In recent times, the United States, Japan and Australia have all promoted extremely similar visions of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific as the central organizing concept to guide their efforts in the region. The concept is essentially a reaffirmation of the security and economic rules-based order which was cobbled together after the Second World War — especially as it relates to freedom of the regional and global commons such as sea, air and cyberspace, and the way nations conduct economic relations. Be that as it may, the Free and Open Indo-Pacific is an updated vision of collective action to defend, strengthen and advance that order. It signals a greater acceptance by the two regional allies of the U.S. of their security burden and takes into account the realities of China’s rise and the relative decline in dominance of the U.S. There are a number of noteworthy “updates” which include: • A deliberate move from “Asia-Pacific” to “Indo-Pacific” as the primary geo-strategic and geo-economic area of interest and responsibility for the three countries; • An increased emphasis on creating and sustaining a “balance of power” in favour of the rules-based order; and • A greater emphasis on the liberal aspects of a preferred order including the importance of rule-of-law and limitations on how governments wield their power, and greater separation of political and strategic objectives on one hand with commercial activities on the other. While operationalization of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific concept is at an early stage, trilateral strategic cooperation between the U.S., Japan and Australia is significant and quickly deepening. On the other hand, and with respect to misalignment and inconsistency, the economic policies of the Trump administration are causing considerable frustration. The three countries have also been strong supporters for the revival of the Quadrilateral grouping which also includes India. However, and notwithstanding some apprehension in Southeast Asia, about where the “Quad” is heading, the latter grouping is only still a fledgling one and its shape and development will depend on the extent to which the four countries become concerned about China’s activities in both Oceans. Finally, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and its member states continue to delay any definitive response to the Free and Open Indo-Pacific concept. Although its principles are attractive to many ASEAN member states, long-held conceptions of ASEAN centrality and its meaning gives the organization apparent reason for hesitation. The reasons include fears of diminished centrality and relevance, and reluctance to endorse a more confrontational mindset being adopted by the U.S. and its allies — including the revival of the Quadrilateral grouping with India — with respect to China. The reality is that while ASEAN and major member states are focused primarily on the risks of action, there are considerable risks of inaction and hesitation. The current era will either enhance or lessen the relevance of ASEAN in the eyes of these three countries in the years ahead depending on how the organisation and its key member states respond. Indeed, the paper argues that ASEAN is more likely to be left behind by strategic events and developments if it remains passive, and that the ball is in ASEAN’s court in terms of the future of its regional “centrality”.

Founded in 1967, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has emerged as one of the most successful regional organizations in the world. This book discusses the future of ASEAN against a backdrop of a growing US–China rivalry and the security implications of COVID-19. Chapters in this book move through a history of ASEAN and its multilateral institutions, including the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the East Asia Summit (EAS), featuring rare photographic material to contextualize both recent developments in regional security and projections for ASEAN’s prospects. Key concepts and terms are unpacked throughout, with the chapters focusing on rapidly changing international and regional environments, economic insecurities such as trade conflicts, human rights, and ASEAN identity, and providing extensive analysis of the factors challenging the principle ASEAN Centrality and the Indo-Pacific security architecture. The concept of security community frames this book, despite being subject to change if intraregional discord and institutional stagnation take hold. As a discussion of the role and future of ASEAN in a pivotal period of world history, ASEAN and Regional Order will prove vital to both students and scholars of international relations, regional organizations, and Asian studies more broadly.

This book brings together a unique team of academics and practitioners to analyse interests, institutions, and issues affecting and affected by the transition from Asia-Pacific to Indo-Pacific. The Indo-Pacific has emerged as the world’s economic and strategic centre of gravity, in which established and rising powers compete with each other. As a strategic space, the Indo-Pacific reflects the rise of geo-political and geo-economic designs and dynamics which have come to shape the region in the early twenty-first century. These new dynamics contrast with the (neo-)liberal ideas and the seemingly increasing globalisation for which the once dominant ‘Asia-Pacific’ regional label stood.

