In this second volume of a three-part series on the Soviet Armed Forces in World War II, author Nigel Thomas turns his attention to the mid-war period. Focusing on the uniforms and organization of Soviet troops during the campaigns of the Caucasus, Stalingrad and Kursk, this book offers a detailed breakdown of all the armed forces which conducted the valiant defensive campaigns, including the army, air force, paratroopers, navy and NKVD troops. It also covers equipment and insignia and the changes brought about by the new regulations of 1943.

In the years between the Russian Revolution of 1917 and World War II, the Soviet Army underwent dramatic changes in conscription, organization and effectiveness. The Russian Army in World War I had been lacking in leadership and drive, but was transformed by the Soviets into a force to be reckoned with, as evidenced by its crucial victory at Stalingrad. Enhanced by color plates, illustrations and photographs, this book traces the development of the Soviet Army from its Tsarist heritage, through the tumultuous years of the Red Army, to its full modernization in 1957.

In a definitive new account of the Soviet Union at war, Alexander Hill charts the development, successes and failures of the Red Army from the industrialisation of the Soviet Union in the late 1920s through to the end of the Great Patriotic War in May 1945. Setting military strategy and operations within a broader context that includes national mobilisation on a staggering scale, the book presents a comprehensive account of the origins and course of the war from the perspective of this key Allied power. Drawing on the latest archival research and a wealth of eyewitness testimony, Hill portrays the Red Army at war from the perspective of senior leaders and men and women at the front line to reveal how the Red Army triumphed over the forces of Nazi Germany and her allies on the Eastern Front, and why it did so at such great cost.

David Glantz examines the Soviet study of war, the re-emergence of the operation level, the evolution of the Soviet theory of operations in depth before 1941, and its application in the European theatre and the Far East between 1941 and 1945.

"Originally published in Russian as U voiny--ne zhenskoe lietiso by Mastatskaya Litaratura, Minsk, in 1985. Originally published in English as War's unwomanly face by Progress Publishers, Moscow, in 1988"--Title page verso.

Drawing on innovative scholarship on Finland in World War II, this volume offers a comprehensive narrative of politics and combat, well-argued analyses of the ideological, social and cultural aspects of a society at war, and novel interpretations of the memory of war.

Contents: The Prewar Experience; Evolution of Airborne Forces During World War II; Operational Employment: Vyaz'ma, January-February 1942; Operational Employment: Vyaz'ma, February-June 1942; Operational Employment: On the Dnepr, September 1943; Tactical Employment; The Postwar Years.

Drawing on evidence never before seen in the West, including combat records of early engagements, David Glantz claims that in 1941 the Red Army was poorly trained, inadequately equipped, ineptly organized, and consequently incapable of engaging in large-scale military campaigns - and both Hitler and Stalin knew it. He provides a complete and convincing study of why the Soviets almost lost the war that summer, dispelling many of the myths about the Red Army that have persisted since the war and soundly refuting Viktor Suvorov's controversial thesis that Stalin was planning a preemptive strike against Germany.