America, Britain and the Cyprus Crisis of 1974 examines recently released and declassified British and American government documents, in order to scrutinize the roles played by both of these countries during the Cyprus crisis of 1974. It evaluates British and American aims towards Cyprus, analysing in particular the roles played by British Foreign Secretary James Callaghan and US Secretary of State Dr. Henry Kissinger, and their respective relationships with the Cypriot, Greek and Turkish governments. Also, the book considers Whitehall and Washington's responses to the Greek military coup, the Turkish invasion, the two Geneva conferences on Cyprus and the second, consolidatory, phase of the Turkish invasion. Ultimately, the book seeks to ascertain whether there exists any credible evidence to support the belief that Britain and/or America were complicit in the coup against President Makarios as well as whether they colluded with Ankara in her subsequent partition of the island.

This book traces the international community's attempts to achieve a solution to the Cyprus problem from 1964-86, and analyzes why it has failed. It also discusses the deep mutual distrust between Turks and Greeks throughout the Eastern Mediterranean, which hampers all attempts to reach a satisfactory solution to this intractable problem. Mirbagheri also examines the divergent policies of the key external players and how they have contributed to the current stalemate.