Russia's forceful re-entry into the Middle Eastern arena, and the accentuated continuity of Soviet policy and methods of the 1960s and '70s, highlight the topicality of this groundbreaking study, which confirms the USSR's role in shaping Middle Eastern and global history. This book covers the peak of the USSR's direct military involvement in the Egyptian-Israeli conflict. The head-on clash between US-armed Israeli forces and some 20,000 Soviet servicemen with state-of-the-art weaponry turned the Middle East into the hottest front of the Cold War. The Soviets' success in this war of attrition paved the way for their planning and support of Egypt's cross-canal offensive in the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Ginor and Remez challenge a series of long-accepted notions as to the scope, timeline and character of the Soviet intervention and overturn the conventional view that détente with the US induced Moscow to restrainthat a US-Moscow détente led to a curtailment of Egyptian ambitions to recapture of the land it lost to Israel in 1967. Between this analytical rethink and the introduction of an entirely new genre of sources-- -memoirs and other publications by Soviet veterans themselves---The Soviet-Israeli War paves the way for scholars to revisit this pivotal moment in world history.

The eyes of the world are on the Middle East. Today, more than ever, this deeply-troubled region is the focus of power games between major global players vying for international influence. Absent from this scene for the past quarter century, Russia is now back with gusto. Yet its motivations, decision-making processes and strategic objectives remain hard to pin down. So just what is Russia up to in the Middle East? In this hard-hitting essay, leading analyst of Russian affairs Dmitri Trenin cuts through the hyperbole to offer a clear and nuanced analysis of Russia's involvement in the Middle East and its regional and global ramifications. Russia, he argues, cannot and will not supplant the U.S. as the leading external power in the region, but its actions are accelerating changes which will fundamentally remake the international system in the next two decades.

First published in 1967, The Soviet Middle East provides an analysis of the economic and political status of the national republics of Central Asia and Transcaucasia, which were, at the time of the book’s initial publication, a part of the Soviet Union. The authors analyse their economic achievements, as well as their rapid progress in health and education, comparing their situation with that of their non-Soviet neighbours and indeed with the rest of the USSR. They seek to define the relevance of the Soviet planning system and Soviet ideology to the development of these countries, and also to contextualise their study in terms of the problems of other developing countries and the political stability of the Soviet Union as a multi-nation state. Written by two leading authorities on the Soviet Union, this reissue will be welcomed by students of Soviet and Middle-Eastern history, and by all those interested in the political, social and economic development of Communist republics.

First Published in 1959, The Soviet Union and the Middle East attempts to shed light on the evolution of Soviet attitudes toward the Middle East, its problems, challenges, and opportunities since 1917. Divided into two parts, the first part "The Soviet Image of the Middle East" presents an investigation into the sources of Soviet policy in that area, while the second part "The Great Breakthrough" explores the political, social, and economic conditions in the Middle East. The volume discusses themes like storm over Asia, the arms deal, the year of Suez, the Syrian Crisis of 1957, Soviet trade and economic aid (1954-1958), Soviet cultural policy and the intellectual climate in the Arab world, communism in the Middle East (1955-1958) and communism and Arab nationalism, to ask larger questions like did the Soviet Communists expect the revolutionary events in Asia? Were they instrumental in bringing them about or did they occur quite independently? This book will be of interest to scholars and researchers of political history, international relations, West Asian Studies, Russian Studies, and history of communism.

For more than three decades, the Soviet Union was a major force in the Middle East, and superpower rivalry exacerbated many of the conflicts endemic to the region. The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union have fundamentally altered the rules of the game in Middle East politics, producing a new fluidity in the region, new diplomatic alignments, and new opportunities for peace. The contributors place recent developments in historical and political context, analyzing changes in Soviet Middle East policy under Gorbachev as well as evaluating developments since the demise of the Soviet Union. The evolution of Moscow's policy toward the Arab states, Israel, the P.L.O., and the U.N. is given special attention. The contributors also examine the emergence of Islamic fundamentalism in the new states of Central Asia and weigh the potential implications of this development for the Middle East. In addition, they discuss security issues related to the transfer of military technology from former Soviet republics to the countries of the Middle East.

