This monograph analyzes the current political tensions between the United States and Turkey and suggests ways to manage them. The two countries have been strategic allies since at least the end of World War II-Turkey became a North Atlantic Treaty Organization member and participated with its military forces in the Korea War, and during the Cold War protected NATO's southern flank against Soviet communism, and Turkey's military and intelligence services maintained close relationships with their Western and Israeli counterparts. These relationships were not without problems, due mostly to differences over minority and civil rights in Turkey and over Turkey's invasion of Cyprus in 1973 and continued tensions with Greece. The special relationship with the United States was put to the final test after the Islamic conservative populist political party, Justice and Development, and its current leader, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, came to power in 2002. Turkey opposed the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the NATO-backed regime change in Libya in 2011. Most recently, Turkey has had strained relations with Cyprus, Greece, and Israel-all key US allies-and has alienated the US Congress and select NATO members further by its October 2019 invasion of Syria against Kurdish forces aligned with the US military against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, all against a background of a military rapprochement with Russia. This monograph highlights differences between US agencies concerning Turkey and ways to reconcile them, and offers several policy recommendations for new directions.

This monograph analyzes the current political tensions between the United States and Turkey and suggests ways to manage them. The two countries have been strategic allies since at least the end of World War II-Turkey became a North Atlantic Treaty Organization member and participated with its military forces in the Korea War, and during the Cold War protected NATO's southern flank against Soviet communism, and Turkey's military and intelligence services maintained close relationships with their Western and Israeli counterparts. These relationships were not without problems, due mostly to differences over minority and civil rights in Turkey and over Turkey's invasion of Cyprus in 1973 and continued tensions with Greece. The special relationship with the United States was put to the final test after the Islamic conservative populist political party, Justice and Development, and its current leader, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, came to power in 2002. Turkey opposed the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the NATO-backed regime change in Libya in 2011. Most recently, Turkey has had strained relations with Cyprus, Greece, and Israel-all key US allies-and has alienated the US Congress and select NATO members further by its October 2019 invasion of Syria against Kurdish forces aligned with the US military against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, all against a background of a military rapprochement with Russia. This monograph highlights differences between US agencies concerning Turkey and ways to reconcile them, and offers several policy recommendations for new directions.

Turkey is a rising regional and global power facing, as is the United States, the challenges of political transitions in the Middle East, bloodshed in Syria, and Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons. As a result, it is incumbent upon the leaders of the United States and Turkey to define a new partnership "in order to make a strategic relationship a reality," says a new Council on Foreign Relations (CFR)-sponsored Independent Task Force.

The longstanding U.S. strategic partnership with Turkey, a powerful NATO ally, has become strained in recent years. RAND researchers assess challenges confronting the partnership and advance recommendations for sustaining it over the coming decade.

Turkey remains at a key geostrategic crossroads for U.S. security interests in Europe, the Middle East, and Central Asia. Yet, there is a perceived divergence of strategic interests between the United States and Turkey which was exacerbated by domestic political quarreling between the Islamist-led government of Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan and the Turkish General Staff. The June change in government, which saw the resignation of Erbakan, is unlikely to resolve these differences. Membership in the European Union (EU) and the Western European Union (WEU) are key foreign policy goals for Turkey's secularist Eurocentric generals. Although the prospects for admission are slim for now, Turkish military and civilian officials place a high priority on trade and investment opportunities to be gained from EU membership. The Turkish government had backed away from efforts to link support for NATO enlargement to Turkish acceptance as a full member in the EU. Nonetheless, Turkey is not enthusiastic about NATO enlargement and may push for a substantial pause after the first round or make another effort at linkage.

