What is "grand strategy," and why is it seemingly so important and so difficult? This monograph explores the concept of grand strategy as it has developed over the past several decades. It explains why the concept is so ubiquitous in discussions of present-day foreign policy, examines why American officials often find the formulation of a successful grand strategy to be such an exacting task, and explores the ways in which having a grand strategy can be both useful and problematic. It illustrates these points via an analysis of two key periods in modern American grand strategy--the Truman years at the outset of the Cold War, and the Nixon-Kissinger years in the late 1960s and 1970s--and provides several suggestions for how U.S. officials might approach the challenges of grand strategy in the 21st century.

What is "grand strategy," and why is it seemingly so important and so difficult? This monograph explores the concept of grand strategy as it has developed over the past several decades. It explains why the concept is so ubiquitous in discussions of present-day foreign policy, examines why American officials often find the formulation of a successful grand strategy to be such an exacting task, and explores the ways in which having a grand strategy can be both useful and problematic. It illustrates these points via an analysis of two key periods in modern American grand strategy-the Truman years at the outset of the Cold War, and the Nixon-Kissinger years in the late 1960s and 1970s-and provides several suggestions for how U.S. officials might approach the challenges of grand strategy in the 21st century.

What is "grand strategy," and why is it seemingly so important and so difficult? This monograph explores the concept of grand strategy as it has developed over the past several decades. It explains why the concept is so ubiquitous in discussions of present-day foreign policy, examines why American officials often find the formulation of a successful grand strategy to be such an exacting task, and explores the ways in which having a grand strategy can be both useful and problematic. It illustrates these points via an analysis of two key periods in modern American grand strategy -- the Truman years at the outset of the Cold War, and the Nixon-Kissinger years in the late 1960s and 1970s -- and provides several suggestions for how U.S. officials might approach the challenges of grand strategy in the 21st century.

In strategic studies and international relations, grand strategy is a frequently-invoked concept. Yet, despite its popularity, it is not well understood and it has many definitions, some of which are even mutually contradictory. This state of affairs undermines its usefulness for scholars and practitioners alike. Lukas Milevski aims to remedy this situation by offering a conceptual history of grand strategy in the English language, analysing its evolution from 1805 to the present day in the writings of its major proponents. In doing so, he seeks to clarify the meaning and role of the concept, both theoretically and practically, and shed light on its continuing utility today.

Grand strategy is one of the most widely used and abused concepts in the foreign policy lexicon. In this important book, Hal Brands explains why grand strategy is a concept that is so alluring—and so elusive—to those who make American statecraft. He explores what grand strategy is, why it is so essential, and why it is so hard to get right amid the turbulence of global affairs and the chaos of domestic politics. At a time when "grand strategy" is very much in vogue, Brands critically appraises just how feasible that endeavor really is.Brands takes a historical approach to this subject, examining how four presidential administrations, from that of Harry S. Truman to that of George W. Bush, sought to "do" grand strategy at key inflection points in the history of modern U.S. foreign policy. As examples ranging from the early Cold War to the Reagan years to the War on Terror demonstrate, grand strategy can be an immensely rewarding undertaking—but also one that is full of potential pitfalls on the long road between conception and implementation. Brands concludes by offering valuable suggestions for how American leaders might approach the challenges of grand strategy in the years to come.

This book explores fundamental questions about grand strategy, as it has evolved across generations and countries. It provides an overview of the ancient era of grand strategy and a detailed discussion of its philosophical, military, and economic foundations in the modern era. The author investigates these aspects through the lenses of four approaches - those of historians, social scientists, practitioners, and military strategists. The main goal is to provide contemporary policy makers and scholars with a historic and analytic framework in which to evaluate and conduct grand strategy. By providing greater analytical clarity about grand strategy and describing its nature and its utility for the state, this book presents a comprehensive theory on the practice of grand strategy in order to articulate the United States' past, present, and future purpose and position on the world stage.

This book makes a compelling case that lethal drone deployment as a counterterrorism tool and instrument of statecraft in targeted states engenders far-reaching consequences for US grand strategy. By examining how successive US administrations since 9/11 have deployed drones in pursuant of different typologies of US grand strategic objectives, the book probes the putative political and strategic goals drones supposedly advance, and the impact of its continued proliferation for US for international security. The book provides a powerful base of evidence for policy makers and researchers by pointing to the perils of deployment of drone technology beyond their immediate or short-term objectives. It also explores how non-state actors and authoritarian regimes such as armed groups are harnessing armed drone technologies for their own political and military ends, as well as the underlying implications for US grand strategy and international security at large.

To explore what extended competition between the United States and China might entail out to 2050, the authors of this report identified and characterized China’s grand strategy, analyzed its component national strategies (diplomacy, economics, science and technology, and military affairs), and assessed how successful China might be at implementing these over the next three decades.

This book argues that while the US president makes foreign policy decisions based largely on political pressures, it is concentrated interests that shape the incentive structures in which he and other top officials operate. The author identifies three groups most likely to be influential: government contractors, the national security bureaucracy, and foreign governments. This book shows that the public choice perspective is superior to a theory of grand strategy in explaining the most important aspects of American foreign policy, including the war on terror, policy toward China, and the distribution of US forces abroad. Arguing that American leaders are selected to respond to public opinion, not necessarily according to their ability to formulate and execute long-terms plans, the author shows how mass attitudes are easily malleable in the domain of foreign affairs due to ignorance with regard to the topic, the secrecy that surrounds national security issues, the inherent complexity of the issues involved, and most importantly, clear cases of concentrated interests. The book will be of interest to students and scholars of American Studies, Foreign Policy Analysis and Global Governance.