Accident analysis is an important tool for confirming the adequacy and efficiency of provisions within the defence in depth concept for the safety of nuclear power plants (NPPs). The purpose of the report is to provide the necessary practical guidance for performing adequate accident analysis in the light of current good practice worldwide.

This book captures the principles of safety evaluation as practiced in the regulated light-water reactor nuclear industry, as established and stabilized over the last 30 years. It is expected to serve both the current industry and those planning for the future. The work's coverage of the subject matter is the broadest to date, including not only the common topics of modeling and simulation, but also methods supporting the basis for the underlying assumptions, the extension to radiological safety, what to expect in a licensing review, historical perspectives and the implication for new designs.This text is an essential resource for practitioners and students, on the current best-practices in nuclear power plant safety and their basis. Contributors of this work are subject matter experts in their specialties, much of which was nurtured and inspired by Prof. Larry Hochreiter, a prominent nuclear safety pioneer.Related Link(s)

This report contains practical guidance for performing accident analysis for nuclear power plants with pressurised water reactors, based on current international good practice. It covers key aspects required including selection of initiating events and acceptance criteria, computer codes and modelling assumptions, the preparation of input data, presentation of results and quality assurance.

Accident analysis is an important tool for confirming the adequacy and efficiency of provisions within the defence in depth concept for the safety of nuclear power plants. This publication contains guidance on the specific design features of graphite moderated boiling water reactors (RBMKs), including advice regarding categorisation of initiating events, selection of acceptance criteria, and initial and boundary conditions.

This report contains practical guidance for performing accident analysis for nuclear power plants with pressurised heavy water reactors, based on current international good practice. It covers key aspects required including selection of initiating events and acceptance criteria, computer codes and modelling assumptions, the preparation of input data, presentation of results and quality assurance.

The March 11, 2011, Great East Japan Earthquake and tsunami sparked a humanitarian disaster in northeastern Japan. They were responsible for more than 15,900 deaths and 2,600 missing persons as well as physical infrastructure damages exceeding $200 billion. The earthquake and tsunami also initiated a severe nuclear accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station. Three of the six reactors at the plant sustained severe core damage and released hydrogen and radioactive materials. Explosion of the released hydrogen damaged three reactor buildings and impeded onsite emergency response efforts. The accident prompted widespread evacuations of local populations, large economic losses, and the eventual shutdown of all nuclear power plants in Japan. "Lessons Learned from the Fukushima Nuclear Accident for Improving Safety and Security of U.S. Nuclear Plants" is a study of the Fukushima Daiichi accident. This report examines the causes of the crisis, the performance of safety systems at the plant, and the responses of its operators following the earthquake and tsunami. The report then considers the lessons that can be learned and their implications for U.S. safety and storage of spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste, commercial nuclear reactor safety and security regulations, and design improvements. "Lessons Learned" makes recommendations to improve plant systems, resources, and operator training to enable effective ad hoc responses to severe accidents. This report's recommendations to incorporate modern risk concepts into safety regulations and improve the nuclear safety culture will help the industry prepare for events that could challenge the design of plant structures and lead to a loss of critical safety functions. In providing a broad-scope, high-level examination of the accident, "Lessons Learned" is meant to complement earlier evaluations by industry and regulators. This in-depth review will be an essential resource for the nuclear power industry, policy makers, and anyone interested in the state of U.S. preparedness and response in the face of crisis situations.

This publication is a companion to the IAEA Safety Report on Accident Analysis for Nuclear Power Plants. It is specifically devoted to the analysis of severe accidents. Although the publication does not explicitly differentiate between various reactor types, it has been written on the basis of the available knowledge and databases developed for light water reactors (LWRs). Its application is therefore oriented mainly towards pressurized water reactors (PWRs) and boiling water reactors (BWRs) and, to a more limited extent, water cooled water moderated power reactors (WWERs) and pressurized heavy water reactors (PHWRs).

The book has been developed in conjunction with NERS 462, a course offered every year to seniors and graduate students in the University of Michigan NERS program. The first half of the book covers the principles of risk analysis, the techniques used to develop and update a reliability data base, the reliability of multi-component systems, Markov methods used to analyze the unavailability of systems with repairs, fault trees and event trees used in probabilistic risk assessments (PRAs), and failure modes of systems. All of this material is general enough that it could be used in non-nuclear applications, although there is an emphasis placed on the analysis of nuclear systems. The second half of the book covers the safety analysis of nuclear energy systems, an analysis of major accidents and incidents that occurred in commercial nuclear plants, applications of PRA techniques to the safety analysis of nuclear power plants (focusing on a major PRA study for five nuclear power plants), practical PRA examples, and emerging techniques in the structure of dynamic event trees and fault trees that can provide a more realistic representation of complex sequences of events. The book concludes with a discussion on passive safety features of advanced nuclear energy systems under development and approaches taken for risk-informed regulations for nuclear plants.