The recent proliferation of free trade areas and customs unions in the world trading system has led to a revival of interest in the economic analysis of Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs). The principal theoretical question of the 1950s and 1960s (Viner) was whether PTAs encourage or discourage the worldwide nondiscriminatory freeing of trade. The essays in this volume present the central contributions to the analytical approaches developed to examine these questions. -- Provided by publisher.

Covers trends from 1957 to 1995.

Regional economic arrangements such as free trade areas (FTAs), customs unions, and currency blocs, have become increasingly prevalent in the world economy. Both pervasive and controversial, regionalization has some economists optimistic about the opportunities it creates and others fearful that it may corrupt fragile efforts to encourage global free trade. Including both empirical and theoretical studies, this volume addresses several important questions: Why do countries adopt FTAs and other regional trading arrangements? To what extent have existing regional arrangements actually affected patterns of trade? What are the welfare effects of such arrangements? Several chapters explore the economic effects of regional arrangements on patterns of trade, either on price differentials or via the gravity model on bilateral trade flows. In addition, this book examines the theoretical foundation of the gravity model. Making extensive use of the gravity model of bilateral trade, several chapters explore the economic effects of regional arrangements. In addition, this book examines the theoretical foundation of the gravity model.

Deep trade agreements (DTAs) cover not just trade but additional policy areas, such as international flows of investment and labor and the protection of intellectual property rights and the environment. Their goal is integration beyond trade or deep integration. These agreements matter for economic development. Their rules influence how countries (and hence, the people and firms that live and operate within them) transact, invest, work, and ultimately, develop. Trade and investment regimes determine the extent of economic integration, competition rules affect economic efficiency, intellectual property rights matter for innovation, and environmental and labor rules contribute to environmental and social outcomes. This Handbook provides the tools and data needed to analyze these new dimensions of integration and to assess the content and consequences of DTAs. The Handbook and the accompanying database are the result of collaboration between experts in different policy areas from academia and other international organizations, including the International Trade Centre (ITC), Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), and World Trade Organization (WTO).

Global commerce is rapidly organizing around regional trading blocs in North America, Western Europe, Pacific Asia, and elsewhere--with potentially dangerous consequences for the world trading system. Professor Kerry Chase examines how domestic politics has driven the emergence of these trading blocs, arguing that businesses today are more favorably inclined to global trade liberalization than in the past because recent regional trading arrangements have created opportunities to restructure manufacturing more efficiently. Trading Blocs is the first book to systematically demonstrate the theoretical significance of economies of scale in domestic pressure for trading blocs, and thereby build on a growing research agenda in areas of political economy and domestic politics. "Chase has written a superb book that provides us with an innovative and compelling explanation for the development of trading blocs." --Vinod Aggarwal, Director, Berkeley APEC Study Center, University of California, Berkeley Kerry A. Chase is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Tufts University.

Jagdish Bhagwati, the internationally renowned economist who uniquely combines a reputation as the leading scholar of international trade with a substantial presence in public policy on the important issues of the day, shines here a critical light on Preferential Trade Agreements, revealing how the rapid spread of PTAs endangers the world trading system. Numbering by now well over 300, and rapidly increasing, these preferential trade agreements, many taking the form of Free Trade Agreements, have re-created the unhappy situation of the 1930s, when world trade was undermined by discriminatory practices. Whereas this was the result of protectionism in those days, ironically it is a result of misdirected pursuit of free trade via PTAs today. The world trading system is at risk again, the author argues, and the danger is palpable. Writing with his customary wit, panache and elegance, Bhagwati documents the growth of these PTAs, the reasons for their proliferation, and their deplorable consequences which include the near-destruction of the non-discrimination which was at the heart of the postwar trade architecture and its replacement by what he has called the spaghetti bowl of a maze of preferences. Bhagwati also documents how PTAs have undermined the prospects for multilateral freeing of trade, serving as stumbling blocks, instead of building blocks, for the objective of reaching multilateral free trade. In short, Bhagwati cogently demonstrates why PTAs are Termites in the Trading System.

Transatlantic economic relations are dominated by three factors which are of major historical significance. The first and most important is the multilateral process for trade liberalisation, deregulation of financial markets, and macroeconomic policy co-ordination. The second factor is a transatlantic environment of national and regional idiosyncrasies exemplified by protectionist initiatives, a significant weakening of the EMS, and changes in central bank statutes. The second factor is in part a political backlash against the first. The third factor affecting transatlantic economic relations is of course the emergence of regional economic relationships within the transatlantic economy, and a treaty calling for a common currency in Europe. In this 1996 volume, specialists in international trade, international finance, and political economy analyse the causes of these three factors, and their implications.

This paper compares two possible formats for free trade in the Americas: a system of spokes surrounding a U.S. hub, and a free trade area. The paper identifies the sources of welfare change, and it argues that a country's attitude towards a system depends on whether the arrangement is a complement or a substitute trading club. The paper argues also that rent-seeking activities, and costs of administration and transportation, are likely to be higher in a hub-and-spoke system than in a free trade area.

Centering on questions of the potential optimality of some trade protection, these original contributions present research at the frontier of international trade and trade policy. They expand and test the new trade theory that has developed during the last decade, incorporating elements of industrial organization and political economy into the study of trade structure and the formation of trade policy. Essays in the first two parts take up trade policy, addressing issues such as the formation of trading blocks, strategic trade policy, the political economy of protection, growth-oriented trade policies, and including empirical studies of the welfare effects of quality - upgrading voluntary export restrictions and import quotas. Essays in the third part discuss various structural issues such as trade in services, intersectoral adjustments, and the advantage of early entry. Elhanan Helpman and Assaf Razin are Professors of Economics at Tel Aviv University and NBER Research Associates. Contents: Trade Policy: Theory. Is Bilateralism Bad? Paul R. Krugman. Strategic Trade Policy and Direct Foreign Investment: When Are Tariffs and Quotas Equivalent? James A. Levinsohn. Making Altruism Pay in Auction Quotas, Kala Krishna. On the Ineffectiveness of Made-to-Measure Protectionist Programs, Aaron Tornell. Export Subsidies and Price Competition, Peter Neary. Adverse Selection in Credit Markets and Infant Industry Protection, Harry Flam and Robert W. Staiger. Protection, Politics, and Market Structure, Arye L. Hillman. Growth and Welfare in a Small Open Economy, Gene M. Grossman and Elhanan Helpman. Trade Policy: Evidence. Quality Upgrading and Its Welfare Cost in U.S. Imports, 1969-74, Randi Boorstein and Robert C. Feenstra. Counting the Cost of Voluntary Export Restraints in the European Car Market, Alasdair Smith and Anthony J. Venables. Structural Issues. Services in International Trade, Wilfred J. Ethier and Henrik Horn. First-Mover Advantages, Blockaded Entry, and the Economics of Uneven Development, James R. Markusen. Wage Sensitivity Rankings and Temporal Convergence, Ronald W. Jones and Peter Neary.