Within only a few days after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the U.S. Army War College initiated a series of short studies addressing strategic issues in the war on terrorism. This collection of essays analyzes a broad array of subjects of great strategic importance. This volume provides historical documentation of some of the advice given the military leadership in the early days of the war, but it also continues to be a source of solid strategic analysis as the war lengthens and perhaps broadens.

Within only a few days after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the U.S. Army War College initiated a series of short studies addressing strategic issues in the war on terrorism. This collection of essays analyzes a broad array of subjects of great strategic importance. This volume provides historical documentation of some of the advice given the military leadership in the early days of the war, but it also continues to be a source of solid strategic analysis as the war lengthens and perhaps broadens.

Within only a few days after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the U.S. Army War College initiated a series of short studies addressing strategic issues in the war on terrorism. This collection of essays analyzes a broad array of subjects of great strategic importance. Because national leaders were pressed to issue orders on the prosecution of the war on terrorism, it was necessary to produce these papers on a very short time-line. This got the ideas included in the articles into the hands of decisionmakers as quickly as possible, giving them better understanding of factors affecting their various decisions. Issue analysis was never short-changed in this process, but authors were asked to provide

Dr. Kamolnick's book is a meticulously documented investigation and comparison of the al-Qaeda and the Islamic State across three key strategically relevant dimensions: essential doctrine, beliefs, and worldview; strategic concept, including terrorist modus operandi; and in the final chapter, specific implications, and recommendations for current U.S. Government policy and strategy. Contents: Belief-System, Creed, Worldview, Doctrine The Al-Qaeda Organization Sunni Islamic Orthodoxy Sunni-Salafism/"Fundamentalism" The Muwahhidun/Wahhabism/Salafi-Wahhabism Muslim Brotherhood-Salafi-Wahhabi The "Base of the Jihad"; Al-Qaeda From Qa'idat Al-Jihad to Bin Ladenism From Bin Ladenism Back to Qa'idat Al-Jihad Post-Arab Spring Qa'idat Al-Jihad "What is Qa'idat Al-Jihad?" In a Nutshell: Fazul Abdullah and Adam Gadahn III. Islamic State Organization "Zarqawism" vs. AQO: Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi's Worldview and Doctrine: 1989-June 7, 2006 From Non-Religious Violent Street Tough to Ultra-Sectarian Salafi-Wahhabi Jihadist Prison Tough: 1980-1999 Al-Zarqawi's Private Jihasist Armies of the Levant: 1999-2004 The History, Doctrines, and Worldview of Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi's "Caliphate": From ISI to the Caliphate: Brief Organizational History Self-Proclaimed Emir Al-Muminin Abu Bakr Al-Hussaini Al-Qurayshi Al-Baghdadi: The Caliphate Now! The "Final Solution" to the "Shia Problem" Terrorist Modus Operandi Terrorist Quadrangle Analysis The Al-Qaeda Organization The "Classical" Base First Bin Ladenist Lone Mujahid" "Far Enemy" Strategy Islamic State Conclusions, Implications, and Recommendations for U.S. Government Key Findings Belief-Systems, Worldviews, Doctrines, Creeds Strategies and Terrorist Modus Operandi Implications for U.S. Government Policy and Strategies Implications for Existing USG Policy and Strategy to Permanently Defeat AQ and its Affiliates Implications for Existing USG Policy and Strategy to Permanently Defeat the IS