'The added value of this book is in both the unusually rich teaching experience which inspires its design - the author has for many years risen to the challenge of making the common law comprehensible to students formed within the civilian tradition - and the remarkable depth of his interdisciplinary and comparative research in the field of legal method and epistemology, which underlies its content.'-Horatia Muir-Watt, Sciences-po, Paris, France --

This comprehensive book provides a comparative overview of legal institutions that intersect with everyday life: contracts, unilateral legal transactions, torts, negotiorum gestio and unjust enrichment. These institutions form the core of the Law of Obligations, which is examined in this book from the perspective of all major legal traditions including Civil, Common, Islamic and Chinese law.

This book is widely regarded as one of the most remarkable achievements in Roman Law and Comparative Law scholarship this century - a fact attested to by the universal acclaim with which it has been received throughout Europe, America, and beyond. As a work of Roman Law scholarship it fusesthe vast volume of 20th century scholarship on the Roman law of obligations into a clear and very readable (and in many ways original) account of the law. As a work of comparative law it traces the transformation of the Roman law of obligations over the centuries into what is now modern German,English and South African law, presenting the reader with a contrast between these legal systems which is unique both in its scope and its depth. As a whole the book is written with a deep understanding of human nature and of many social, economic, and other forces that determine the face of thelaw.

Long a major element of classical studies, the examination of the laws of the ancient Romans has gained momentum in recent years as interdisciplinary work in legal studies has spread. Two resulting issues have arisen, on one hand concerning Roman laws as intellectual achievements and historical artifacts, and on the other about how we should consequently conceptualize Roman law. Drawn from a conference convened by the volume's editor at the American Academy in Rome addressing these concerns and others, this volume investigates in detail the Roman law of obligations—a subset of private law—together with its subordinate fields, contracts and delicts (torts). A centuries-old and highly influential discipline, Roman law has traditionally been studied in the context of law schools, rather than humanities faculties. This book opens a window on that world. Roman law, despite intense interest in the United States and elsewhere in the English-speaking world, remains largely a continental European enterprise in terms of scholarly publications and access to such publications. This volume offers a collection of specialist essays by leading scholars Nikolaus Benke, Cosimo Cascione, Maria Floriana Cursi, Paul du Plessis, Roberto Fiori, Dennis Kehoe, Carla Masi Doria, Ernest Metzger, Federico Procchi, J. Michael Rainer, Salvo Randazzo, and Bernard Stolte, many of whom have not published before in English, as well as opening and concluding chapters by editor Thomas A. J. McGinn.

When people in a relationship disagree about their obligations to each other, they need to rely on a method of reasoning that allows the relationship to flourish while advancing each person's private projects. This book presents a method of reasoning that reflects how people reason through disagreements and how courts create doctrine by reasoning about the obligations arising from the relationship. Built on the ideal of the other-regarding person, Contract Law and Social Morality displays a method of reasoning that allows one person to integrate their personal interests with the interests of another, determining how divergent interests can be balanced against each other. Called values-balancing reasoning, this methodology makes transparent the values at stake in a disagreement, and provides a neutral and objective way to identify and evaluate the trade-offs that are required if the relationship is to be sustained or terminated justly.

'Contract as Promise' is a study of the foundations and structure of contract law. It has both theoretical and pedagogic purposes. It moves from trust to promise to the nuts and bolts of contract law. The author shows that contract law has an underlying unifying moral and practical structure. This second edition retains the original text, and includes a new Preface. It also includes a lengthy postscript that takes account of scholarly and practical developments in the field over the last thirty years, especially the large and rich law and economics literature.

“One of the most important contributions to the field of contract theory—if not the most important—in the past 25 years.” —Stephen A. Smith, McGill University Can we account for contract law on a moral basis that is acceptable from the standpoint of liberal justice? To answer this question, Peter Benson develops a theory of contract that is completely independent of—and arguably superior to—long-dominant views, which take contract law to be justified on the basis of economics or promissory morality. Through a detailed analysis of contract principles and doctrines, Benson brings out the specific normative conception underpinning the whole of contract law. Contract, he argues, is best explained as a transfer of rights, which is complete at the moment of agreement and is governed by a definite conception of justice—justice in transactions. Benson’s analysis provides what John Rawls called a public basis of justification, which is as essential to the liberal legitimacy of contract as to any other form of coercive law. The argument of Justice in Transactions is expressly complementary to Rawls’s, presenting an original justification designed specifically for transactions, as distinguished from the background institutions to which Rawls’s own theory applies. The result is a field-defining work offering a comprehensive theory of contract law. Benson shows that contract law is both justified in its own right and fully congruent with other domains—moral, economic, and political—of liberal society.