Human rights norms do matter. Those established by the Helsinki Final Act contributed directly to the demise of communism in the former East bloc, contends Daniel Thomas. This book counters those skeptics who doubt that such international norms substantially affect domestic political change, while explaining why, when, and how they matter most. Thomas argues that the Final Act, signed in 1975, transformed the agenda of East-West relations and provided a common platform around which opposition forces could mobilize. Without downplaying other factors, Thomas shows that the norms established at Helsinki undermined the viability of one-party Communist rule and thereby contributed significantly to the largely peaceful and democratic changes of 1989, as well as the end of the Cold War. Drawing on both governmental and nongovernmental sources, he offers a powerful Constructivist alternative to Realist theory's failure to anticipate or explain these crucial events. This study will fundamentally influence ongoing debates about the politics of international institutions, the socialization of states, the spread of democracy, and, not least, about the balance of factors that felled the Iron Curtain. It casts new light on Solidarity, Charter 77, and other democratic movements in Eastern Europe, the sources of Gorbachev's reforms, the evolution of the European Union, U.S. foreign policy, and East-West relations in the final decades of the Cold War. The Helsinki Effect will be essential reading for scholars and students of international relations, international law, European politics, human rights, and social movements.

The definitive account of the historic diplomatic agreement that provided a blueprint for ending the Cold War The Helsinki Final Act was a watershed of the Cold War. Signed by thirty-five European and North American leaders at a summit in Finland in the summer of 1975, the document presented a vision for peace based on common principles and cooperation across the Iron Curtain. The Final Act is the first in-depth history of the diplomatic saga that produced this important agreement. This gripping book explains the Final Act's emergence from the parallel crises of the Soviet bloc and the West during the 1960s and the conflicting strategies that animated the negotiations. Drawing on research in eight countries and multiple languages, The Final Act shows how Helsinki provided a blueprint for ending the Cold War and building a new international order.

Following nearly three decades of conflict and a series of failed ceasefire agreements, on 15 August 2005, the separatist Free Aceh Movement (GAM) and the Government of Indonesia reached an historic peace agreement to end the fighting and to give Aceh a high degree of genuine autonomy. The catalyst for the talks that produced this agreement was the devastating tsunami of 26 December 2004, which left almost 170,000 dead or missing in Aceh and destroyed most of the populated low-lying areas. Despite the massive destruction, the peace talks were conducted under an intensified military campaign. GAM made a major concession to the talks by announcing early that it was prepared to negotiate an outcome other than complete independence. The Indonesian side, however, under pressure from the military and "nationalists" in Jakarta, pressed for GAM to accept a minor reworking of the status quo. The international community, meanwhile, just pressed for a settlement. In the end, the Indonesian government also compromised, and the two parties reached an agreement that was intended to end the fighting and to address many, if not all, of GAM's outstanding claims. Despite opposition to the talks process, and to compromise, the outcome was increasingly seen both in Jakarta and in Aceh as a "win-win" situation, and as a further significant step in Indonesia's continuing process of reform and democratization. Peace in Aceh offers an insider's personal account of that peace process and is required reading for anyone wishing to understand this troubled province. DR. DAMIEN KINGSBURY is Associate Professor in the School of International and Political Studies and Director of International and Community Development at Deakin University, Victoria, Australia. He was political adviser to GAM for the peace talks and assisted in drafting and negotiating key elements of the peace agreement. Dr. Kingsbury has published extensively on Indonesian politics, the military and regional security issues, including The Politics of Indonesia (3rd edition 2005), Violence in Between: Conflict and Security in Archipelagic Southeast Asia (2005), and Power Politics and the Indonesian Military (2003).

Conference paper comprising the text of the final act adopted at the conference on security and co-operation in europe, concerning peaceful international relations and international cooperation between the participating states (incl. European countries, the USA and Canada) - includes measures relating to disarmament, economic relations, defence manoeuvres, trade relations, scientific cooperation, etc. Conf helsinki 1973 jul 3. Conference held in Geneva 1973 September 18 to jul 21. Conf helsinki 1975 aug 1.

