Information dominance may be defined as superiority in the generation, manipulation, and use of information sufficient to afford its possessors military dominance. It has three sources: Command and control that permits everyone to know where they (and their cohorts) are in the battlespace, and enables them to execute operations when and as quickly as necessary; Intelligence that ranges from knowing the enemy's dispositions to knowing the location of enemy assets in real-time with sufficient precision for a one-shot kill; information warfare that confounds enemy information systems at various points (sensors, communications, processing, and command), while protecting one's own. Technical means, nevertheless, are no substitute for information dominance at the strategic level: knowing oneself and one's enemy; and, at best, inducing them to see things as one does.

Information dominance may be defined as superiority in the generation, manipulation, and use of information sufficient to afford its possessors military dominance. It has three sources: Command and control that permits everyone to know where they (and their cohorts) are in the battlespace, and enables them to execute operations when and as quickly as necessary; Intelligence that ranges from knowing the enemy's dispositions to knowing the location of enemy assets in real-time with sufficient precision for a one-shot kill; information warfare that confounds enemy information systems at various points (sensors, communications, processing, and command), while protecting one's own. Technical means, nevertheless, are no substitute for information dominance at the strategic level: knowing oneself and one's enemy; and, at best, inducing them to see things as one does.

There are many risks to the U.S. Army's command and control (C2) operations and to its intelligence and information warfare (IW) capabilities. The challenges include: significant uncertainty; sudden unexpected events; high noise and clutter levels in intelligence pictures; basic and complex deceptions exercised through a variety of channels; the actions of hidden malign actors; and novel forms of attack on U.S. and allied command, control, communications, computers, information/intelligence, surveillance, targeting acquisition, and reconnaissance (C4ISTAR) systems.If the U.S. Army is to secure and maintain information dominance in all environments, it must exploit complexity and uncertainty in the battlespace and not simply seek to overcome it. Innovation requires that new ideas are considered, and that old ideas should be robustly challenged. To achieve and maintain information dominance, the U.S. Army will also require a significant injection of innovation, a robust and resilient C2 and intelligence capability, novel technologies and an accelerated information operations capability development program that is broad, deep, sustained and well-coordinated. Furthermore, once information dominance is achieved, maintaining it will demand continuous change and development.

This book revises the strategic objectives of Information Warfare, interpreting them according to the modern canons of information age, focusing on the fabric of society, the economy, and critical Infrastructures. The authors build plausible detailed real-world scenarios for each entity, showing the related possible threats from the Information Warfare point of view. In addition, the authors dive into the description of the still open problems, especially when it comes to critical infrastructures, and the countermeasures that can be implemented, possibly inspiring further research in the domain. This book intends to provide a conceptual framework and a methodological guide, enriched with vivid and compelling use cases for the readers (e.g. technologists, academicians, military, government) interested in what Information Warfare really means, when its lenses are applied to current technology. Without sacrificing accuracy, rigor and, most importantly, the big picture of Information Warfare, this book dives into several relevant and up-to-date critical domains. The authors illustrate how finance (an always green target of Information Warfare) is intertwined with Social Media, and how an opponent could exploit these latter ones to reach its objectives. Also, how cryptocurrencies are going to reshape the economy, and the risks involved by this paradigm shift. Even more compelling is how the very fabric of society is going to be reshaped by technology, for instance how our democratic elections are exposed to risks that are even greater than what appears in the current public discussions. Not to mention how our Critical Infrastructure is becoming exposed to a series of novel threats, ranging from state-supported malware to drones. A detailed discussion of possible countermeasures and what the open issues are for each of the highlighted threats complete this book. This book targets a widespread audience that includes researchers and advanced level students studying and working in computer science with a focus on security. Military officers, government officials and professionals working in this field will also find this book useful as a reference.

There are many risks to the U.S. Army's command and control (C2) operations and to its intelligence and information warfare (IW) capabilities. The challenges include: significant uncertainty; sudden unexpected events; high noise and clutter levels in intelligence pictures; basic and complex deceptions exercised through a variety of channels; the actions of hidden malign actors; and novel forms of attack on U.S. and allied command, control, communications, computers, information/intelligence, surveillance, targeting acquisition, and reconnaissance (C4ISTAR) systems.If the U.S. Army is to secure and maintain information dominance in all environments, it must exploit complexity and uncertainty in the battlespace and not simply seek to overcome it. Innovation requires that new ideas are considered, and that old ideas should be robustly challenged. To achieve and maintain information dominance, the U.S. Army will also require a significant injection of innovation, a robust and resilient C2 and intelligence capability, novel technologies and an accelerated information operations capability development program that is broad, deep, sustained and well-coordinated. Furthermore, once information dominance is achieved, maintaining it will demand continuous change and development.

