This dissertation studies our relationship with energy, as individuals and as a society. In the first chapter, I look at individual response to gasoline prices by investigating the relationship between gasoline prices and running out of gasoline. In the second chapter I investigate household level short-run responses to gasoline prices by decomposing the traditional fuel use elasticity into changes in driving and change in average fuel economy. The third chapter looks at policies that comes as responses to environmental externalities associated with fuel use.

Covering a wide and fascinating selection of topics incorporating the whole spectrum of energy economics, this book examines the belief that markets are the key to the effective allocation of resources, a notion which arguably applies as much to energy as it does to any other commodity. In particular it focuses on several pertinent issues including: competition and regulation in gas and electricity; comparative efficiency analysis in electricity regulation; UK coal in competitive markets; vertical integration in the oil industry; cluster developments in the UK continental shelf; modelling underlying energy demand trends; and emissions targets, environmental Kuznets curves and incentive mechanisms.

Energy and Economic Myths: Institutional and Analytical Economic Essays is a collection of materials that deal with various issues and concerns in economics. The title aims to clarify the misconception in economics. The first part of the text deals with the issues in natural resources and the economics of production. Next, the selection tackles the problems in institutional economics. Part III covers the epistemological and methodological concerns in economics. The title also talks about economic theories. The book will be of great interest to economists and readers who want to enhance their understanding of economic concepts.

In this dissertation I explore two aspects of the economics of energy. The first focuses on consumer behavior, while the second focuses on market structure and firm behavior. In the first chapter, I demonstrate evidence of loss aversion in the behavior of households on two critical peak pricing experimental tariffs while participating in the California Statewide Pricing Pilot. I develop a model of loss aversion over electricity expenditure from which I derive two sets of testable predictions. First, I show that when there is a higher probability that a household is in the loss domain of their value function for the bill period, the more strongly they cut back peak consumption. Second, when prices are such that households are close to the kink in their value function - and would otherwise have expenditure skewed into the loss domain - I show evidence of disproportionate clustering at the kink. In essence this means that the occurrence of critical peak days did not only result in a reduction of peak consumption on that day, but also spilled over to further reduction of peak consumption on regular peak days for several weeks thereafter. This was similarly true when temperatures were high during high priced periods. This form of demand adjustment resulted in households experiencing bill-period expenditures equal to what they would have paid on the standard non-dynamic pricing tariff at a disproportionate rate. This higher number of bill periods with equal expenditure displaced bill periods in which they otherwise would have paid more than if they were on standard pricing. In the second chapter, I explore the effects of two simultaneous changes in minimum energy efficiency and Energy Star standards for clothes washers. Adapting the Mussa and Rosen (1978) and Ronnen (1991) second-degree price discrimination model, I demonstrate that clothes washer prices and menus adjusted to the new standards in patterns consistent with a market in which firms had been price discriminating. In particular, I show evidence of discontinuous price drops at the time the standards were imposed, driven largely by mid low efficiency segments of the market. The price discrimination model predicts this result. On the other hand, under perfect competition, prices should increase for these market segments. Additionally, new models proliferated in the highest efficiency market segment following the standard changes. Finally, I show that firms appeared to use different adaptation strategies at the two instances of the standards changing.