Examines European efforts to reduce defense dependency on the United States in a post-Cold War world.

Analyzing changes in the role and place of NATO, European integration, and Franco-American relations in foreign policy discourse under Presidents Jacques Chirac and Nicolas Sarkozy, this book provides an original perspective on French foreign policy and its identity construction. The book employs a novel research design for the analysis of foreign policies, which can be used beyond the case of France, by combining the discourse theory of the Essex School with Interpretive Policy Analysis to examine political ideas and how they are organized into a foreign policy identity. On these grounds, the volume undertakes a comparative analysis of parliamentary and executive discourse of President Chirac’s failed attempt at NATO reintegration in the 1990s, Sarkozy’s successful attempt in the 2000s, and the Libyan War. Ostermann depicts French foreign policy and identity as turning away from the European Union, atlanticizing, and losing its American nemesis. As a result, France uses a much more pragmatic, de-unionized, and pro-American strategy to implement foreign policy objectives than before. Offering a new and innovative explanation for a major change in French foreign policy and grand strategy, this book will be of great interest to scholars of NATO, European defense cooperation, and foreign policy.

The European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) is the European Union's (EU) effort to acquire a military instrument of power commensurate with its economic and political instruments of power. The US should support ESDI on the condition that it continues to evolve within the context of NATO. ESDI should result in stronger and more capable allies who will be better partners for the US in pursuit of shared interests and values. Any EU or NATO operation in the foreseeable future will rely on US capabilities. The US can leverage its technological strengths, as well as its mobility, aerial refueling, and reconnaissance capabilities to maintain its leadership role in Europe. By supporting ESDI, the US can shape its development in a manner that will be beneficial to both sides of the Atlantic. Failure to support ESDI risks further damaging an already strained relationship with Europe.

A new European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) is evolving. The development will be influenced by a diversity of interests. These include a continued strong transatlantic link and the policy of countries seeking a closer cooperation in Europe, including countries like Denmark that have chosen to stay outside the defense cooperation. How can a future ESDI be organized and how will it be related to the already existing organizations, NATO, the EU, and the WEU? As a basis for the study of European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI), this paper will describe the term and development of ESDT including the present status of ESDI in relation to the involved organizations, The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Union (EU) and the Western European Union (WEU). The paper will define major interests by looking at those European countries which seek further integration within the EU, other European countries including non-EU Allies and the United States (US).

This new book tackles two key questions: 1) How is the EU functioning as a security actor? 2) How and to what extent is the EU affecting national security identities? Focusing on the four largest Nordic states (Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden), this incisive study analyzes how and to what extent the EU affects national security identities. It shows how the EU has developed into a special kind of security actor that, due to its level of political integration, has an important influence on national security approaches and identities. This new analysis applies a fresh combination of integration theory, security studies and studies of Europeanization. The main argument in this book is that, rather than adapting to the changing conditions created by the end of the Cold War, the Nordic states changed their security approaches in response to the European integration process. It shows how different phases in the post Cold War European integration process have influenced the national security approaches of Sweden, Finland, Denmark and Norway. While all four security approaches seem to have been Europeanized, the speed and the character of these changes seem to vary due to a combination of differing ties to the EU and differing security policy traditions. This new book will be of great interest to all students of European Defence, national security and of security studies in general.

"As the United States continues to adjust to its role in the post-Cold War world, the transatlantic partnership remains fundamental to US security concerns. Commander Gunning[alpha]s paper is a wake-up call suggesting that Europe is concerned about US intransigence when it comes the security partnership with Europe. While the United States has often encouraged the Europeans to improve capabilities and take on a greater share of the defensive burden, their recent efforts to do so have often been viewed as paradoxical to US concerns. Policymakers on this side of the Atlantic worry that Europe in some ways is moving towards going it alone with the development of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). Still, US desires for increased burdensharing need to be reconciled with ESDP. Commander Gunning highlights these differences and spells out how, in his opinion, it is possible for the United States to remain engaged in Europe and to allow the European Union to develop its own defense identity. The differences of opinion between the two sides are more "speed bumps" than "road blocks" and some disagreement and frustration is to be expected. The conclusion here is that security interests on both sides of the Atlantic will be served in the long run by encouraging the development of a more autonomous European defense capability and through American patience as that process unfolds."--Forward.

The emergence of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) in the last two-thirds of the 1990s and continuing into the new century, has been a complex process intertwining politics, economics, national cultures, and numerous institutions. This book provides an essential background for understanding how security issues as between NATO and the European Union are being posed for the early part of the 21st century, including the new circumstances following the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington on September 11, 2001. This study should be of interest to those interested in the evolution of U.S.-European relations, especially in, but not limited to, the security field; the development of institutional relationships; and key choices that lie ahead in regard to these critical arrangements.

The notion of a unified European military is nothing new. It was raised after World War II as a means of ridding the Continent of its legacy of internal warfare and nearly succeeded before falling victim to fears of lost sovereignty. Forgotten but not completely abandoned, it was revived in 1987 under more favorable conditions after the awakening of a long-dormant defense institution, the Western European Union (WEU). The born again WEU called for greater cooperation on security and defense (including arms production) noting that, "Europe's integration will never be complete so long as it does not include security and defense." The effort moved slowly at first but then gained momentum with the end of the Cold War. With the final outcome still uncertain, however, the idea of portraying Europe as a more or less freestanding pillar of NATO assumed the awkward rubric of European security and defense identity (ESDI). Now ten years old ESDI seems here to stay. Initial American reactions to ESDI were polite but proscriptive, emphasizing that it should be transparent and complement NATO. Moreover, the United States saw it as an internal European matter unlikely to have major implications for the Alliance. But France, always an advocate of greater independence from the United States, saw ESDI as a means of reducing American influence after the demise of the Soviet Union. Future U.S. force levels in Europe were unpredictable, and France pointed to the possibility of a complete American pullout, raising the fear among Europeans that they might be left to fend for themselves and thus need their own defense capability. Simultaneously, American political interest in Europe appeared to wane. Key U.S. posts at NATO went unfilled for long periods in 1993 and Washington was focused on the Asia-Pacific region and domestic affairs. Political interest in Europe seemed relegated to central and eastern Europe and Russia.

Four years after the end of the Cold War, the United States and its European allies have still not agreed on a new security system to deal with war in Yugoslavia, a restless eastern Europe, and an unstable Russia. The contributors to this timely volume evaluate reforms in the North Atlantic Alliance, the new European Union, and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). They also explore a number of critical issues: Why is it that NATO cannot end the Yugoslav conflict? Why do the Americans and West Europeans quarrel over a European Security and Defense Identity? Why is it that the states of Central and Eastern Europe cannot simply join NATO? Is the CSCE becoming the pan-European security organization that will bear responsibility for preventing or managing future conflicts? The book offers careful analysis of the pivotal years of reform between 1989 and 1992. In the first section, the contributors assess those developments from the viewpoint of the key institutions—NATO, CSCE, the European Union, and its security arm, the Western European Union (WEU). They then examine the policies of the key allies—the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, and France. The book concludes that the current problems in European security affairs are directly explained by the discord, divergences, and contradictions that have characterized the crucial formative years of these newly significant organizations. In the closing chapter, the editors suggest pragmatic political initiatives for strengthening these groups in the near future.