Explains when, why, and how citizens try to limit the Supreme Court's independence and power-- and why it matters.

This book investigates the causes and consequences of congressional attacks on the US Supreme Court, arguing that the extent of public support for judicial independence constitutes the practical limit of judicial independence. First, the book presents a historical overview of Court-curbing proposals in Congress. Then, building on interviews with Supreme Court justices, members of Congress, and judicial and legislative staffers, the book theorizes that congressional attacks are driven by public discontent with the Court. From this theoretical model, predictions are derived about the decision to engage in Court-curbing and judicial responsiveness to Court-curbing activity in Congress. The Limits of Judicial Independence draws on illustrative archival evidence, systematic analysis of an original dataset of Court-curbing proposals introduced in Congress from 1877 onward and judicial decisions.

"This book describes and explains the failure of the federal courts of the United States to act and to provide remedies to individuals whose constitutional rights have been violated by illegal state coercion and violence. This remedial vacuum must be understood in light of the original design and historical development of the federal courts. At its conception, the federal judiciary was assumed to be independent thanks to an apolitical appointment process, a limited supply of adequately trained lawyers (which would prevent cherry-picking), and the constraining effect of laws and constitutional provision. Each of these checks quickly failed. As a result, the early federal judicial system was highly dependent on Congress. Not until the last quarter of the nineteenth century did a robust federal judiciary start to emerge, and not until the first quarter of the twentieth century did it take anything like its present form. The book then charts how the pressure from Congress and the White House has continued to shape courts behaviour-first eliciting a mid-twentieth-century explosion in individual remedies, and then driving a five-decade long collapse. Judges themselves have not avidly resisted this decline, in part because of ideological reasons and in part out of institutional worries about a ballooning docket. Today, as a result of these trends, the courts are stingy with individual remedies, but aggressively enforce the so-called "structural" constitution of the separation of powers and federalism. This cocktail has highly regressive effects, and is in urgent need of reform"--

Few institutions in the world are credited with initiating and confounding political change on the scale of the United States Supreme Court. The Court is uniquely positioned to enhance or inhibit political reform, enshrine or dismantle social inequalities, and expand or suppress individual rights. Yet despite claims of victory from judicial activists and complaints of undemocratic lawmaking from the Court's critics, numerous studies of the Court assert that it wields little real power. This book examines the nature of Supreme Court power by identifying conditions under which the Court is successful at altering the behavior of state and private actors. Employing a series of longitudinal studies that use quantitative measures of behavior outcomes across a wide range of issue areas, it develops and supports a new theory of Supreme Court power. Matthew E. K. Hall finds that the Court tends to exercise power successfully when lower courts can directly implement its rulings; however, when the Court must rely on non-court actors to implement its decisions, its success depends on the popularity of those decisions. Overall, this theory depicts the Court as a powerful institution, capable of exerting significant influence over social change.

This book explores some of the most glaring misunderstandings about the U.S. Supreme Court—and makes a strong case for why our Supreme Court Justices should not be entrusted with decisions that affect every American citizen. Supreme Myths: Why the Supreme Court is Not a Court and its Justices are Not Judges presents a detailed discussion of the Court's most important and controversial constitutional cases that demonstrates why it doesn't justify being labeled "a court of law." Eric Segall, professor of law at Georgia State University College of Law for two decades, explains why this third branch of the national government is an institution that makes important judgments about fundamental questions based on the Justices' ideological preferences, not the law. A complete understanding of the true nature of the Court's decision-making process is necessary, he argues, before an intelligent debate over who should serve on the Court—and how they should resolve cases—can be held. Addressing front-page areas of constitutional law such as health care, abortion, affirmative action, gun control, and freedom of religion, this book offers a frank description of how the Supreme Court truly operates, a critique of life tenure of its Justices, and a set of proposals aimed at making the Court function more transparently to further the goals of our representative democracy.

Since the early 1960s the Supreme Court and its congressional critics have been locked in a continuing dispute over the issues of school prayer, busing, and abortion. Although for years the Court's congressional foes have introduced legislation designed to curb the powers of the federal courts in these areas, they have until now failed to enact such proposals. It is likely that these legislative efforts and the present confrontation with the Court will continue. Edward Keynes and Randall Miller argue that Congress lacks the constitutional power to legislate away the powers of the federal courts and to prevent individuals from seeking redress for presumed infringements of their constitutional rights in these areas. They demonstrate that neither the framers nor ratifiers of the Constitution intended the Congress to exercise plenary power over the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Throughout its history the Court has never conceded unlimited powers to Congress; and until the late 1950s Congress had not attempted to gerrymander the Court's jurisdiction in response to specific decisions. But the authors contend this is just what the sponsors of recent legislative attacks on the Court intend, and they see such efforts as threatening the Court's independence and authority as defined in the separation of powers clauses of the Constitution.

Princeton political scientist Walter Murphy analyzed the role of Congress in trying to manage an activist Supreme Court at a time of seismic change in the law and evolving interplay between these powerful institutions. As the original dustjacket offered, this is a "first-rate assessment of the delicate balance of power between Congress and the Supreme Court as it affects the American political process." The new digital republication of this classic work adds a 2014 Foreword by law professor Thomas Baker, who notes the continuing relevance of Murphy's insights: "The principal object lesson he offers is that what happened in the 1950s happened before and will happen again, that separation of powers showdowns are cyclical." In sum, "This book was recognized immediately upon publication as an important contribution to the literature on separation of powers and in particular the constitutional dynamic between Congress and the Court." It "continues to enjoy in the canon of constitutional law" a recognized status, to both legal academics and political scientists, as Baker explains in his contemporary introduction. The new digital edition presents the original text and tables accurately and properly formatted as an ebook; it features active contents, linked chapter footnotes and endnotes, and even a fully-linked Index for continuity with the original print edition. Originally published by the University of Chicago Press, this is an authorized and unabridged new addition to the Classics of Law & Society Series from Quid Pro Books.

The most important constitutional issues of this generation concern the meaning of the rule of law and the ability of the people to enforce true law by restraining runaway activist judges. For decades, such judges have been simply making up law. What is worse, liberal and conservative lawmakers have been reinforcing such behavior by treating such rulings as if they are legitimate. Today, one in every three Americans have been killed by abortion simply because a handful of unelected officials said it was acceptable for these Americans to be killed. But issues like abortion and homosexual marriages can be resolved immediately, without special constitutional amendments, if we will simply avail ourselves of the measures given to us by our Founding Fathers to hold renegade and lawless judges accountable for their behavior. In this brilliant, accessible, and documented work, Dr. Edwin Vieira offers us the best researched and clearest overview to date of the power of the people to control a runaway judiciary. Author: Dr. Edwin Vieira Format: Paperback (328 pages)

Examines the relationship between the president and the Supreme Court, including how presidents view the norm of judicial independence.

For two centuries, federal judges exercised wide discretion in criminal sentencing. In 1987 a complex bureaucratic apparatus termed Sentencing "Guidelines" was imposed on federal courts. FEAR OF JUDGING is the first full-scale history, analysis, and critique of the new sentencing regime, arguing that it sacrifices comprehensibility and common sense.