A comprehensive examination of the rulings, key figures, and legal legacy of the Stone Court. When President Franklin Roosevelt got the chance to appoint seven Supreme Court justices within five years, he created a bench packed with liberals and elevated justice Harlan Fiske Stone to lead them. Roosevelt Democrats expected great things from the Stone Court. But for the most part, they were disappointed. The Stone Court significantly expanded executive authority. It also supported the rights of racial minorities, laying the foundation for subsequent rulings on desegregation and discrimination. But whatever gains it made in advancing individual rights were overshadowed by its decisions regarding the evacuation of Japanese Americans. Although the Stone Court itself did not profoundly affect individual rights jurisprudence, it became the bridge between the pre-1937 constitutional interpretation and the "new constitutionalism" that came after.

The Birth of the Modern Constitution recounts the history of the United States Supreme Court in the momentous yet usually overlooked years between the constitutional revolution in the 1930s and Warren-Court judicial activism in the 1950s. 1941-1953 marked the emergence of legal liberalism, in the divergent activist efforts of Hugo Black, William O. Douglas, Frank Murphy, and Wiley Rutledge. The Stone/Vinson Courts consolidated the revolutionary accomplishments of the New Deal and affirmed the repudiation of classical legal thought, but proved unable to provide a substitute for that powerful legitimating explanatory paradigm of law. Hence the period bracketed by the dramatic moments of 1937 and 1954, written off as a forgotten time of failure and futility, was in reality the first phase of modern struggles to define the constitutional order that will dominate the twenty-first century.

Originally published in 1970. This is a study of one of the most highly respected tribunals in the history of the English-speaking world—the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Situated in Manhattan, the Second Circuit Court, serving New York, Connecticut, and Vermont, is the most important commercial court in the country. But, like other inferior courts, it has never been studied in depth. Marvin Schick provides a comprehensive analysis. From 1941 to 1951, Learned Hand presided over the Second Circuit as chief judge, and the court bore his stamp. But on its bench sat other men of great competence, judges Thomas W. Swan, August N. Hand, and Harrie B. Chase, as well as Charles E. Clark and Jerome N. Frank, whose constant disagreement characterized much of the court's work. Schick studies the Second Circuit Court from several angles: historical, biographical, behavioral, and case analytical. He tells a history of the court from its origins in 1789. He provides biographical sketches of the six judges who sat during Learned Hand's tenure as chief judge. He analyzes the many decisions handed down by the court, including the precedent setters. He examines the court's decision-making process, especially its unique procedures such as the memorandum system, which requires from the judges "preliminary opinions" in the cases they hear. A novel feature of this book is the correlation of votes of the Second Circuit judges with subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court. Schick was aided in his study by having access to the private papers of Judge Clark. These thousands of memoranda and letters throw much light on the workings of the Second Circuit Court and reveal the bargaining that went on among the judges in difficult cases. The Clark papers make possible a clearer understanding of the incessant conflict between Clark and Frank and show how this unusual relationship gave vitality to the Second Circuit.

Complete with headnotes, summaries of decisions, statements of cases, points and authorities of counsel, annotations, tables, and parallel references.

These three volumes contain the only collection of all substantive decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court under its original jurisdiction. This is a unique publication. Under the U.S. Constitution, the Supreme Court considers certain cases directly without taking them as an appeal from lower courts. These cases involve the United States and individual states and state against state. Cases between states may not be considered in any other court; the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction is exclusive.