When Charles de Gaulle declared that “it is because we are no longer a great power that we need a grand policy,” he neatly summarized France’s predicament on the world scene. In this compact and engaging history, author Frédéric Bozo deftly recounts France’s efforts to reconcile its proud history and global ambitions with a realistic appraisal of its capabilities, from the aftermath of World War II to the present. He provides insightful analysis of the nation’s triumphs and setbacks through the years of decolonization, Cold War maneuvering, and European unification, as well as the more contemporary challenges posed by an increasingly multipolar and interconnected world.

This book investigates how modern French foreign policy is practiced. France finds its traditional power status challenged by internal as well as external developments. Internally, it faces societal challenges related to unemployment, integration, social exclusion, Islamist terrorism and the rise of populism. Externally, its status is challenged by global and regional developments – including the financial crises, competition from emerging states, EU enlargement and a more powerful Germany. While the French recognise that they no longer have great-power economic or military power capacities, the conviction of the universal value of French civilization and culture remains strong. As this book argues, for France to be able to punch above its weight in international politics, it must effectively promote the value of ‘French universalism’ and culture. This study investigates how this is reflected in modern French foreign policy by examining foreign policy practices towards selected regions/countries and in relation to external and internal security. Written by a senior researcher specializing in French and EU foreign and security policy, this book will be an invaluable resource for practitioners of foreign policy and students of French politics, international relations and European studies.

Why do states similar in size, resources and capabilities significantly differ in their basic orientations and actions across major domains in foreign policy, security and defense? This book addresses this important question by analyzing the major differences between the foreign policies of France and Germany over extended periods of time.

This study of the French Revolution reveals that from March 1792 to April 1793, French foreign policy was dominated not by the leaders of the French revolutionary government, but by two successive French foreign ministers, Charles-Francois Dumouriez and Pierre LeBrun.

French President Charles de Gaulle (1958-1969) has consistently fascinated contemporaries and historians. His vision_conceived out of national interest_of uniting Europe under French leadership and overcoming the Cold War still remains relevant and appealing. De Gaulle's towering personality and his challenge to US hegemony in the Cold War have inspired a vast number of political biographies and analyses of the foreign policies of the Fifth Republic mostly from French or US angle. In contrast, this book serves to rediscover de Gaulle's global policies how they changed the Cold War. Offering truly global perspectives on France's approach to the world during de Gaulle's presidency, the 13 well-matched essays by leading experts in the field tap into newly available sources drawn from US, European, Asian, African and Latin American archives. Together, the contributions integrate previously neglected regions, actors and topics with more familiar and newly approached phenomena into a global picture of the General's international policy-making. The volume at hand is an example of how cutting-edge research benefits from multipolar and multi-archival approaches and from attention to big, middle and smaller powers as well as institutions.

With contributions from leading scholars in the field, this book examines France's strategies for protection against Germany and appeasement during this period, and places interwar relations in a larger European context.

This book gives the reader a straightforward and continuous survey of the history of the French Foreign Legion. By outlining the Legion's vicissitudes, victorious campaigns, epic marches, heroic and sometimes hopeless stands, dirtiest combats and dramatic defeats, but also by briefly placing the Legion back in the historical background of France, and by describing its development, organization, uniforms, equipments and weapons, the author hopes to dispel myths, and try to give a true and accurate picture of what the French Foreign Legion has been from 1831 until today. There are well-researched, detailed line drawings throughout.

On 16 May 1940 an emergency meeting of the French High Command was called at the Quai d'Orsay in Paris. The German army had broken through the French lines on the River Meuse at Sedan and elsewhere, only five days after launching their attack. Churchill, who had been telephoned by Prime Minister Reynaud the previous evening to be told that the French were beaten, rushed to Paris to meet the French leaders. The mood in the meeting was one of panic and despair; there was talk ofevacuating Paris. Churchill asked Gamelin, the French Commander in Chief, 'Where is the strategic reserve?' 'There is none,' replied Gamelin.This exciting book by Julian Jackson, a leading historian of twentieth-century France, charts the breathtakingly rapid events that led to the defeat and surrender of one of the greatest bastions of the Western Allies, and thus to a dramatic new phase of the Second World War. The search for scapegoats for the most humiliating military disaster in French history began almost at once: were miscalculations by military leaders to blame, or was this an indictment of an entire nation?Using eyewitness accounts, memoirs, and diaries, Julian Jackson recreates, in gripping detail, the intense atmosphere and dramatic events of these six weeks in 1940, unravelling the historical evidence to produce a fresh answer to the perennial question of whether the fall of France was inevitable.

Shocked by the fall of France in 1940, panicked US leaders rushed to back the Vichy governmentÑa fateful decision that nearly destroyed the AngloÐAmerican alliance. According to US Secretary of War Henry Stimson, the Òmost shocking single eventÓ of World War II was not the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, but rather the fall of France in spring 1940. Michael Neiberg offers a dramatic history of the American responseÑa policy marked by panic and moral ineptitude, which placed the United States in league with fascism and nearly ruined the alliance with Britain. The successful Nazi invasion of France destabilized American plannersÕ strategic assumptions. At home, the result was huge increases in defense spending, the advent of peacetime military conscription, and domestic spying to weed out potential fifth columnists. Abroad, the United States decided to work with Vichy France despite its pro-Nazi tendencies. The USÐVichy partnership, intended to buy time and temper the flames of war in Europe, severely strained AngloÐAmerican relations. American leaders naively believed that they could woo men like Philippe PŽtain, preventing France from becoming a formal German ally. The British, however, understood that Vichy was subservient to Nazi Germany and instead supported resistance figures such as Charles de Gaulle. After the war, the choice to back Vichy tainted USÐFrench relations for decades. Our collective memory of World War II as a period of American strength overlooks the desperation and faulty decision making that drove US policy from 1940 to 1943. Tracing the key diplomatic and strategic moves of these formative years, When France Fell gives us a more nuanced and complete understanding of the war and of the global position the United States would occupy afterward.