While US-centred bilateralism and ASEAN-led multilateralism have largely dominated the post-Cold War regional security architecture in the Indo-Pacific, increasing doubts about their effectiveness have resulted in countries turning to alternative forms of cooperation, such as minilateral arrangements. Compared to multilateral groupings, minilateral platforms are smaller in size, as well as more exclusive, flexible and functional. Both China and the US have contributed to minilateral initiatives in the Indo-Pacific. In the case of the former, there is the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation mechanism—involving China, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam—established in 2015. In the case of the latter, there has been a revival of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue in 2017—involving the US, Australia, Japan and India. This book examines the rise of these arrangements, their challenges and opportunities, as well as their impact on the extant regional security architecture, including on the ASEAN-led multilateral order. A valuable guide for students and policy-makers looking to understand the nature and development of minilateralism in the Indo-Pacific region.

This book assesses the important role of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in the management of regional political, security and economic relations. The author argues that ASEAN's prominent role in the region, spanning 50 years, is largely due to the acquiescence of the great powers who endorsed ASEAN, accepted its regional position and accorded the institution a legitimacy and durability that, otherwise, it would not have. This text offers a key intervention into the debate regarding ASEAN and regional order by showing how ASEAN's contribution to order management is part of a negotiated division of labour with the great powers. The author applies an innovative social roles analysis, which captures the dynamic interactions between ASEAN and the great powers from the Cold War to the present day. Robert Yates is Senior Teaching Associate in Politics at the School of Sociology, Politics and International Studies (SPAIS), University of Bristol, UK.

This book explains why the idea of the Indo-Pacific is so strategically important and concludes with a strategy designed to help the West engage with Chinese power in the region in such a way as to avoid conflict.

This volume argues that international security in the Asia-Pacific lends itself to contradictory analyses of centrifugal and centripetal trends. Transitional polycentrism is intrinsically awkward as a description of the security of states and their populations; it implies the loosening of state control and the emergence of newly asserted authority by mixed constellations of intergovernmental organizations and non-state actors. It implies a competition of agendas: threats to the integrity of borders and human security threats such as natural disasters, airliner crashes, and displacement by man-made pollution and food scarcity. Conversely, polycentrism could also imply a return to a more neo-realist oriented international order where great powers ignore ASEAN and steer regional order according to their perceived interests and relative military superiority. This book embraces these contradictory trends as a foundation of analysis and accepts that disorder can also be re-described from the perspective of studied detachment as polycentric order.

Written by the highly regarded diplomat Marty Natalegawa, former ambassador and foreign minister of Indonesia, this book offers a unique insider-perspective on the present and future relevance of ASEAN. It is about ASEAN’s quest for security and prosperity in a region marked by complex dynamics of power. Namely, the interplay of relations and interests among countries — large and small — which provide the settings within which ASEAN must deliver on its much-cited leadership and centrality in the region. The book seeks to answer the following questions: How can ASEAN build upon its past contributions to the peace, security and prosperity of Southeast Asia, to the wider East Asia, the Asia-Pacific and the Indo-Pacific regions? More fundamentally and a sine qua non, how can ASEAN continue to ensure that peace, security and prosperity prevail in Southeast Asia? And, equally central, how can ASEAN become more relevant to the peoples of ASEAN, such that its contributions can be genuinely felt in making better the lives of its citizens?

This edited volume examines the political and security issues influencing and shaping the developing maritime order in the Indo Pacific. If focuses specifically on the impact of China’s maritime expansion upon the policies and strategies of the regional states as well as the major players. The chapters examine the interaction of these players, paying particular attention to Japan, as the originator of the Indo Pacific idea and promoter of security cooperation and regionalism. It also covers the responses of the ASEAN claimants, Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines as well as Indonesia, alongside the key players, India, the US and also the EU.

Examining the pivotal relationship between Japan and Southeast Asia, as it has changed and endured into the Indo-Pacific Era