essays on Actions and Events, including two additional essays.

This book explores an understudied area of language development in autism – namely, how children with autism learn the meaning of verbs. The key feature is a profile of verb acquisition in autism derived from qualitative analysis of the conversational language of ten children with autism. Douglas examines whether this profile is typical or atypical compared with verb learning in neurotypical children. Verb use is central to linguistic development, and the ability of children with autism to develop and use verb categories is of interest, because verbs also encode information about the number and type of participants and the temporal location of the activity/event. Moreover, the acquisition of verb meanings is often dependent on other cognitive skills, such as the recognition that human beings have beliefs and desires which motivate their actions. All these are areas which are widely considered problematic for children with autism and continue to generate much discussion among researchers and clinicians. This investigation is among the first studies of its type, offering new insights into the process of language acquisition in autism.

How many things did the gunman do? Is his pulling of the trigger the same as his killing of the victim? Or are these two different actions or events? Such questions are at the heart of the dispute between «unifiers» and «multipliers» over the individuation of actions and events. In this study Karl Pfeifer defends the unifying approach of G.E.M. Anscombe and Donald Davidson against the criticisms and rival views of Alvin I. Goldman and others. Along the way, the discussion touches on a variety of problems concerning causality, time, explanation, language, ontology, and identity. What finally emerges is a clearer picture of the nature of criteria of identity and individuation for actions and events than has been available to date.

"Negative actions (intentional omissions, refrainments, etc.) seem to be genuine actions. The standard metaphysical theories of action are event-based: they treat actions as events of a special kind. But it seems that many (and perhaps all) negative actions are, not events, but absences thereof. In this book, I provide a comprehensive treatment of this problem and its solution. I trace the appearance that negative actions are mere absences to the widely-assumed view that negative action sentences (sentences which describe an agent as omitting, refraining, etc.) are negative existentials, reporting the non-occurrence of an event of a certain kind. I argue, on the contrary, that such sentences report the occurrence of an event, not the absence of one. Moreover, I show how these events can be identified with ordinary, positive events of the sort we should already have in our ontology. In developing these views, I provide a comprehensive picture of the metaphysics of negative actions, the nature of our thought and talk about them, and their place in a theory of action and agency"--

Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective is the long-awaited third volume of philosophical writings by Donald Davidson, whose influence on philosophy since the 1960s has been deep and broad. His first two collections, published by OUP in the early 1980s, are recognized as contemporary classics. Now Davidson presents a selection of his work on knowledge, mind, and language from the 1980s and the 1990s. We all have knowledge of our own minds, knowledge of the contents of other minds, and knowledge of the shared environment. Davidson examines the nature and status of each of these three sorts of knowledge, and the connections and differences among them. Along the way he has illuminating things to say about truth, human rationality, and the relations among language, thought, and the world. This new volume offers a rich and rewarding feast for anyone interested in philosophy today, and is essential reading for anyone working on its central topics.

This is the first ever in-depth interpretation of Czech Action Art as a vast and very original stream of Czech post-war art within the context of the region's complex socio-political history. Based on the author's more than decade-long research, her interviews with artists and interpretations of many of their performances and other actions, Czech Action Art also features a list of all Czech happenings, events, performances, body-art pieces, land-art related and other actions from the 1960s to 1989."--Page [4] of cover.

Simon J. Evnine explores the view (which he calls amorphic hylomorphism) that some objects have matter from which they are distinct but that this distinctness is not due to the existence of anything like a form. He draws on Aristotle's insight that such objects must be understood in terms of an account that links what they are essentially with how they come to exist and what their functions are (the coincidence of formal, final, and efficient causes). Artifacts are the most prominent kind of objects where these three features coincide, and Evnine develops a detailed account of the existence and identity conditions of artifacts, and the origins of their functions, in terms of how they come into existence. This process is, in general terms, that they are made out of their initial matter by an agent acting with the intention to make an object of the given kind. Evnine extends the account to organisms, where evolution accomplishes what is effected by intentional making in the case of artifacts, and to actions, which are seen as artifactual events.