In his book Law and Politics: The House of Lords as a Judicial Body 1800-1976 Robert Stevens wrote that Lord Denning was ‘certainly the most interesting and possibly the most important English judge of the twentieth century’. Stevens also suggested that Lord Denning was one of the ‘few English judges who clearly merits an extensive intellectual biography’. Freedom under the Law essays this task by setting the jurisprudence of Lord Denning in the context of the history of the 1960s and 1970s; assessing his writings about the law and examining his role in the Profumo affair and other major political and legal controversies of that era. Lord Denning’s approach to matters such as religion, education, the currency, the Empire, the Union, national security, the status of aliens and foreigners, social change, the family, the rights of trades unions and the role of the courts in the regulation of industrial conflict and the City of London are examined in the course of a detailed consideration of the judgments which he handed down in the Court of Appeal between 1962 and 1982.

When Lord Denning died in 1999, the leader writer of the Daily Telegraph wrote of ‘a deep and almost tangible ‘Englishness’ which ‘shone through many of Lord Denning’s celebrated judgments. He was patriotic, sceptical and humane; intelligent without being intellectual’. Since 1999, the nature of English identity has become the subject of debate and contention, not only within the academy, but also in politics and the media. In some respects, it could be argued that the debate about English identity is one of the most important in contemporary Britain. The Last of England considers the role of Englishness in the jurisprudence of Lord Denning, setting his conception of the role of the judiciary in the constitution, his views about the nature of history, the land and war, his understanding of equity, in particular the way in which he developed the doctrine of estoppel, his attitudes towards immigration and race and his approach to the law of the European Community in the context of the developing debate about the nature of English identity.

Risk-sharing investment is currently the buzz word in Islamic finance. However, there is an incongruence in applying multilayered and opaque Tijarah contracts for investment purposes. This has contributed to the divergence between Shariah and Common Law and caused tremendous problems and systemic legal risks to Islamic finance. The authors of Shariah Investment Agreement introduce a legal tool in the form of a Shariah Investment Agreement carefully drafted to ensure that it is Shariah-compliant and can be applied in Common Law jurisdictions as well, so as to allow for the execution of risk-sharing investment in Islamic finance. It details the building blocks and key considerations that must be noted when drafting such agreements so the investor and investee will know what to expect when entering into such a contract. Proper implementation of the Shariah Investment Agreement will pave a clear route to a harmonious convergence between Shariah and Common Law and lead to Islamic finance developing further to become a stronger, unstoppable force in the finance industry.

Writing about Lord Denning in the Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Lord Goff wrote that ‘Denning was a great master of the common law….he was one of the greatest and most influential judges ever to sit on the English bench….few would dispute that Denning was the greatest English judge of the twentieth century’. Lord Goff added that Lord Denning ‘taught the English judiciary that the common law cannot stand still [but] must be capable of development on a case by case basis; to ensure that the principles of the common law are apt to do practical justice in a living society’. Fiat Justitia is concerned with Lord Denning’s place in the common law tradition, as defined by Fortescue, Coke and Blackstone. Lord Denning’s approach to the role of the Judge, and the use of judicial discretion, set in the context of the common law tradition, and the assessments of his contemporaries, is evaluated with particular attention being paid to his understanding of precedent, statutory interpretation, individual rights and control of the abuse of power. Lord Denning’s jurisprudence, as an expression of the common law tradition, is also considered in relation to current developments in the law.

Freedom of thought is one of the great and venerable notions of Western thought, often celebrated in philosophical texts – and described as a crucial right in American, European, and International Law, and in that of other jurisdictions. What it means more precisely is, however, anything but clear; surprisingly little writing has been devoted to it. In the past, perhaps, there has been little need for such elaboration. As one Supreme Court Justice stressed, “[f]reedom to think is absolute of its own nature” because even “the most tyrannical government is powerless to control the inward workings of the mind.” But the rise of brain scanning, cognition enhancement, and other emerging technologies make this question a more pressing one. This volume provides an interdisciplinary exploration of how freedom of thought might function as an ethical principle and as a constitutional or human right. It draws on philosophy, legal analysis, history, and reflections on neuroscience and neurotechnology to explore what respect for freedom of thought (or an individual’s cognitive liberty or autonomy) requires.

