This first full length treatment of interventionist theories of causation in the social sciences, the biological sciences and other higher-level sciences the presents original counter arguments to recent trends in the debate and serves as useful introduction to the subject.

This volume addresses fundamental issues in the philosophy of science in the context of two most intriguing fields: biology and economics. Written by authorities and experts in the philosophy of biology and economics, Mechanism and Causality in Biology and Economics provides a structured study of the concepts of mechanism and causality in these disciplines and draws careful juxtapositions between philosophical apparatus and scientific practice. By exploring the issues that are most salient to the contemporary philosophies of biology and economics and by presenting comparative analyses, the book serves as a platform not only for gaining mutual understanding between scientists and philosophers of the life sciences and those of the social sciences, but also for sharing interdisciplinary research that combines both philosophical concepts in both fields. The book begins by defining the concepts of mechanism and causality in biology and economics, respectively. The second and third parts investigate philosophical perspectives of various causal and mechanistic issues in scientific practice in the two fields. These two sections include chapters on causal issues in the theory of evolution; experiments and scientific discovery; representation of causal relations and mechanism by models in economics. The concluding section presents interdisciplinary studies of various topics concerning extrapolation of life sciences and social sciences, including chapters on the philosophical investigation of conjoining biological and economic analyses with, respectively, demography, medicine and sociology.

A comprehensive treatment of the concept of causation in evolutionary biology that makes clear its central role in both historical and contemporary debates. Most scientific explanations are causal. This is certainly the case in evolutionary biology, which seeks to explain the diversity of life and the adaptive fit between organisms and their surroundings. The nature of causation in evolutionary biology, however, is contentious. How causation is understood shapes the structure of evolutionary theory, and historical and contemporary debates in evolutionary biology have revolved around the nature of causation. Despite its centrality, and differing views on the subject, the major conceptual issues regarding the nature of causation in evolutionary biology are rarely addressed. This volume fills the gap, bringing together biologists and philosophers to offer a comprehensive, interdisciplinary treatment of evolutionary causation. Contributors first address biological motivations for rethinking evolutionary causation, considering the ways in which development, extra-genetic inheritance, and niche construction challenge notions of cause and process in evolution, and describing how alternative representations of evolutionary causation can shed light on a range of evolutionary problems. Contributors then analyze evolutionary causation from a philosophical perspective, considering such topics as causal entanglement, the commingling of organism and environment, and the relationship between causation and information. Contributors John A. Baker, Lynn Chiu, David I. Dayan, Renée A. Duckworth, Marcus W Feldman, Susan A. Foster, Melissa A. Graham, Heikki Helanterä, Kevin N. Laland, Armin P. Moczek, John Odling-Smee, Jun Otsuka, Massimo Pigliucci, Arnaud Pocheville, Arlin Stoltzfus, Karola Stotz, Sonia E. Sultan, Christoph Thies, Tobias Uller, Denis M. Walsh, Richard A. Watson

Causation is a central topic in many areas of philosophy. In metaphysics, philosophers want to know what causation is, and how it is related to laws of nature, probability, action, and freedom of the will. In epistemology, philosophers investigate how causal claims can be inferred from statistical data, and how causation is related to perception, knowledge and explanation. In the philosophy of mind, philosophers want to know whether and how the mind can be said to have causal efficacy, and in ethics, whether there is a moral distinction between acts and omissions and whether the moral value of an act can be judged according to its consequences. And causation is a contested concept in other fields of enquiry, such as biology, physics, and the law. This book provides an in-depth and comprehensive overview of these and other topics, as well as the history of the causation debate from the ancient Greeks to the logical empiricists. The chapters provide surveys of contemporary debates, while often also advancing novel and controversial claims; and each includes a comprehensive bibliography and suggestions for further reading. The book is thus the most comprehensive source of information about causation currently available, and will be invaluable for upper-level undergraduates through to professional philosophers.

