The storied history of the US Army's elite 10th Mountain Division is presented here in precise detail by Dennis Chapman, a former officer in the division. The reader will first learn of the outfit's 1943 activation, then the dramatic story of their famous WWII Italian campaign. After successfully storming the near-vertical slope of Riva Ridge (thought unclimbable by their German opponents) and then seizing the strategic heights of the Mount Belvedere massif, the men of the 10th Mountain Division battered their way through the Apennine Mountains. Breaking out into the Po Valley, the 10th Mountain Division raced across the lowlands to the foot of the Austrian Alps, slamming the door shut on thousands of retreating Axis troops. The reader will also learn about the heroism of the 10th Mountain Division troops at the Battle of the Black Sea in Mogadishu—the famous story of "Black Hawk Down"—as well as its exploits during the early years of the global war on terror. Unlike most books of its kind, this book goes beyond those famous exploits, bringing together all the threads of the division's history. Chapman also recounts the history of the 10th Mountain Division in its Cold War incarnations at Fort Riley, Kansas, and in Germany. He also tells the story of the 87th Infantry Regiment, the last remaining of the division's three original regiments, and the only element of the division to continue in existence from the division's deactivation in 1958 until its reactivation in 1985.

The Cold War did not culminate in World War III as so many in the 1950s and 1960s feared, yet it spawned a host of military engagements that affected millions of lives. This book is the first comprehensive, multinational overview of military affairs during the early Cold War, beginning with conflicts during World War II in Warsaw, Athens, and Saigon and ending with the Cuban Missile Crisis. A major theme of this account is the relationship between government policy and military preparedness and strategy. Author Jonathan M. House tells of generals engaging in policy confrontations with their governments’ political leaders—among them Anthony Eden, Nikita Khrushchev, and John F. Kennedy—many of whom made military decisions that hamstrung their own political goals. In the pressure-cooker atmosphere of atomic preparedness, politicians as well as soldiers seemed instinctively to prefer military solutions to political problems. And national security policies had military implications that took on a life of their own. The invasion of South Korea convinced European policy makers that effective deterrence and containment required building up and maintaining credible forces. Desire to strengthen the North Atlantic alliance militarily accelerated the rearmament of West Germany and the drive for its sovereignty. In addition to examining the major confrontations, nuclear and conventional, between Washington, Moscow, and Beijing—including the crises over Berlin and Formosa—House traces often overlooked military operations against the insurgencies of the era, such as French efforts in Indochina and Algeria and British struggles in Malaya, Kenya, Cyprus, and Aden. Now, more than fifty years after the events House describes, understanding the origins and trajectory of the Cold War is as important as ever. By the late 1950s, the United States had sent forces to Vietnam and the Middle East, setting the stage for future conflicts in both regions. House’s account of the complex relationship between diplomacy and military action directly relates to the insurgencies, counterinsurgencies, and confrontations that now occupy our attention across the globe.

The epic story of the U.S. Army's 10th Mountain Division, whose elite soldiers broke the last line of German defenses in Italy's mountains in 1945, spearheading the Allied advance to the Alps and final victory.

In 1942, at the beginning of World War II, the US Army built its most unusual military post for its most unusual division in a high, remote, Rocky Mountain valley 100 miles west of Denver, Colorado. Located at 9,250 feet above sea level, Camp Hale was the training home of the famed 13,459-man 10th Mountain Division, which trained in mountain warfare techniques for two years--and almost missed the war. After they were finally deployed for combat in early 1945 in the Northern Apennine Mountains of Italy, the young men of the 10th never lost a battle or gave up a foot of ground. And, after the war, many of the veterans returned home to create America's ski and winter sports industry. Building Camp Hale was an incredible feat of wartime engineering and construction. To transform the wild, alpine meadow into an Army camp, 10,000 civilian construction workers were hired to scrape away the vegetation; level the valley floor; install roads and water and sewer lines; build 1,000 structures and two ski areas; and relocate a highway and railroad line--all within seven months and at a cost of $31 million (over a half billion dollars in today's money). Yet Camp Hale was demolished two years after it was built.

Colonel Pat Proctor’s long overdue critique of the Army’s preparation and outlook in the all-volunteer era focuses on a national security issue that continues to vex in the twenty-first century: Has the Army lost its ability to win strategically by focusing on fighting conventional battles against peer enemies? Or can it adapt to deal with the greater complexity of counterinsurgent and information-age warfare? In this blunt critique of the senior leadership of the U.S. Army, Proctor contends that after the fall of the Soviet Union, the U.S. Army stubbornly refused to reshape itself in response to the new strategic reality, a decision that saw it struggle through one low-intensity conflict after another—some inconclusive, some tragic—in the 1980s and 1990s, and leaving it largely unprepared when it found itself engaged—seemingly forever—in wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. The first book-length study to connect the failures of these wars to America’s disastrous performance in the war on terror, Proctor’s work serves as an attempt to convince Army leaders to avoid repeating the same mistakes.

A multidimensional, multidisciplinary work on one of the least understood but most important conflicts in modern history. A cornerstone work in ABC-CLIO's distinguished list of reference works on military history, The Encyclopedia of the Korean War: A Political, Social, and Military History is a comprehensive resource on the confrontation that became the first shooting war of the Cold War, the first limited conflict of the Atomic Age, and the war that led to a dramatic escalation of the national security state while foreshadowing U.S. involvement in Vietnam. Encyclopedia of the Korean War offers complete coverage of strategies, weapon systems, and clashes that marked the course of events on the battlefield. But this authoritative, multidisciplinary work expands beyond the military perspective to portray the overall culture of the era, addressing a variety of political, economic, social, and popular culture topics as well. Incorporating a wealth of recent research, the new edition adds more than 130 entries and updated coverage throughout, plus more bibliographic listings, an expanded historiographical essay, and a documents volume.