This book is the first book to comprehensively and deeply explain and construct the legal system of Chinese art auctions. Based on agency theory in traditional contract law, this book combs the legal relationship between client, auctioneer, and buyer. Aiming at the most difficult problem of art identification, this book shows the obligations that auctioneers must perform and the common methods for auctioneers to avoid these obligations. The purpose of this book is to ease the current situation in which the interests of buyers and auctioneers are too opposed and speed up the legalization process of art auctions through the construction of the legal system of art auctions in China. Additionally, using the method of policy demonstration, this book discusses how public power should intervene in the process of art auctions.

From America to Zanzibar, the popularity of wine has skyrocketed in recent years. While millions of people have come to appreciate wine’s taste, a growing number of collectors also recognize it as a sound investment. For these savvy individuals, as well as top chefs and wine aficionados, the wine auction has become an important place to find superior wines. Now, renowned wine auctioneer Ursula Hermacinski has written The Wine Lover’s Guide to Auctions to explain how wine auctions really work so that you, too, can become a successful player. The guide begins by exploring the history of wine auctions. It then provides information on wine basics and details the auction process—for buyers and sellers. Rounding out the book are helpful hints for starting or expanding your wine collection, choosing the best auction house for your needs, and organizing your own wine tasting.

The practical importance of auction theory is widely recognized. This is an introduction to the basic theory of auction that provided the insights for the design of auctions such as the sale of spectrum for mobiles telecommunications and the sale of former government-owned companies around the globe.

A guide to modeling and analyzing auctions, with the applications of game theory and auction theory to real-world auction decision making. Auctions are highly structured market transactions primarily used in thin markets (markets with few participants and infrequent transactions). In auctions, unlike most other markets, offers and counteroffers are typically made within a structure defined by a set of rigid and comprehensive rules. Because auctions are essentially complex negotiations that occur within a fully defined and rigid set of rules, they can be analyzed by game theoretic models more accurately and completely than can most other types of market transactions. This book offers a guide for modeling, analyzing, and predicting the outcomes of auctions, focusing on the application of game theory and auction theory to real-world auction design and decision making. After a brief introduction to fundamental concepts from game theory, the book explains some of the more significant results from the auction theory literature, including the revenue (or payoff) equivalence theorem, the winner's curse, and optimal auction design. Chapters on auction practice follow, addressing collusion, competition, information disclosure, and other basic principles of auction management, with some discussion of auction experiments and simulations. Finally, the book covers auction experience, with most of the discussion centered on energy and telecommunications auctions, which have become the proving ground for many new auction designs. A clear and concise introduction to auctions, auction design, and auction strategy, this Primer will be an essential resource for students, researchers, and practitioners.

Electricity is an essential commodity traded at power exchanges. Its price is very volatile within a day and over the year. This raises questions about the efficiency of the trading rules. The author develops a non-cooperative auction model analyzing the bidding behavior of producers at power exchanges. Producers are limited by the production capacity of their power plants. Production costs are affiliated. This allows for independence or positive correlation. The author analyzes and compares a uniform-price, a discriminatory, and a generalized second-price auction. Optimal bids, cost efficiency, profits, and consumer prices are examined. A simple probability density function of affiliated production costs is given and used for examples. Numerical results are presented. The results of the analysis can help improving the bidding strategies of producers, selecting the best auction type at power exchanges or detecting price manipulations.

The Big Book of Benefit Auctions is the ultimate step-by-step handbook on how to plan and have a successful and effective auction. Auction committees will find it an invaluable reference as it provides all the tools they will need for complete auction planning and management. From setting the goal for the event, to organizing the committee, procuring auction items, building the audience, preparing the catalog and through auction night cashiering (check out) services, everything you will want to know about the auction process is readily at your fingertips in this resource guide. The book will not only contain important "how to" information, it will also explain why some decisions and activities are not only good practices, they are essential to having a well-run and efficient event. Also, the book will discuss important strategies for maximizing revenue at your event, and will cover common pitfalls and how to avoid them.