China's military build-up, particularly the expansion of its long-range nuclear forces and its development of 'anti-access/area-denial' (A2/AD) capabilities, poses a serious threat to both the American position in East Asia, and the security of other regional powers. The growth of these forces challenges Washington's ability, and perhaps its willingness, to project power into the region. This could call American security guarantees into question, eventually undermining the United States' place as the dominant Asia-Pacific power. Left unchecked, perceived shifts in the regional military balance away from the US and its allies towards China could also raise the risks of miscalculation and deterrence failure.

An important new history of air and sea power in World War II and its decisive role in Allied victory.

Adolph Gysbert Malan was born in Wellington, South Africa. A natural leader and driven individual with a totally positive outlook, aged fourteen Malan became an officer cadet in the South African Merchant Navy, before being commissioned into the Royal Navy Reserve. Well-travelled and worldly-wise, aged twenty-five the intrepid adventurer applied for a Short Service Commission in the RAF. Universally known as ‘Sailor’ in the RAF, Malan became a fighter pilot. Shortly after war was declared, Malan was involved in the infamous ‘Battle of Barking Creek’, in which 74 Squadron mistakenly destroyed friendly Hurricanes. Then, over Dunkirk in May 1940, Malan’s exceptional ability was immediately demonstrated in combat and a string of confirmed aerial victories rapidly accumulated. The following month, Malan scored the Spitfire’s first nocturnal kill. By August 1940 he was commanding 74 Squadron, which he led with great distinction during the Battle of Britain. In March 1941, Malan was promoted and became the first Wing Commander (Flying) at Biggin Hill, leading the three-squadron-strong Spitfire wing during operations over northern France. After a break from operations, Malan went on to command a succession of fighter training units, passing on his tactical genius and experience, and producing his famous ‘Ten Rules of Air Fighting’ which are still cited today. By the war’s end, Group Captain Malan was the RAF’s tenth top-scoring fighter pilot. Leaving the RAF in 1945 and returning to South Africa, he was disgusted by Apartheid and founded the ‘Torch Commando’ of ex-servicemen against this appalling racist policy. This part of Malan’s life is equally as inspirational, in fact, as his wartime service, and actually tells us more about the man than just his RAF record. Tragically, in 1963, he died, prematurely, aged just fifty-three, of Parkinson’s. Written with the support of the Malan family, this biography is the full story of a remarkable airman and politician.

A future Europe has spiraled into barbarism. The Western Hemisphere stands alone, isolated and sheltered from the destruction - for now. Influenced by the events of World War I, this is the year 2137 as portrayed by Edgar Rice Burroughs' in his science fiction novel The Lost Continent, its subtitle Beyond Thirty being the longitude that Western Hemisphere inhabitants are forbidden to pass.

In Between Threats and War: U.S. Discrete Military Operations in the Post-Cold War World, author Micah Zenko presents a new concept to capture and illuminate the phenomenon: "Discrete Military Operations."

Tells the story of the growing Chinese Navy - The People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) - and its expanding capabilities, evolving roles and military implications for the USA. Divided into four thematic sections, this special collection of essays surveys and analyzes the most important aspects of China's navel modernization.

This is a book about strategy and war fighting. It contains 11 essays which examine topics such as military operations against a well-armed rogue state, the potential of parallel warfare strategy for different kinds of states, the revolutionary potential of information warfare, the lethal possibilities of biological warfare and the elements of an ongoing revolution in military affairs. The purpose of the book is to focus attention on the operational problems, enemy strategies and threat that will confront U.S. national security decision makers in the twenty-first century.

This major revision updates Wayne Hughes's 1986 landmark study that is credited with providing decision makers a sound foundation for battle planning and tactical thinking. The book integrates the historical evolution of tactics, analysis, and fleet operations, and today it can serve as a primer for anyone who wants to learn how navies fight and win. This second edition includes much new material on combat in the missile age and reflects the reconfiguration of many tactics for littoral operations after the fall of the Soviet Union. Hughes recreates famous battles to show how tactics have changed through the ages and the ways in which they have remained unchanged. He covers tactical interaction between land and sea, the sensory revolution of WWII, secret weapons and maritime surprise, the role in battle of leadership and morale, and the importance of surface warships in today's U.S. fleet. He suggests that naval tactics, unlike ground combat, are dominated by the offense and concludes that the great tactical maxim must be attack effectively first. A new chapter traces the evolution of missile tactics at sea and includes details of attacks on ships. Many changes emphasize joint operations and coastal combat. The already extensive appraisal of command and control and information warfare is further expanded to cover modern naval operations and the character of modern salvo warfare. In the tradition of Mahan and Clauswitz, this classic text incorporates literature, politics, and a knowledge of human nature. Indispensable reading for all those interested in naval tactics, it is also a valuable reference for wargamers

"The Air-Sea Battle Concept appears to be the prevailing response to adversarial strategies of anti-access, area-denial (A2/AD). That is, the denial of entry and the denial of maneuver within a particular theater of operation. The June 2012 issue of Armed Forces Journal stated that when adversaries can counter U.S. advantages with their own asymmetric capabilities, our best response lies in better integration and more flexible capabilities. The U.S. needs to explore ways to capitalize on, and improve, existing platforms in order to create effective responses to the pending threats posed by A2/AD. At the time of this writing, no published source on contemporary A2/AD counter-strategy has been found that includes capabilities of military airlift forces (MAF) beyond basic logistical support. If the goal of the Air-Sea Battle Concept is to make a major war less likely, and is not meant to be provocative, then military plans should include less threatening platforms into the overall concept. The MAF has proven it can provide positive results on the A2/AD problem and history lends a grateful hand to those U.S. Presidents, defense chairmen, and Air Force leaders who had the foresight to see its potential. A strong consideration of MAF contributions to this Air-Sea Battle Concept is overdue."--Abstract.