On one level, Information Warfare (IW) and deterrence are well matched, but on other levels the two topics can be seen as orders of magnitude apart. IW covers a huge domain while deterrence is a narrow topic. Their relationship is spotty-highly relevant on some topics, marginally so on others, and not at all relevant in many areas. The term "information warfare" typically focuses on the military or cyber-war domains dominated by computers. This narrow definition is inconsistent with the broad policy questions relevant to IW, its impact from cooperation to competition and conflict, and the key role of information media. Deterrence is part of IW only when the attacker is known (or can be discovered), the defender has a credible capability to threaten important interests of the attacker, and the attacker cannot defend those interests.

Acknowledgments -- Introduction: the power of algorithms -- A society, searching -- Searching for Black girls -- Searching for people and communities -- Searching for protections from search engines -- The future of knowledge in the public -- The future of information culture -- Conclusion: algorithms of oppression -- Epilogue -- Notes -- Bibliography -- Index -- About the author

Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) are an integral part of the US national critical infrastructure. They must be protected from hostile intent or use to the same level as any other military or commercial asset involved in US national security. However, from the Spratly Islands to Djibouti to heartland America, the expanding Chinese Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS / Drone) industry has outpaced the US technologically and numerically on all fronts: military, commercial, and recreational. Both countries found that there were large information security gaps in unmanned systems that could be exploited on the international cyber-security stage. Many of those gaps remain today and are direct threats to US advanced Air Assets if not mitigated upfront by UAS designers and manufacturers. The authors contend that US military / commercial developers of UAS hardware and software must perform cyber risk assessments and mitigations prior to delivery of UAS systems to stay internationally competitive and secure. The authors have endeavored to bring a breadth and quality of information to the reader that is unparalleled in the unclassified sphere. This book will fully immerse and engage the reader in the cyber-security considerations of this rapidly emerging technology that we know as unmanned aircraft systems (UAS). Topics covered include National Airspace (NAS) policy issues, information security, UAS vulnerabilities in key systems (Sense and Avoid / SCADA), collision avoidance systems, stealth design, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms; weapons systems security; electronic warfare considerations; data-links, jamming operational vulnerabilities and still-emerging political scenarios that affect US military / commercial decisions.

Rapid progress in information and communications technologies is dramatically enhancing the strategic role of information, positioning effective exploitation of these technology advances as a critical success factor in military affairs. These technology advances are drivers and enablers for the "nervous system" of the militaryâ€"its command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) systemsâ€"to more effectively use the "muscle" side of the military. Authored by a committee of experts drawn equally from the military and commercial sectors, Realizing the Potential of C4I identifies three major areas as fundamental challenges to the full Department of Defense (DOD) exploitation of C4I technologyâ€"information systems security, interoperability, and various aspects of DOD process and culture. The book details principles by which to assess DOD efforts in these areas over the long term and provides specific, more immediately actionable recommendations. Although DOD is the focus of this book, the principles and issues presented are also relevant to interoperability, architecture, and security challenges faced by government as a whole and by large, complex public and private enterprises across the economy.

Information warfare and its primary objective of achieving information dominance over enemy forces have arisen as a major area of emphasis for future military actions. The concept of information dominance and the issues involved in attaining it are explored through a model of situation awareness within the context of the type of complex, distributed crews (or military units) envisioned in future military operations. Achieving information dominance involves far more than having more data than the enemy. It will require that available data be transformed into relevant information in a timely manner for a multitude of forces, each with varied and dynamically changing but inter-related information needs. Further, the information must be properly understood by each within the context of a joint mission. The difficulty of accomplishing this task is not to be underestimated, however. This is exactly where an understanding of situation awareness and the factors that impact it are essential. By examining what is known about how people access, assimilate and interpret information to develop situation awareness as well as how this fits within the decision making and action cycle, clear directions for the development of systems to support the goal of information dominance can be established.