The U.S. Army and World War II is an anthology of selected papers from three international conferences held in 1990, 1992, and 1994 on the Army's role in the war. Taking the best from those meetings, Judith L. Bellafaire has organized the various presentations into four thematic categories--prewar planning, the home front, the European theater, and the Asian-Pacific theaters--reflecting the diversity of both the war and the interest of those seeking to understand its many facets. In these carefully edited papers, one will find the more conventional treatments of doctrine, strategy, and operations side by side with those focusing on military mobilization and procurement, race and gender, psychological warfare, and large-scale advice and assistance programs. Despite significant changes in military technology and the geopolitical landscape of the world since those desperate times, the human problems highlighted by the authors are not much different from many of those facing Army leaders today. Although the past can never provide the specific recipes needed for the future, experience has shown that both the basic ingredients and the manner in which they are prepared and processed have remained remarkably constant. Those grappling with the challenges of stability operations and other contingency missions in support of the Global War on Terrorism will find this collection of readings invaluable.

A history of World War II’s Operation Overlord, from the campaign’s planning to its execution, as Allied forces battled to take France back from Germany. D-Day, June 6, 1944, and the seventy-six days of bitter fighting in Normandy that followed the Allied landing, have become the defining episode of World War II in the west—the object of books, films, television series, and documentaries. Yet as familiar as it is, as James Holland makes clear in his definitive history, many parts of the Overlord campaign, as it was known, are still shrouded in myth and assumed knowledge. Drawing freshly on widespread archives and on the testimonies of eye-witnesses, Holland relates the extraordinary planning that made Allied victory in France possible; indeed, the story of how hundreds of thousands of men, and mountains of materiel, were transported across the English Channel, is as dramatic a human achievement as any battlefield exploit. The brutal landings on the five beaches and subsequent battles across the plains and through the lanes and hedgerows of Normandy—a campaign that, in terms of daily casualties, was worse than any in World War I—come vividly to life in conferences where the strategic decisions of Eisenhower, Rommel, Montgomery, and other commanders were made, and through the memories of paratrooper Lieutenant Dick Winters of Easy Company, British corporal and tanker Reg Spittles, Thunderbolt pilot Archie Maltbie, German ordnance officer Hans Heinze, French resistance leader Robert Leblanc, and many others. For both sides, the challenges were enormous. The Allies confronted a disciplined German army stretched to its limit, which nonetheless caused tactics to be adjusted on the fly. Ultimately ingenuity, determination, and immense materiel strength—delivered with operational brilliance—made the difference. A stirring narrative by a pre-eminent historian, Normandy ‘44 offers important new perspective on one of history’s most dramatic military engagements and is an invaluable addition to the literature of war. Praise for Normandy ‘44 An Amazon Best Book of the Month (History) An Amazon Best History Book of the Year “Detail and scope are the twin strengths of Normandy ’44. . . . Mr. Holland effectively balances human drama with the science of war as the Allies knew it.” —Jonathan W. Jordan, Wall Street Journal “A superb account of the invasions that deserves immense praise. . . . To convey the human drama of Normandy requires great knowledge and sensitivity. Holland has both in spades.” —Times (UK)

The German Wehrmacht was one of the most capable fighting forces the world has ever known, but in the end it was no match for the Allies. Some historians contend that the Allies achieved victory through brute force and material superiority. But, as Peter Mansoor argues, all of the material produced by U.S. industry was useless without trained soldiers to operate it, a coherent doctrine for its use, and leaders who could effectively command the formations into which it was organized. This book provides a comprehensive study of America's infantry combat performance in Europe during World War II, showing that the Army succeeded by developing combat effective divisions that could not only fight and win battles, but also sustain that effort over years of combat. While American industry admittedly enabled the U.S. to sustain its overseas armies, the effectiveness of those forces ultimately rested on their organizational capabilities and ability to adapt to combat in a variety of lethal environments and to learn from their mistakes. Mansoor analyzes the impact of personnel and logistical systems on the Army's strength, explaining how leaders used these systems to keep a small number of divisions at a high state of combat effectiveness. During the critical battles of 1944-45, American divisions were able to sustain this high level while their Wehrmacht counterparts disintegrated, demonstrating that the Army's endurance in extended combat was the most critical factor in its ultimate success. Mansoor also takes a close look at the personalities and capabilities of division commanders, infantry tactics and operations, logistics, and the benefits and weaknesses of stateside training. The American army won, asserts Mansoor, because unit for unit at the division level it was more effective than its adversaries. By showing how U.S. infantry developed more quickly and fought better than commonly believed, The GI Offensive in Europe contributes significantly to the history of the U.S. Army in the European theater and to our overall understanding of military effectiveness.