An examination of the relationship between the Royal Air Force and the French Fighter pilots who flew for the RAF during WWII.

Ian Gooderson presents a study of close air support in World War II, with the analysis focusing on the use of tactical air power by British and American forces during the campaigns in Italy and northwestern Europe between 1943 and 1945.

From Paul Kennedy, author of The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, one of the most acclaimed history books of recent decades, Engineers of Victory is a new account of how the tide was turned against the Nazis by the Allies in the Second World War. In January 1943 Churchill and Roosevelt and the Combined Chiefs of Staff met in Casablanca to review the western Allies' war aims and strategy. They realised that to attain their ultimate aim of 'unconditional surrender' they would have to achieve some formidable objectives - win control of the Atlantic sea-lanes and command of the air over the whole of West-Central Europe, work out how to land on an enemy-held shore so that Continental Europe could be retaken, how to blunt the Nazi blitzkrieg that a successful invasion would undoubtedly provoke, and finally how to 'hop' across the islands of the Pacific to assault the Japanese mainland. Eighteen months later on, as Paul Kennedy writes, 'these operational aims were either accomplished or close to being so.' The history of the Second World War is often told as a grand narrative. The focus of this book, by contrast, is on the problem-solvers - Major-General Perry Hobart, who invented the 'funny tanks' which flattened the curve on the D-Day beaches; Flight Lieutenant Ronnie Harker 'the man who put the Merlin in the Mustang'; Captain 'Johnny' Walker, the convoy captain who worked out how to sink U-boats with a 'creeping barrage'. The result is a fresh perspective on the greatest, conflict in human history. Paul Kennedy is one of the world's best-selling and most influential historians. He is the author or editor of nineteen books, including The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, which has been translated into over twenty languages, Preparing for the Twenty-First Century, The Parliament of Man and the now classic Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery.

Since 1899, the significant role Australian gunners have played in supporting the Australian Military Forces' campaigns has been well-documented. They have gallantly and whole-heartedly supported Australian, British, New Zealand and Indian armies in both World Wars, the Korean and Borneo Confrontation Wars and most recently the Vietnam War. Do Unto Others is a comprehensive account of the history of counter bombardment, including the development of Australian techniques, equipment and procedures through the campaigns up until Vietnam, with references to the techniques and actions of the British and American artillery included where appropriate to place the Australian experience in perspective. It is also the story of the brave men behind the artillery and their outstanding efforts and results across these varied campaigns.

In 1940, the German army fought and won an extraordinary battle with France in six weeks of lightning warfare. With the subtlety and compulsion of a novel, Horne’s narrative shifts from minor battlefield incidents to high military and political decisions, stepping far beyond the confines of military history to form a major contribution to our understanding of the crises of the Franco-German rivalry. To Lose a Battle is the third part of the trilogy beginning with The Fall of Paris and continuing with The Price of Glory (already available in Penguin).

In the First World War many battles on the Western Front had lasted weeks or months. All too often they degenerated into glacial and indecisive campaigns of attrition. By the 1930s, however, military science had recreated the possibility of a decisive battle. An unprecedented rate of technological change meant that a stream of new inventions were readily at hand for military innovators to exploit. Aircraft, armoured vehicles and new forms of motorised transport became available to make possible a fresh style of offensive warfare when the next European war began in 1939. A belief in the importance of effective war fighting was vital to the Nazi vision of Germany's future. Nazi Germany's political and military leaders aimed for rapid and decisive victory in battle. From 1939-45 new ideologies and new machines of war carried destruction across the globe. Alan Warren chronicles the sixteen most decisive battles of the Second World War, from the Blitzkrieg of Poland to the fall of Berlin.

This book is unusual inasmuch as the author is not worried about being controversial. He wrote this work in a frank manner using his personal experience. In his preface he says: 'The experience of twenty-six years' commissioned service in the Royal Air Force, coupled with an enquiring mind, led me to write this book...'The book is not about the aircrews of Bomber Command. Operations are brushed over, operational fatigue hardly men-tioned. Instead the book focuses on the policy and its wisdom. He does not raise the cry 'morality', and rightly points out that the activities indulged in by Hitler and Stalin were not pleasant. What he does do, with much relevant observation, is to point out what might have been achieved if British targeting policies had been thought through with greater intelligence. At the end in a helpful appendix he quotes the post-war interrogation of Albert Speer:QUESTION: Which, at various periods of the war, caused most concern: British or American heavy bomber attacks, day or night attacks; and why?ANSWER: The American attacks, which followed a definite system of assault on industrial targets, were by far the most dangerous. It was in fact these attacks which caused the breakdown of the German armaments industry. The night attacks did not succeed in breaking the will to work of the civilian population...

Much has been written about the conduct of the land battles and the commanders who faced each other yet, as the main protagonists realised at the time, success or failure rested on the effectiveness of their seaborne supply chain. Control of the Mediterranean was therefore absolutely crucial. In the final analysis it was the Allies' ability to dominate the Mediterranean that bought them victory but there is no denying that it was a 'damned close run thing'. In this authoritative study, Bernard Ireland brings a fresh clarity to the complexities and factors at play during this critical period.