"Skillfully lays out Mr. Putin's approach to the Middle East." Wall Street Journal "Detailed and fascinating." Diplomatic Courier Putin intervened in Syria in September 2015, with international critics predicting that Russia would overextend itself and Barack Obama suggesting the country would find itself in a “quagmire” in Syria. Contrary to this, Anna Borshchevskaya argues that in fact Putin achieved significant key domestic and foreign policy objectives without crippling costs, and is well-positioned to direct Syria's future and become a leading power in the Middle East. This outcome has serious implications for Western foreign policy interests both in the Middle East and beyond. This book places Russian intervention in Syria in this broader context, exploring Putin's overall approach to the Middle East – historically Moscow has a special relationship with Damascus – and traces the political, diplomatic, military and domestic aspects of this intervention. Borshchevskaya delves into the Russian military campaign, public opinion within Russia, as well as Russian diplomatic tactics at the United Nations. Crucially, this book illustrates the impact of Western absence in Syria, particularly US absence, and what the role of the West is, and could be, in the Middle East.

This book sheds light on Russia’s motives in the Middle East, examining its growing role in the region and its efforts to defend its national interests. As one of the first volumes to address both domestic and external drivers, it provides a valuable multi-dimensional account of Moscow’s foreign policy. Russian Foreign Policy Towards the Middle East also traces the historical evolution of Russia’s presence in the region, comparing Moscow’s current vision of its diplomatic priorities with the strategic goals of the Soviet Union. Diverse case studies reveal areas of both divergence and convergence between Russia and various Middle Eastern players on a range of issues, including the Syrian Civil War, Iran’s regional activities and the Yemeni conflict. In an era of renewed global tensions, this volume provides an important corrective to the notion that Russia’s Cold War-era confrontation with ‘the West’ determines its contemporary approach to the Middle East. No less important are economic interests and domestic security considerations, which push Moscow towards greater interaction with the region. Only by examining both new trends and old traditions can we understand Russia’s significance as a global player today.

Why did the Soviet Union spark war in 1967 between Israel and the Arab states by falsely informing Syria and Egypt that Israel was massing troops on the Syrian border? Based on newly available archival sources, The Soviet Union and the June 1967 Six Day War answers this controversial question more fully than ever before. Directly opposing the thesis of the recently published Foxbats over Dimona by Isabella Ginor and Gideon Remez, the contributors to this volume argue that Moscow had absolutely no intention of starting a war. The Soviet Union's reason for involvement in the region had more to do with enhancing its own status as a Cold War power than any desire for particular outcomes for Syria and Egypt. In addition to assessing Soviet involvement in the June 1967 Arab-Israeli Six Day War, this book covers the USSR's relations with Syria and Egypt, Soviet aims, U.S. and Israeli perceptions of Soviet involvement, Soviet intervention in the Egyptian-Israeli War of Attrition (1969-70), and the impact of the conflicts on Soviet-Jewish attitudes. This book as a whole demonstrates how the Soviet Union's actions gave little consideration to the long- or mid-term consequences of their policy, and how firing the first shot compelled them to react to events.

A perceptive and provocative history of Henry Kissinger's diplomatic negotiations in the Middle East that illuminates the unique challenges and barriers Kissinger and his successors have faced in their attempts to broker peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors. “A wealth of lessons for today, not only about the challenges in that region but also about the art of diplomacy . . . the drama, dazzling maneuvers, and grand strategic vision.”—Walter Isaacson, author of The Code Breaker More than twenty years have elapsed since the United States last brokered a peace agreement between the Israelis and Palestinians. In that time, three presidents have tried and failed. Martin Indyk—a former United States ambassador to Israel and special envoy for the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations in 2013—has experienced these political frustrations and disappointments firsthand. Now, in an attempt to understand the arc of American diplomatic influence in the Middle East, he returns to the origins of American-led peace efforts and to the man who created the Middle East peace process—Henry Kissinger. Based on newly available documents from American and Israeli archives, extensive interviews with Kissinger, and Indyk's own interactions with some of the main players, the author takes readers inside the negotiations. Here is a roster of larger-than-life characters—Anwar Sadat, Golda Meir, Moshe Dayan, Yitzhak Rabin, Hafez al-Assad, and Kissinger himself. Indyk's account is both that of a historian poring over the records of these events, as well as an inside player seeking to glean lessons for Middle East peacemaking. He makes clear that understanding Kissinger's design for Middle East peacemaking is key to comprehending how to—and how not to—make peace.