Rejecting current arguments that international law should be 'constitutionalized', this book advances an alternative, pluralist vision of postnational legal orders. It analyses the promise and problems of pluralism in theory and in current practice - focusing on the European human rights regime, the European Union, and global governance in the UN.

"Liberal constitutionalism has come under sharp attack as globalization led to a confluence of huge disparities in wealth, identity-based alienation triggered by mass migration, and accompanying erosions of democracy. Liberal constitutionalism has also been challenged by illiberal populists who have adapted its framework to mask their aim to subvert its core values. These developments bring the nexus between the constitution and justice to the fore--and in particular that concerning distributive justice in its three dimensions of redistribution, recognition, and representation. The book provides a systematic account of the central role of distributive justice in the normative legitimation of liberal constitutions. Because what distributive justice requires is highly contested, and constitutions are supposed to be susceptible of garnering a consensus among those they govern, constitutions only ought to guarantee essential but limited aspects of justice. Drawing on Rawls's insight that distributive justice calls for "constitutional essentials", the book advances the thesis that liberal constitutions must incorporate certain "justice essentials". The book is divided into three parts. Part one examines the combination of current legal, economic, political, and ideological developments that pose challenges to the normative viability of liberal constitutionalism. Part two offers a rereading of the relevant philosophical and jurisprudential literature that sheds crucial theoretical light on the relationship between constitution and justice. This rereading draws on key figures in both the analytic and the continental traditions. Finally, part three makes the case for a thoroughly pluralistic approach being optimal in the quest for a constitution's justice essentials"

We live in a pluralist world of multi-level law and governance. More than ever before multiple legal systems and governing authorities at different levels - sub-state, state, supranational, international - are recognized as applying to, and claiming authority over, the affairs of the same sets of individuals and institutions. Yet our constitutional theories fail to adequately capture this pluralist state of affairs. This book examines some of the key conceptual and theoretical puzzles which the contemporary state of multilevel pluralism poses for our constitutional theories. It offers fresh perspectives on these questions by addressing the pluralism of norms and authorities from the viewpoint of legality and legitimacy respectively, proposing novel solutions for pluralizing constitutional theory in the light of contemporary multilevel governance. Our turbulent times are on a steady trajectory of ever-more pluralism of law and governance to tackle the defining social and political problems of our age including populism, pandemic, and climate change and this book provides an essential intervention in debates on how to pluralize constitutional theory to better understand and, perhaps more importantly, legitimize the tools to address these increasingly shared problems.

This book offers the first overarching examination of constitutional pluralism. Comprehensively mapping out the leading contributions to date and solving the complicated labyrinth they currently form, Klemen Jaklic offers a complete assessment against existing and new criticisms while elaborating his own original vision.

This book represents a major new statement on the issue of property rights. It argues for the justification of some rights of private property while showing why unequal distributions of private property are indefensible. Three features of the book are especially salient: it offers a challenging new pluralist theory of justification; the argument integrates perceptive analyses of the great classical theorists Aristotle, Locke, Hegel and Marx with a discussion of contemporary philosophers such as Nozick and Rawls; and the author moves with assurance among philosophy, law and economics to present a very broad, interdisciplinary study.

In this interdisciplinary volume, a group of prominent international scholars considers alternative political formations to the nation-state, discussing their ability to preserve and expand the achievements of democratic constitutionalism in the twenty-first century and their capacity to deal with deep societal differences.

The Cold War ideological battle with universal aspirations has given way to a clash of cultures as the world concurrently moves toward globalization of economies and communications and balkanization through a clash of ethnic and cultural identities. Traditional liberal theory has confronted daunting challenges in coping with these changes and with recent developments such as the spread of postmodern thought, religious fundamentalism and global terrorism. This book argues that a political and legal philosophy based on pluralism is best suited to confront the problems of the twenty-first century. Pointing out that monist theories such as liberalism have become inadequate and that relativism is dangerous, the book makes the case for pluralism from the standpoint of both theory and its applications. The book engages with thinkers, such as Spinoza, Kant, Hegel, Rawls, Berlin, Dworkin, Habermas and Derrida and with several subjects that are at the center of current controversies.

The field of comparative constitutional law has grown immensely over the past couple of decades. Once a minor and obscure adjunct to the field of domestic constitutional law, comparative constitutional law has now moved front and centre. Driven by the global spread of democratic government and the expansion of international human rights law, the prominence and visibility of the field, among judges, politicians, and scholars has grown exponentially. Even in the United States, where domestic constitutional exclusivism has traditionally held a firm grip, use of comparative constitutional materials has become the subject of a lively and much publicized controversy among various justices of the U.S. Supreme Court. The trend towards harmonization and international borrowing has been controversial. Whereas it seems fair to assume that there ought to be great convergence among industrialized democracies over the uses and functions of commercial contracts, that seems far from the case in constitutional law. Can a parliamentary democracy be compared to a presidential one? A federal republic to a unitary one? Moreover, what about differences in ideology or national identity? Can constitutional rights deployed in a libertarian context be profitably compared to those at work in a social welfare context? Is it perilous to compare minority rights in a multi-ethnic state to those in its ethnically homogeneous counterparts? These controversies form the background to the field of comparative constitutional law, challenging not only legal scholars, but also those in other fields, such as philosophy and political theory. Providing the first single-volume, comprehensive reference resource, the 'Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law' will be an essential road map to the field for all those working within it, or encountering it for the first time. Leading experts in the field examine the history and methodology of the discipline, the central concepts of constitutional law, constitutional processes, and institutions - from legislative reform to judicial interpretation, rights, and emerging trends.

The book gathers the general report and the national reports presented at the XXth General Congress of the IACL, in Fukuoka (Japan), on the topic “Debating legal pluralism and constitutionalism: new trajectories for legal theory in the global age”. Discussing the major contemporary changes occurring in and problems faced by domestic legal systems in the global age, the book describes how and to what extent these trends affect domestic legal orderings and practices, and challenges the traditional theoretical lenses that are offered to tackle them: constitutionalism and pluralism. Combining comparative law and comparative legal doctrine, and drawing on the national contributions, the general report concludes that most of the classic tools offered by legal doctrine are not appropriate to address most of today’s practical and theoretical global legal challenges, and as such, the book also offers new intellectual tools for the global age.

Transconstitutionalism is a concept used to describe what happens to constitutional law when it is emancipated from the state, in which can be found the origins of constitutional law. Transconstitutionalism does not exist because a multitude of new constitutions have appeared, but because other legal orders are now implicated in resolving basic constitutional problems. A transconstitutional problem entails a constitutional issue whose solution may involve national, international, supranational and transnational courts or arbitral tribunals, as well as native local legal institutions. Transconstitutionalism does not take any single legal order or type of order as a starting-point or ultima ratio. It rejects both nation-statism and internationalism, supranationalism, transnationalism and localism as privileged spaces for solving constitutional problems. The transconstitutional model avoids the dilemma of 'monism versus pluralism'. From the standpoint of transconstitutionalism, a plurality of legal orders entails a complementary and conflicting relationship between identity and alterity: constitutional identity is rearticulated on the basis of alterity. Rather than seeking a 'Herculean Constitution', transconstitutionalism tackles the many-headed Hydra of constitutionalism, always looking for the blind spot in one legal system and reflecting it back against the many others found in the world's legal orders.