First published in 1982, Philosophical Foundations of Probability Theory starts with the uses we make of the concept in everyday life and then examines the rival theories that seek to account for these applications. It offers a critical exposition of the major philosophical theories of probability, with special attention given to the metaphysical and epistemological assumptions and implications of each. The Classical Theory suggests probability is simply the ratio of favorable cases to all equi-possible cases: it is this theory that is relied on by gamblers and by most non-specialists. The A Priori Theory, on the other hand, describes probability as a logical relation between statements based on evidence. The Relative Frequency theories locate it not in logic but among empirical rates of occurrence in the real world, while the Subjectivist Theory identifies probability with the degree of a person’s belief in a proposition. Each of these types of theory is examined in turn, and the treatment is unified by the use of running examples and parallel analyses of each theory. The final chapter includes a summary and the author’s conclusions. This book is an essential read for scholars and researchers of Philosophy.

The Twentieth Century has seen a dramatic rise in the use of probability and statistics in almost all fields of research. This has stimulated many new philosophical ideas on probability. Philosophical Theories of Probability is the first book to present a clear, comprehensive and systematic account of these various theories and to explain how they relate to one another. Gillies also offers a distinctive version of the propensity theory of probability, and the intersubjective interpretation, which develops the subjective theory.

Proceedings of an International Research Colloquium held at the University of Western Ontario, 10-13 May 1973.

Probability is increasingly important for our understanding of the world. What is probability? How do we model it, and how do we use it? Timothy Childers presents a lively introduction to the foundations of probability and to philosophical issues it raises. He keeps technicalities to a minimum, and assumes no prior knowledge of the subject. He explains the main interpretations of probability-frequentist, propensity, classical, Bayesian, and objective Bayesian-and uses stimulating examples to bring the subject to life. All students of philosophy will benefit from an understanding of probability, and this is the book to provide it.

This Element has two main aims. The first one (sections 1-7) is an historically informed review of the philosophy of probability. It describes recent historiography, lays out the distinction between subjective and objective notions, and concludes by applying the historical lessons to the main interpretations of probability. The second aim (sections 8-13) focuses entirely on objective probability, and advances a number of novel theses regarding its role in scientific practice. A distinction is drawn between traditional attempts to interpret chance, and a novel methodological study of its application. A radical form of pluralism is then introduced, advocating a tripartite distinction between propensities, probabilities and frequencies. Finally, a distinction is drawn between two different applications of chance in statistical modelling which, it is argued, vindicates the overall methodological approach. The ensuing conception of objective probability in practice is the 'complex nexus of chance'.

First published in 1982, Philosophical Foundations of Probability Theory starts with the uses we make of the concept in everyday life and then examines the rival theories that seek to account for these applications. It offers a critical exposition of the major philosophical theories of probability, with special attention given to the metaphysical and epistemological assumptions and implications of each. The Classical Theory suggests probability is simply the ratio of favorable cases to all equi-possible cases: it is this theory that is relied on by gamblers and by most non-specialists. The A Priori Theory, on the other hand, describes probability as a logical relation between statements based on evidence. The Relative Frequency theories locate it not in logic but among empirical rates of occurrence in the real world, while the Subjectivist Theory identifies probability with the degree of a person’s belief in a proposition. Each of these types of theory is examined in turn, and the treatment is unified by the use of running examples and parallel analyses of each theory. The final chapter includes a summary and the author’s conclusions. This book is an essential read for scholars and researchers of Philosophy.

A collection of papers presented at the conference on Probability Theory - Philosophy, Recent History and Relations to Science, University of Roskilde, Denmark, September 16-18, 1998. Since the measure theoretical definition of probability was proposed by Kolmogorov, probability theory has developed into a mature mathematical theory. It is today a fruitful field of mathematics that has important applications in philosophy, science, engineering, and many other areas. The measure theoretical definition of probability and its axioms, however, are not without their problems; some of them even puzzled Kolmogorov. This book sheds light on some recent discussions of the problems in probability theory and their history, analysing their philosophical and mathematical significance, and the role pf mathematical probability theory in other sciences.

This book is open access under a CC BY 4.0 license.This book addresses the age-old problem of infinite regresses in epistemology. How can we ever come to know something if knowing requires having good reasons, and reasons can only be good if they are backed by good reasons in turn? The problem has puzzled philosophers ever since antiquity, giving rise to what is often called Agrippa's Trilemma. The current volume approaches the old problem in a provocative and thoroughly contemporary way. Taking seriously the idea that good reasons are typically probabilistic in character, it develops and defends a new solution that challenges venerable philosophical intuitions and explains why they were mistakenly held. Key to the new solution is the phenomenon of fading foundations, according to which distant reasons are less important than those that are nearby. The phenomenon takes the sting out of Agrippa's Trilemma; moreover, since the theory that describes it is general and abstract, it is readily applicable outside epistemology, notably to debates on infinite regresses in metaphysics. The book is a potential game-changer and a must for any advanced student or researcher in the field.

This reissue of D. A. Gillies highly influential work, first published in 1973, is a philosophical theory of probability which seeks to develop von Mises’ views on the subject. In agreement with von Mises, the author regards probability theory as a mathematical science like mechanics or electrodynamics, and probability as an objective, measurable concept like force, mass or charge. On the other hand, Dr Gillies rejects von Mises’ definition of probability in terms of limiting frequency and claims that probability should be taken as a primitive or undefined term in accordance with modern axiomatic approaches. This of course raises the problem of how the abstract calculus of probability should be connected with the ‘actual world of experiments’. It is suggested that this link should be established, not by a definition of probability, but by an application of Popper’s concept of falsifiability. In addition to formulating his own interesting theory, Dr Gillies gives a detailed criticism of the generally accepted Neyman Pearson theory of testing, as well as of alternative philosophical approaches to probability theory. The reissue will be of interest both to philosophers with no previous knowledge of probability theory and to mathematicians interested in the foundations of probability theory and statistics.