From its inception, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) provoked controversy. Today it is widely regarded as having contributed to the end of the Cold War. Bringing together new and innovative research on the CSCE, this volume explores questions key to understanding the Cold War: What role did diplomats play in shaping the 1975 Helsinki Final Act? How did that agreement and the CSCE more broadly shape societies in Europe and North America? And how did the CSCE and activists inspired by the Helsinki Final Act influence the end of the Cold War?

Two of the most pressing questions facing international historians today are how and why the Cold War ended. Human Rights Activism and the End of the Cold War explores how, in the aftermath of the signing of the Helsinki Final Act in 1975, a transnational network of activists committed to human rights in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe made the topic a central element in East-West diplomacy. As a result, human rights eventually became an important element of Cold War diplomacy and a central component of détente. Sarah B. Snyder demonstrates how this network influenced both Western and Eastern governments to pursue policies that fostered the rise of organized dissent in Eastern Europe, freedom of movement for East Germans and improved human rights practices in the Soviet Union - all factors in the end of the Cold War.

Governments play a major role in the development process, and constantly introduce reforms and policies to achieve developmental objectives. Many of these interventions have limited impact, however; schools get built but children don't learn, IT systems are introduced but not used, plans are written but not implemented. These achievement deficiencies reveal gaps in capabilities, and weaknesses in the process of building state capability. This book addresses these weaknesses and gaps. It starts by providing evidence of the capability shortfalls that currently exist in many countries, showing that many governments lack basic capacities even after decades of reforms and capacity building efforts. The book then analyses this evidence, identifying capability traps that hold many governments back - particularly related to isomorphic mimicry (where governments copy best practice solutions from other countries that make them look more capable even if they are not more capable) and premature load bearing (where governments adopt new mechanisms that they cannot actually make work, given weak extant capacities). The book then describes a process that governments can use to escape these capability traps. Called PDIA (problem driven iterative adaptation), this process empowers people working in governments to find and fit solutions to the problems they face. The discussion about this process is structured in a practical manner so that readers can actually apply tools and ideas to the capability challenges they face in their own contexts. These applications will help readers devise policies and reforms that have more impact than those of the past.

After the heads of state and government of almost all European countries, the USA, and Canada signed the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in Helsinki on August 1st, 1975, little was heard about the CSCE process. However, far away from the headline-grabbing meetings between the leading politicians of the USA and the USSR as well as the Geneva negotiations on disarmament, the Helsinki process proved to be an efficient framework for the East-West negotiations. The inconclusive Belgrade CSCE Meeting of 1977-1978 - after six months the delegations were only able to agree on a brief final document - was nevertheless a significant milestone for the CSCE process itself: negotiation rules were drawn up, interpreted, negotiated and re-negotiated. The contributions to this volume offer solid insights into the follow-up meeting in Belgrade in 1977/78, the Cold War, and in particular the CSCE process.

The “Joint Declaration of Twenty-two States,” signed in Paris on November 19, 1990 by the Chiefs of State or Government of all the countries which participated in World War Two in Europe, is the closest document we will ever have to a true “peace treaty” concluding World War II in Europe. In his new book, retired United States Ambassador John Maresca, who led the American participation in the negotiations, explains how this document was quietly negotiated following the reunification of Germany and in view of Soviet interest in normalizing their relations with Europe. With the reunification of Germany which had just taken place it was, for the first time since the end of the war, possible to have a formal agreement that the war was over, and the countries concerned were all gathering for a summit-level signing ceremony in Paris. With Gorbachev interested in more positive relations with Europe, and with the formal reunification of Germany, such an agreement was — for the first time — possible. All the leaders coming to the Paris summit had an interest in a formal conclusion to the War, and this gave impetus for the negotiators in Vienna to draft a document intended to normalize relations among them. The Joint Declaration was negotiated carefully, and privately, among the Ambassadors representing the countries which had participated, in one way or another, in World War Two in Europe, and the resulting document -- the “Joint Declaration” — was signed, at the summit level, at the Elysée Palace in Paris. But it was overshadowed at the time by the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe — signed at the same signature event — and has remained un-noticed since then. No one could possibly have foreseen that the USSR would be dissolved about one year later, making it impossible to negotiate a more formal treaty to close World War II in Europe. The “Joint Declaration” thus remains the closest document the world will ever see to a formal “Peace Treaty” concluding World War Two in Europe. It was signed by all the Chiefs of State or Government of all the countries which participated in World War II in Europe.