The Nature, the Performance, and the Reform of State-owned Enterprises provides a detailed description of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in China with respect to both efficiency and income distribution. It shows that state ownership in the form of SOEs does not use resources efficiently and has a poor record in income distribution. Moreover, SOEs are found to enjoy unfair advantages in their competition with other firms. To illustrate the point, the book presents data revealing how favored policies, monopolistic powers, and subsidies benefit SOEs. These advantages are worth several trillion yuans a year. It is a sad irony that such wealth of the people is used to beef up the revenues of the SOEs, making their accounts look much better than they should be.This book, with its rich empirical data and information, is an authoritative reference for researchers interested in SOEs. It is also a good read for students of social sciences and the public to learn more about SOEs.

This work is a continuation of the authors' earlier publication, "The China Miracle: Development Strategy and Economic Reform". The authors review the historical evolution of the state-owned enterprises, analyze the current problems, and suggest the direction for future reforms.

Based on extensive original research, this book provides a comprehensive overview of the current status of state enterprise reform in China. Chinese State Enterprise Reform considers the relationship between public ownership and public enterprises, and the historical evolution of China's economic reform programme since 1978, including assessments of the Contrast Responsiblity System, which operated from the early 1980s to the early 1990s, and the Group Company Experiments, which began in the 1990s. It discusses the relations between workers, managers, and the state in post-Dengist China, the implications of the reform programme for human resources management in state enterprises, the nature of labour representation, and organization under tate capitalism and the problems of surplus labour and reemployment.

We document that publicly listed Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are less productive and profitable than publicly listed firms in which the state has no ownership stake. In particular, Chinese listed SOEs are more capital intensive and have a lower average product of capital than non-SOEs. These productivity differences increased between 2002 and 2009, and remain sizeable in 2019. Using a heterogeneous firm model of resource misallocation, we find that there are large potential productivity gains from reforms which could equalize the marginal products of listed SOEs and listed non-SOEs.

State-owned enterprises (SOEs) play significant roles in developing economies in Asia and SOE performance remains crucial for economy-wide productivity and growth. This book looks at SOEs in Azerbaijan, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, the People's Republic of China, and Viet Nam, which together present a panoramic view of SOEs in the region. It also presents insights from the Republic of Korea on the evolving role of the public sector in various stages of development. It explores corporate governance challenges and how governments could reform SOEs to make them efficient drivers of the long-term productivity-induced growth essential to Asia's transition to high-income status.

This book focuses on the nature and significance of China’s state enterprises which have undergone substantial changes since China’s economic liberalization in 1978. It argues that much of the criticism is based on mistaken premises, where even the term ‘state-owned enterprises’ is a misnomer given that the emphasis is much less on ownership than on control. Using numerous case studies, this book highlights the extent to which these enterprises have evolved in response to reforms, and provides an in-depth analysis of their role in China’s outward investment strategy in the “Belt and Road” initiative. This role speaks to their growing influence as China expands her global footprint.

The majority of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in China were privatized through ownership reforms over the last two decades. Using a comprehensive dataset of all medium and large enterprises in China between 1998 and 2013, we show that privatized SOEs continue to benefit from government support relative to private enterprises. Compared to private firms that were never state-owned, privatized SOEs are favored by low interest loans and government subsidies. These differences are more salient with the Chinese government's trillion-dollar stimulus package introduced after the 2008 global financial crisis. Moreover, both SOEs and privatized SOEs significantly under-perform in profitability compared to private firms. Nevertheless there are clear improvements in performance post-privatization. The tiger can change its stripes; however, the government's behavior seems to be sticky.