Downward causation is found in two-level and multi-level systems with complex behaviour generated by many components interacting in a simple or complex way. The term was coined by the social psychologist and philosopher Donald T. Campbell, who asked the question: If many small-scale interactions can create emergent large-scale patterns, can large-scale patterns re-influence the small-scale interactions that generated them? This has led to many further questions, among them: Does the cell as a system reorganise the biochemical processes inside it in a new way? Do psychosomatic illnesses exist? Can life change biochemical laws? Can mind change the body? The chapters in this comprehensive book address these questions from the viewpoints of different disciplines. Part 1 contains a classification of positions regarding 'downward causation', Part 2 covers physics, Part 3 covers biology and psychology, Part 4 covers social and communicative systems, and Part 5 covers general philosophy.

This book presents the elaboration model for the multivariate analysis of observational quantitative data. This model entails the systematic introduction of "third variables" to the analysis of a focal relationship between one independent and one dependent variable to ascertain whether an inference of causality is justified. Two complementary strategies are used: an exclusionary strategy that rules out alternative explanations such as spuriousness and redundancy with competing theories, and an inclusive strategy that connects the focal relationship to a network of other relationships, including the hypothesized causal mechanisms linking the focal independent variable to the focal dependent variable. The primary emphasis is on the translation of theory into a logical analytic strategy and the interpretation of results. The elaboration model is applied with case studies drawn from newly published research that serve as prototypes for aligning theory and the data analytic plan used to test it; these studies are drawn from a wide range of substantive topics in the social sciences, such as emotion management in the workplace, subjective age identification during the transition to adulthood, and the relationship between religious and paranormal beliefs. The second application of the elaboration model is in the form of original data analysis presented in two Analysis Journals that are integrated throughout the text and implement the full elaboration model. Using real data, not contrived examples, the text provides a step-by-step guide through the process of integrating theory with data analysis in order to arrive at meaningful answers to research questions.

Why do ideas of how mechanisms relate to causality and probability differ so much across the sciences? Can progress in understanding the tools of causal inference in some sciences lead to progress in others? This book tackles these questions and others concerning the use of causality in the sciences.

This book goes beyond the truism that 'correlation does not imply causation' and explores the logical and methodological relationships between correlation and causation. It presents a series of statistical methods that can test, and potentially discover, cause-effect relationships between variables in situations in which it is not possible to conduct randomised or experimentally controlled experiments. Many of these methods are quite new and most are generally unknown to biologists. In addition to describing how to conduct these statistical tests, the book also puts the methods into historical context and explains when they can and cannot justifiably be used to test or discover causal claims. Written in a conversational style that minimises technical jargon, the book is aimed at practising biologists and advanced students, and assumes only a very basic knowledge of introductory statistics.

Over the last several decades, the theories of emergence and downward causation have become arguably the most popular conceptual tools in scientific and philosophical attempts to explain the nature and character of global organization observed in various biological phenomena, from individual cell organization to ecological systems. The theory of emergence acknowledges the reality of layered strata or levels of systems, which are consequences of the appearance of an interacting range of novel qualities. A closer analysis of emergentism, however, reveals a number of philosophical problems facing this theory. In Emergence, Mariusz Tabaczek offers a thorough analysis of these problems and a constructive proposal of a new metaphysical foundation for both the classic downward causation-based and the new dynamical depth accounts of emergence theory, developed by Terrence Deacon. Tabaczek suggests ways in which both theoretical models of emergentism can be grounded in the classical and the new (dispositionalist) versions of Aristotelianism. This book will have an eager audience in metaphysicians working both in the analytic and the Thomistic traditions, as well as philosophers of science and biology interested in emergence theory and causation.

Recent arguments concerning the nature of causation in evolutionary theory, now often known as the debate between the 'causalist' and 'statisticalist' positions, have involved answers to a variety of independent questions – definitions of key evolutionary concepts like natural selection, fitness, and genetic drift; causation in multi-level systems; or the nature of evolutionary explanations, among others. This Element offers a way to disentangle one set of these questions surrounding the causal structure of natural selection. Doing so allows us to clearly reconstruct the approach that some of these major competing interpretations of evolutionary theory have to this causal structure, highlighting particular features of philosophical interest within each. Further, those features concern problems not exclusive to the philosophy of biology. Connections between them and, in two case studies, contemporary metaphysics and philosophy of physics demonstrate the potential value of broader collaboration in the understanding of evolution.