This book offers a new theory of federalism. The work critically discusses traditional federal theories and builds on theories that focus on the dynamics of federalism. It offers a definition of federalism and federal organizations that encompasses both new and old types of multi-tiered system. Unlike traditional federal theory, it is well-suited to research both multinational and mononational systems. It also takes into account the complexity of these systems, with bodies of governance at the local, regional, national, and supranational level. The book is divided into three parts: the first part outlines the contours of dynamic federalism, based on a critical overview of traditional federal theory; the second part develops comprehensive indexes to measure autonomy and cohesion of multi-tiered systems; and the third part focuses on the dynamics of federal organizations, with a special focus on institutional hubs for change. Dynamic Federalism will be an essential resource for legal, social, economic, and political scholars interested in federalism, regionalism, and de/centralization.

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This book departs from the 'statist' imagination by suggesting the EU is a federal union of states, or a federation. Dedicated to the constitutional theory of federalism, this book gives the strengths and weaknesses of a federation as a political form, its histories, and current perils for the EU.

This is the first full-length presentation of a republican alternative to the liberal and communitarian theories that have dominated political philosophy in recent years. The latest addition to the acclaimed Oxford Political Theory series, Pettit's eloquent and compelling account opens with an examination of the traditional republican conception of freedom as non-domination, contrasting this with established negative and positive views of liberty. The first part of the book traces the rise and decline of this conception, displays its many attractions, and makes a case for why it should still be regarded as a central political ideal. The second part of the book looks at what the implementation of the ideal would require with regard to substantive policy-making, constitutional and democratic design, regulatory control and the relation between state and civil society. Prominent in this account is a novel concept of democracy, under which government is exposed to systematic contestation, and a vision of state-societal relations founded upon civility and trust. Pettit's powerful and insightful new work offers not only a unified, theoretical overview of the many strands of republican ideas, but also a new and sophisticated perspective on studies in related fields including the history of ideas, jurisprudence, and criminology.

This is an open access title available under the terms of a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 International licence. It is free to read on the Oxford Academic platform and offered as a free PDF download from OUP and selected open access locations. In Shared Rule in Federal Theory and Practice, Sean Mueller provides a new, in-depth treatment of shared rule, a crucial but so far largely neglected dimension of federalism and multilevel governance. He discusses shared rule's conceptual evolution and defines three different meanings commonly ascribed to it: shared rule as horizontal cooperation, centralization, or bottom-up influence seeking. An original expert survey conducted among 38 federalism scholars in 11 countries is used to measure actual regional government influence over national decisions. Drawing on a wide range of literature, from lobbying and political parties to power sharing and secessionism, the author then investigates the emergence and impact of shared rule thus understood. The evidence presented includes qualitative case studies on Belgium, Canada, Germany, Spain, Switzerland, and the US as well as quantitative, cross-sectional analyses at regional and national level. Mueller shows that shared rule has the potential to become the holy grail of territorial politics in that it satisfies both those wanting greater unity and uniformity of policy making as well as those desiring greater regional autonomy and recognition of diversity. Building on the conceptual and empirical groundwork laid by the Regional Authority Index, he takes us further and deeper still into the mechanics of territorial contestation, cooperation, and cohesion. Transformations in Governance is a major academic book series from Oxford University Press. It is designed to accommodate the impressive growth of research in comparative politics, international relations, public policy, federalism, and environmental and urban studies concerned with the dispersion of authority from central states to supranational institutions, subnational governments, and public-private networks. It brings together work that advances our understanding of the organization, causes, and consequences of multilevel and complex governance. The series is selective, containing annually a small number of books of exceptionally high quality by leading and emerging scholars. The series is edited by Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks of the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, and Walter Mattli of the University of Oxford.

The promise and peril of nuclear power have been a preoccupation of the modern age. Robert Duffy now examines the politics of nuclear power over the last 50 years, relating broad trends in American politics to changes in the regulation of the nuclear industry to show how federal policies in this area have been made, implemented, and altered.

This book examines the theory, law, and reality of preemption choice. The Constitution's federalist structures protect states' sovereignty but also create a powerful federal government that can preempt and thereby displace the authority of state and local governments and courts to respond to a social challenge. Despite this preemptive power, Congress and agencies have seldom preempted state power. Instead, they typically have embraced concurrent, overlapping power. Recent legislative, agency, and court actions, however, reveal an aggressive use of federal preemption, sometimes even preempting more protective state law. Preemption choice fundamentally involves issues of institutional choice and regulatory design: should federal actors displace or work in conjunction with other legal institutions? This book moves logically through each preemption choice step, ranging from underlying theory to constitutional history, to preemption doctrine, to assessment of when preemptive regimes make sense and when state regulation and common law should retain latitude for dynamism and innovation.

Classic Books Library presents this brand new edition of “The Federalist Papers”, a collection of separate essays and articles compiled in 1788 by Alexander Hamilton. Following the United States Declaration of Independence in 1776, the governing doctrines and policies of the States lacked cohesion. “The Federalist”, as it was previously known, was constructed by American statesman Alexander Hamilton, and was intended to catalyse the ratification of the United States Constitution. Hamilton recruited fellow statesmen James Madison Jr., and John Jay to write papers for the compendium, and the three are known as some of the Founding Fathers of the United States. Alexander Hamilton (c. 1755–1804) was an American lawyer, journalist and highly influential government official. He also served as a Senior Officer in the Army between 1799-1800 and founded the Federalist Party, the system that governed the nation’s finances. His contributions to the Constitution and leadership made a significant and lasting impact on the early development of the nation of the United States.

Judges play a central role in the American legal system, but their behavior as decision-makers is not well understood, even among themselves. The system permits judges to be quite secretive (and most of them are), so indirect methods are required to make sense of their behavior. Here, a political scientist, an economist, and a judge work together to construct a unified theory of judicial decision-making. Using statistical methods to test hypotheses, they dispel the mystery of how judicial decisions in district courts, circuit courts, and the Supreme Court are made. The authors derive their hypotheses from a labor-market model, which allows them to consider judges as they would any other economic actors: as self-interested individuals motivated by both the pecuniary and non-pecuniary aspects of their work. In the authors' view, this model describes judicial behavior better than either the traditional “legalist” theory, which sees judges as automatons who mechanically apply the law to the facts, or the current dominant theory in political science, which exaggerates the ideological component in judicial behavior. Ideology does figure into decision-making at all levels of the federal judiciary, the authors find, but its influence is not uniform. It diminishes as one moves down the judicial hierarchy from the Supreme Court to the courts of appeals to the district courts. As The Behavior of Federal Judges demonstrates, the good news is that ideology does not extinguish the influence of other components in judicial decision-making. Federal judges are not just robots or politicians in robes.