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This report provides background information on Turkey and discusses possible policy questions and considerations for Members of Congress. U.S. relations with Turkey-a longtime North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) ally-have evolved over time. Turkey's economic dynamism and geopolitical importance underpin its regional and global influence. Although Turkey still depends on the United States and other NATO allies for political and strategic support, and has close economic links with the European Union, its increased economic and military self-reliance since the Cold War allows Turkey relatively greater opportunity for an assertive role in foreign policy. The record of U.S.-Turkey cooperation during the Obama Administration has been mixed. To some extent it mirrors the complexities that past U.S. Administrations faced with Turkey in reconciling alignment on general foreign policy objectives with substantive points of disagreement. Greater Turkish independence of action and continuing political transformation appear to have been mutually reinforcing-with both led for more than a decade by President (previously Prime Minister) Recep Tayyip Erdogan and the Islamist-rooted Justice and Development Party (AKP). However, it remains unclear how Turkey might reconcile majoritarian views favoring Turkish nationalism and Sunni Muslim values with secular governance and protection of individual freedoms and minority rights, including with regard to Turkey's Kurdish citizens. Existing challenges for Turkey and tensions in U.S.-Turkey relations have been exacerbated by a failed coup attempt in July 2016 and the ongoing government response. The vigorous response, accompanied by the Turkish parliament's approval of a three-month state of emergency, seeks to restructure the military and other key institutions and purge Turkey of the influence of Fethullah Gulen. Gulen was formerly a state-employed imam in Turkey, and is now a permanent U.S. resident whose teachings provide foundational inspiration for an array of individuals, educational institutions, and other organizations in Turkey and elsewhere around the world. Turkish officials' claim that Gulen was responsible for the failed coup has fueled anti-American sentiment and conspiracy theories among the media and public opinion. Turkish officials have called for the United States to extradite Gulen, with some saying that a U.S. failure to do so could damage bilateral relations. U.S. officials have stated their willingness to consider any Turkish extradition request under the terms of the applicable bilateral treaty. Bilateral tensions in the failed coup's aftermath have the potential to affect U.S.-Turkey cooperation in countering the Islamic State and more broadly. Effects from some coup plotters' apparent use of Incirlik air base temporarily disrupted U.S. military operations, raising questions about Turkey's stability and the safety and utility of Turkish territory for U.S. and NATO assets.

Until a few years ago, the relationship between Washington, DC, and Ankara, Turkey, was perennially troubled and occasionally terrible. Turks strongly opposed the U.S. 2003 invasion of Iraq and have subsequently complained that the Pentagon was allowing Iraqi Kurds too much autonomy, leading to deteriorating security along the Iraq-Turkey border. Disagreements over how to respond to Iran's nuclear program, U.S. suspicions regarding Turkey's outreach efforts to Iran and Syria, and differences over Armenia, Palestinians, and the Black Sea further strained ties and contributed to further anti-Americanism in Turkey. Now Turkey is seen as responding to its local challenges by moving closer to the West, leading to the advent of a "Golden Era" in Turkish-U.S. relations. Barack Obama has called the U.S.-Turkish relationship a "model partnership" and Turkey "a critical ally." Explanations abound as to why U.S.-Turkey ties have improved during the last few years. The U.S. military withdrawal from Iraq removed a source of tension and gave Turkey a greater incentive to cooperate with Washington to influence developments in Iraq. Furthermore, the Arab Awakening led both countries to partner in support of the positive agenda of promoting democracy and security in the Middle East. Americans and Turks both want to see democratic secular governments in the region rather than religiously sanctioned authoritarian ones. Setbacks in Turkey's reconciliation efforts with Syria, Iran, and other countries led Ankara to realize that having good relations with the United States helps it achieve core goals in the Middle East and beyond. Even though Turkey's role as a provider of security and stability in the region is weakened as a result of the recent developments in Syria and the ensuing negative consequences in its relations to other countries, Turkey has the capacity to recover and resume its position. Partnering with the United States is not always ideal, but recent setbacks have persuaded Turkey's leaders that they need to backstop their new economic strength and cultural attractiveness with the kind of hard power that is most readily available to the United States. For a partnership between Turkey and the United States to endure, however, Turkey must adopt more of a collective transatlantic perspective, crack down harder on terrorist activities, and resolve a domestic democratic deficit. At the same time, Europeans should show more flexibility meeting Turkey's security concerns regarding the European Union, while the United States should adopt a more proactive policy toward resolving potential sources of tensions between Ankara and Washington that could significantly worsen at any time.

Since the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1949, America's security partnership with Turkey has been a strategic asset that both parties value. Now, however, trends in the greater Middle East, in Turkish security policies, and within Turkish society itself appear to be eroding the commonality of interests that constitutes the foundation of that partnership. Left unchecked, these trends could diminish U.S. influence in Turkey and increase instability in the Middle East. This monograph explores the dynamics of the evolving U.S.-Turkish security relationship and their implications for U.S. foreign and security policies.