Regardless of technological and doctrinal advances, final mastery of any battlefield ultimately depends upon the tight-knit group of soldiers trained to direct fire, move, take ground and hold it. This book examines the infantry combat methods of World War II. It draws on the training manuals of the time and first-hand accounts of frontline action and covers the organization and tactics of squad, platoon, company and battalion. It identifies the differences between German, American, British and Japanese approaches and demonstrates how these evolved in the face of changes in the battlefield environment. Motorized infantry tactics are also covered together with each army's responses to the continuously growing challenge and shifting patterns of anti-tank combat and combined operations with armor.

Despite all technological advances, final mastery of any battlefield depends upon the tight-knit group of footsoldiers trained to manoeuvre, shoot and dig in. This first of a two-part study examines the methods by which the Western infantry of World War II - the German, British and US armies - actually brought their firepower to bear. Drawing upon period training manuals for the evolving theory, and on personal memoirs for the individual practice, this first book covers the organization and tactics of the squad of ten or a dozen men, and the platoon of three or four squads. The text is illustrated with contemporary photographs and diagrams, and with colour plates bringing to life the movement of soldiers on the battlefield.

Little has been published on US armored infantry units and tactics over the years. However, their contribution to the war effort was hugely important. There were a total of 57 armored infantry battalions and two regiments that served throughout the war and in all theaters. Equipped with halftracks, they fought as part of combined arms teams and combat commands alongside tanks, tank destroyers and artillery battalions. Significantly, they were not simply standard infantry battalions provided with halftracks. Their company and platoon organization was very different from the standard infantry unit and these highly mobile, heavily armed battalions fought in an entirely different manner. Using period training manuals and combat reports this book provides an exclusive look at the unique tactics developed by US armored infantry units including movement formations and battle drills.

The battlefield interaction between infantry and tanks was central to combat on most fronts in World War II. The first 'Blitzkrieg' campaigns saw the tank achieve a new dominance. New infantry tactics and weapons – some of them desperately dangerous – had to be adopted, while the armies raced to develop more powerful anti-tank guns and new light weapons. By 1945, a new generation of revolutionary shoulder-fired AT weapons was in widespread use. This book explains in detail the shifting patterns of anti-tank combat, illustrated with photographs, diagrams and colour plates showing how weapons were actually employed on the battlefield.

This paper focuses on the formulation of doctrine since World War II. In no comparable period in history have the dimensions of the battlefield been so altered by rapid technological changes. The need for the tactical doctrines of the Army to remain correspondingly abreast of these changes is thus more pressing than ever before. Future conflicts are not likely to develop in the leisurely fashions of the past where tactical doctrines could be refined on the battlefield itself. It is, therefore, imperative that we apprehend future problems with as much accuracy as possible. One means of doing so is to pay particular attention to the business of how the Army's doctrine has developed historically, with a view to improving methods of future development.

Historians have portrayed British participation in World War I as a series of tragic debacles, with lines of men mown down by machine guns, with untried new military technology, and incompetent generals who threw their troops into improvised and unsuccessful attacks. In this book a renowned military historian studies the evolution of British infantry tactics during the war and challenges this interpretation, showing that while the British army's plans and technologies failed persistently during the improvised first half of the war, the army gradually improved its technique, technology, and, eventually, its' self-assurance. By the time of its successful sustained offensive in the fall of 1918, says Paddy Griffith, the British army was demonstrating a battlefield skill and mobility that would rarely be surpassed even during World War II. Evaluating the great gap that exists between theory and practice, between textbook and bullet-swept mudfield, Griffith argues that many battles were carefully planned to exploit advanced tactics and to avoid casualties, but that breakthrough was simply impossible under the conditions of the time. According to Griffith, the British were already masters of "storm troop tactics" by the end of 1916, and in several important respects were further ahead than the Germans would be even in 1918. In fields such as the timing and orchestration of all-arms assaults, predicted artillery fire, "Commando-style" trench raiding, the use of light machine guns, or the barrage fire of heavy machine guns, the British led the world. Although British generals were not military geniuses, says Griffith, they should at least be credited for effectively inventing much of the twentieth-century's art of war.

This book reveals the evolving US, Viet Cong and NVA tactics at battalion level and below throughout the Vietnam War. Beginning with a description of the terrain, climate and the unique nature of operations in this theatre of war, the author, a Vietnam veteran himself, goes on to explain how unit organisation was broken down by combatant forces and the impact this had on the kind of tactics they employed. In particular, the author highlights how units were organised in reality on the battlefield as opposed to their theoretical tables of organisation. US tactics included the standard US tactical doctrine as prescribed by several field manuals and in which leaders and troops were rigourously trained. But it also reveals how many American units developed innovative small unit tactics specifically tailored to the terrain and enemy practices. In contrast, this book also reveals the tactics employed by Viet Cong and NVA units including their own Offensive Operations, Reconnaissance, Movement Formations and Security, and Ambushes.

The US armed forces were responsible for many tactical innovations during the years 1941–45, but in no field was US mastery more complete than amphibious warfare. In the vast, almost empty battlefield of the Pacific the US Navy and Marine Corps were obliged to develop every aspect of the amphibious assault landing in painstaking detail, from the design of many new types of vessel, down to the tactics of the rifle platoon hitting the beach, and the logistic system without which they could not have fought their way inland. This fascinating study offers a clear, succinct explanation of every phase of these operations as they evolved during the war years, illustrated with detailed color plates and photographs.