This volume is the outcome of the NATO Advanced Research Workshop on Time, Action and Cognition. which was held in Saint-Malo, France, in October 1991. The theme - time in action and cognition of time - was sparked by growing awareness in informal meetings between mostly French-speaking time psychologists of the need to bring together time specialists in the areas of development, motor behavior, attention, memory and representations. The workshop was designed to be a forum where different theoretical points of view and a variety of empirical approaches could be presented and discussed. Time psychologists tended to draw conclusions restricted to their specific fields of interest. From our own experience, we felt that addressing a common issue - possible relationships between time in action and representations of time - could lead to a more comprehensive approach. We are endebted to NATO for allowing us to bring this idea to fruition. We take this opportunity as well to express our thanks to Cognisciences ( Cognisud section) -- an active interdisciplinary research organization - for its financial backing and the CNRS for its scientific support.

Moving beyond the traditional, and unproductive, rivalry between the fields of motivation and cognition, this book integrates the two domains to shed new light on the control of goal-directed action. Renowned social and motivational psychologists present concise formulations of the latest research programs which are effectively mapping the territory, providing new findings, and suggesting innovative strategies for future research. Ideally structured for classroom use, this book will effectively familiarize readers with important theories in the psychology of action.

Traditional cognitive science is Cartesian in the sense that it takes as fundamental the distinction between the mental and the physical, the mind and the world. This leads to the claim that cognition is representational and best explained using models derived from AI and computational theory. The authors depart radically from this model.

Recent cognitive neuroscientific research that crosses traditional conceptual boundaries among perceptual, cognitive, and motor functions in an effort to understand intentional acts. Traditionally, neurologists, neuroscientists, and psychologists have viewed brain functions as grossly divisible into three separable components, each responsible for either perceptual, cognitive, or motor systems. The artificial boundaries of this simplification have impeded progress in understanding many phenomena, particularly intentional actions, which involve complex interactions among the three systems.This book presents a diverse range of work on action by cognitive neuroscientists who are thinking across the traditional boundaries. The topics discussed include catching moving targets, the use of tools, the acquisition of new actions, feedforward and feedback mechanisms, the flexible sequencing of individual movements, the coordination of multiple limbs, and the control of actions compromised by disease. The book also presents recent work on relatively unexplored yet fundamental issues such as how the brain formulates intentions to act and how it expresses ideas through manual gestures.

The book questions two key dichotomies: that of the apparent and real, and that of the internal and external. This leads to revised notions of the structure of experience and the object of knowledge. Our world is experienced as possibilities of action, and to know is to know what to do. A further consequence is that the mind is best considered as a property of organisms’ interactions with their environment. The unit of analysis is the loop of action and perception, and the central concept is the notion of habit of action, which provides the embodied basis of cognition as the anticipation of action. This holds for non-linguistic tacit meanings as well as for linguistic meanings. Habit of action is a teleological notion and thus opens a possibility for defining intentionality and normativity in terms of the soft naturalism adopted in the book. The mind is embodied, and this embodiment determines our physical perspective on the world. Our sensory organs and other instruments give us instrumental access to the world, and this access is epistemic in character. The distinction between the physical and conceptual viewpoint allows us to define truth as the correspondence with operational fit. This embodied epistemic truth is however not a sign of antirealism, as the instrumentally accessed theoretical objects are precisely those objects that experimental science deals with.

The phenomena of effortless attention and action and the challenges they pose to current cognitive models of attention and action.

Designed for undergraduate courses in cognitive psychology, this textbook approaches cognitive psychology by asking what it says about how people carry out everyday activities.

This book integrates findings from across domains in performance psychology to focus on core research on what influences peak and non-peak performance. The book explores basic and applied research identifying cognition-action interactions, perception-cognition interactions, emotion-cognition interactions, and perception-action interactions. The book explores performance in sports, music, and the arts both for individuals and teams/groups, looking at the influence of cognition, perception, personality, motivation and drive, attention, stress, coaching, and age. This comprehensive work includes contributions from the US, UK, Canada, Germany, and Australia. - Integrates research findings found across domains in performance psychology - Includes research from sports, music, the arts, and other applied settings - Identifies conflicts between cognition, action, perception, and emotion - Explores influences on both individual and group/team performance - Investigates what impacts peak performance and error production

Experts from a range of disciplines assess the foundations and implications of a novel action-oriented view of cognition. Cognitive science is experiencing a pragmatic turn away from the traditional representation-centered framework toward a view that focuses on understanding cognition as “enactive.” This enactive view holds that cognition does not produce models of the world but rather subserves action as it is grounded in sensorimotor skills. In this volume, experts from cognitive science, neuroscience, psychology, robotics, and philosophy of mind assess the foundations and implications of a novel action-oriented view of cognition. Their contributions and supporting experimental evidence show that an enactive approach to cognitive science enables strong conceptual advances, and the chapters explore key concepts for this new model of cognition. The contributors discuss the implications of an enactive approach for cognitive development; action-oriented models of cognitive processing; action-oriented understandings of consciousness and experience; and the accompanying paradigm shifts in the fields of philosophy, brain science, robotics, and psychology. Contributors Moshe Bar, Lawrence W. Barsalov, Olaf Blanke, Jeannette Bohg, Martin V. Butz, Peter F. Dominey, Andreas K. Engel, Judith M. Ford, Karl J. Friston, Chris D. Frith, Shaun Gallagher, Antonia Hamilton, Tobias Heed, Cecilia Heyes, Elisabeth Hill, Matej Hoffmann, Jakob Hohwy, Bernhard Hommel, Atsushi Iriki, Pierre Jacob, Henrik Jörntell, Jürgen Jost, James Kilner, Günther Knoblich, Peter König, Danica Kragic, Miriam Kyselo, Alexander Maye, Marek McGann, Richard Menary, Thomas Metzinger, Ezequiel Morsella, Saskia Nagel, Kevin J. O'Regan, Pierre-Yves Oudeyer, Giovanni Pezzulo, Tony J. Prescott, Wolfgang Prinz, Friedemann Pulvermüller, Robert Rupert, Marti Sanchez-Fibla, Andrew Schwartz, Anil K. Seth, Vicky Southgate, Antonella Tramacere, John K. Tsotsos, Paul F. M. J. Verschure, Gabriella Vigliocco, Gottfried Vosgerau

How can science be brought to connect with experience? This book addresses two of the most challenging problems facing contemporary neurobiology and cognitive science: understanding how we unconsciously execute habitual actions as a result of neurological and cognitive processes, and creating an ethic adequate to our present awareness that there is no such thing as a transcendental self, a stable subject, or a soul.