The Jurisprudence of Lord Denning: A Study in Legal History consists of three volumes: Fiat Justitia: Lord Denning and the Common Law; The Last of England: Lord Denning’s Englishry and the Law and Freedom under the Law: Lord Denning as Master of the Rolls, 1962–1982. Each volume considers a different aspect of Lord Denning’s jurisprudence. Fiat Justitia is concerned with Lord Denning’s place in the common law tradition, as defined by Fortescue, Coke and Blackstone. Particular attention is paid to Lord Denning’s approach to the role of the Judge and the use of judicial discretion in relation to precedent, statutory interpretation, individual rights and control of the abuse of power. The Last of England looks at the role of Englishness in the jurisprudence of Lord Denning, setting his approach to equity, in particular the way in which he developed the doctrine of estoppel, immigration and race and the law of the European Community in the context of the developing debate about the nature of English identity. Freedom under the Law sets the jurisprudence of Lord Denning in the context of the history of the 1960s and 1970s; examining his writings about the law, role in the Profumo affair and treatment of themes such as religion, literature, education, the currency, the Empire, the Union, national security, social change, industrial conflict and the role of the City of London. The trilogy provides a comprehensive analysis of the work of one of the most important judges of the twentieth century set in its historical, political and philosophical context. In the course of preparing this work, each of the 1072 judgments of Lord Denning, as reported in the All England Law Reports for the years 1962 to 1982, was considered, together with all the books about the law which he published while sitting as a judge.

In these essays J. Willard Hurst shows the correlation between the conception of individual freedom and the application of law in the nineteenth-century United States--how individuals sought to use law to increase both their personal freedom and their opportunities for personal growth. These essays in jurisprudence and legal history are also a contribution to the study of social and intellectual history in the United States, to political science, and to economics as it concerns the role of public policy in our economy. The nonlawyer will find in them demonstration of how "technicalities" express deep issues of social values.

The Dred Scott suit for freedom, argues Kelly M. Kennington, was merely the most famous example of a phenomenon that was more widespread in antebellum American jurisprudence than is generally recognized. The author draws on the case files of more than three hundred enslaved individuals who, like Dred Scott and his family, sued for freedom in the local legal arena of St. Louis. Her findings open new perspectives on the legal culture of slavery and the negotiated processes involved in freedom suits. As a gateway to the American West, a major port on both the Mississippi and Missouri Rivers, and a focal point in the rancorous national debate over slavery’s expansion, St. Louis was an ideal place for enslaved individuals to challenge the legal systems and, by extension, the social systems that held them in forced servitude. Kennington offers an in-depth look at how daily interactions, webs of relationships, and arguments presented in court shaped and reshaped legal debates and public attitudes over slavery and freedom in St. Louis. Kennington also surveys more than eight hundred state supreme court freedom suits from around the United States to situate the St. Louis example in a broader context. Although white enslavers dominated the antebellum legal system in St. Louis and throughout the slaveholding states, that fact did not mean that the system ignored the concerns of the subordinated groups who made up the bulk of the American population. By looking at a particular example of one group’s encounters with the law—and placing these suits into conversation with similar encounters that arose in appellate cases nationwide—Kennington sheds light on the ways in which the law responded to the demands of a variety of actors.

“A brilliant and bracing analysis of the Palestine question and settler colonialism . . . a vital lens into movement lawyering on the international plane.” —Vasuki Nesiah, New York University, founding member of Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL) Justice in the Question of Palestine is often framed as a question of law. Yet none of the Israel-Palestinian conflict’s most vexing challenges have been resolved by judicial intervention. Occupation law has failed to stem Israel’s settlement enterprise. Laws of war have permitted killing and destruction during Israel’s military offensives in the Gaza Strip. The Oslo Accord’s two-state solution is now dead letter. Justice for Some offers a new approach to understanding the Palestinian struggle for freedom, told through the power and control of international law. Focusing on key junctures—from the Balfour Declaration in 1917 to present-day wars in Gaza—Noura Erakat shows how the strategic deployment of law has shaped current conditions. Over the past century, the law has done more to advance Israel’s interests than the Palestinians’. But, Erakat argues, this outcome was never inevitable. Law is politics, and its meaning and application depend on the political intervention of states and people alike. Within the law, change is possible. International law can serve the cause of freedom when it is mobilized in support of a political movement. Presenting the promise and risk of international law, Justice for Some calls for renewed action and attention to the Question of Palestine. “Careful and captivating . . . This book asks that the Palestinian liberation struggle and Jewish-Israeli society each reckon with the impossibility of a two-state future, reimagining what their interests are—and what they could become.” —Amanda McCaffrey, Jewish Currents

A comparison of French and American approaches to freedom of expression, with reference to the historical, social and philosophical contexts.